Many of today's central banks in Latin America were established in the interwar period. During the 1920s, most of them were designed under the influence of money doctors. The main mandate of these new institutions was to cope with inflation and provide exchange stability. This article analyses how these central banks responded to the onset of the Great Depression. I show that, in accordance with the requirements of the monetary regime, central banks initially acted to prevent capital outflows and to protect their gold reserves. This led to a credit drop to the private sector. Additional credit was made available once governments decided to intervene more actively in the economy, thereby disregarding the advice of money doctors. The central banks that were founded in the 1930s, and the reforms introduced to those already operating, were conceived to face the effects of the crisis.

This paper proposes a new interpretation for a main issue of modern Spanish monetary history. The Spanish legal monetary system became bimetallist, as result of the Figuerola Decree, in 1868. The bimetallist system in force throughout the XIXth Century allowed the Bank of Spain, as the Bank of France did, pay its notes with silver, gold or both. As a result there was neither an inconvertibility declaration, nor any imaginary gold standard was abandoned in 1883. Law and legal practice always guaranteed convertibility of the peseta, that can't be identified only with gold exchange. In Spain there was never a suspension of tender notes convertibility such as in Italy, Portugal, Austria or France.