What are the basic coordinates of the dispute between Heidegger and Levinas over the phenomenology of “death” and its larger ontological or ethical significance? Or, put in the “perfectionist” terms developed in Chapter 4, in what ways do Heidegger and Levinas disagree about how we human beings become genuinely or fully ourselves? Examining the convergences and divergences of Heidegger’s and Levinas’s phenomenologies of death, this chapter suggests that Heidegger and Levinas both understood themselves as struggling to articulate the requisite ethical response to the great traumas of the twentieth century. By comparing their thinking at this level, I contend, we can better understand the ways in which Levinas genuinely diverges from Heidegger even while building critically on his thinking.

In Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005), I sought to establish and build upon the hermeneutic thesis that Heidegger’s concern to reform education spans his entire career of thought. In my view, a radical rethinking of education – in a word, an ontologization of education, one that situates a transformative death and rebirth of the self at the very heart of the educational vision that founded the philosophical academy in Plato’s Republic – forms one of the deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger’s work, early as well as late. We will come back to this “ontologization” of education at the end, but I want to begin by addressing a worry I did not previously thematize and confront. If my interpretive thesis is correct, then we should expect to find some sign of Heidegger’s supposed lifelong concern with education in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. The fact, then, that little or nothing had been written on Being and Time’s “philosophy of education” before my first book came out could reasonably be taken to cast doubt upon my thesis that a philosophical rethinking of education was of great importance to Heidegger’s work as a whole. Such a worry, of course, does not arise deductively; even if Being and Time contained no philosophy of education, one might be able to explain such an omission in a way that would leave my general thesis intact. Rather than trying to preserve the thesis in the face of such a hermeneutic anomaly, however, I will instead demonstrate that no such anomaly exists. This chapter will seek both to show that Heidegger’s philosophy of education deeply permeates Being and Time and to explain some of the context and significance of this fact, thereby coming to understand yet another interlocking set of philosophical implications arising from Heidegger’s phenomenology of existential death.

To be human is to want to be better– if not a better person, then at least better at something. The first premise of this book is that we cannot strive to become better without some notion of the best; logically speaking, better implies best. The second premise is that the idea of the divine serves as the limit case of what is best in our practical reasoning; it is a conceptual truth about god that nothing better can be conceived. The third premise is that our ideas about the gods are an invaluable window on human nature. I then set out my principles for the interpretation of the Socratic philosophers and the Bible. Finally, I discuss the existing scholarship about “becoming like a god” in Greek philosophy and how I see this book in relation to it.

First, I argue that the aspiration to become like a god is an inescapable part of the human condition and is as common among atheists as among theists. I set aside the whole question of the existence of the gods and treat theology as a guide to anthropology. Ideas of the divine reveal essential truths about human beings. Second, I explore the ambivalence about this aspiration to divinity – an ambivalence found both in philosophy and in biblical religion. Third, I discuss the relation of philosophy to religion by showing that the great philosophers, especially the Socratic philosophers, have attempted to think through the presuppositions of religious thought. Fourth, I argue that common attempts to contrast Athens and Jerusalem as reason and faith are absurd. I show that the true differences between Greek philosophy and biblical religion emerge only against the background of the common project of attempting to become divine in both Athens and Jerusalem.

Research indicates that a segment of the lawyer population is impaired by mental illness, such as anxiety, depression, substance misuse, or suicide risk. A much higher number of lawyers likely fall on the languishing end of the mental health spectrum. If you are languishing, you may be at a higher risk of sliding into impairment. Mental health is assessed on a continuum, ranging from languishing to flourishing. Languishing has been described as feeling uninspired, joyless, and lacking the power to function at full capacity. And languishing may increase your risk of mental illness, such as major depressive episode, generalized anxiety, panic attacks, or substance use disorder. Lawyers may suffer from several obstacles to mental strength, including lack of self-awareness, perfectionism, imposter syndrome, social comparisons, trained pessimism, inability to regulate emotions, and inauthenticity from a failure to understand or leverage their temperament and personality strengths. Features of the lawyering culture may augment these obstacles and lead to lawyer languishing.

Studies have shown that eating disorders (EDs) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) have a high rate of comorbidity. Childhood anxiety disorders have been found to predict the onset of EDs. Researchers propose that OCD and EDs are part of the same spectrum of disorders, with AN being a specific type of OCD similar to body dysmorphic disorder. Malnutrition is a primary factor leading to complications in this presentation as it can compromise medical safety, worsen cognitive functioning, hinder insight and perception of reality, and increase obsessionality. Both groups experience symptoms such as intrusive cognitions, perfectionism, avoidance, and ritualistic behavior, which require specific interventions and complex clinical expertise for positive treatment outcomes. Maladaptive perfectionism is common in both disorders, leading to self-defeating behavior and daily impairment. Avoidance and ritualistic behavior are common in both disorders and are motivated by maladaptive cognitions related to catastrophic outcomes and beliefs about morality, achievement, and identity. These behaviors serve to alleviate anxiety associated with these cognitive domains.

Treating comorbid obsessive-compulsive disorder and eating disorders can be complex as OCD symptoms such as rigidity, perfectionism, and reassurance seeking can disrupt typical ED interventions such as meal planning. Additionally, the content of a patient’s obsessions in OCD can shift to different categories in their life, including ED recovery (e.g., intrusive thoughts that they are going to relapse). To address the challenges of treating comorbid OCD and EDs, it is important to promote flexibility in various aspects of meal planning such as incorporating a variety of foods, being flexible with meal times, meal prepping, and promoting mindfulness and self-compassion. Cognitive techniques such as cognitive restructuring can be used to help patients identify and challenge rigid and perfectionistic thinking. Gradual exposure to flexibility can also be used to help patients learn to tolerate and manage their anxiety. A collaborative approach involving patients in the meal-planning process can also be helpful in reducing rigidity and promoting a more active role in decision-making.

Self-monitoring is a core component of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and is often used in the treatment of eating disorders (EDs) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). It enables individuals to observe their behaviors and thought patterns, identify triggers and areas of strength, and make changes to improve their mental and physical health. For individuals with co-occurring OCD and EDs, self-monitoring can be especially useful in discerning between their thoughts and those influenced by their pathology. However, there is a risk that self-monitoring can become compulsive and part of the OCD. In people with OCD, the process of information gathering can fuel the disorder and lead to prolonged distress, rigidity, and a lack of mindfulness. To address this, a therapist may suggest modifying the self-monitoring protocol or incorporating OCD-specific treatment such as exposure and response prevention (ERP) into the treatment plan. It’s important for individuals to seek professional help and support to address their co-occurring OCD and ED. Clinicians treating EDs should be aware of the signs that OCD may be impacting the self-monitoring process and take steps to address it.

Due to the rates of comorbidity between OCD and EDs, it is common for clinicians to encounter patients with subclinical features of each disorder. This can present in various ways, such as patients having a primary diagnosis of one disorder but with subclinical features of the other, or patients having a subclinical secondary feature of the other disorder. One of the most common co-occurring traits in EDs and OCD is perfectionism, which may present as high achievement, rigidity, overpreparedness, thoroughness, extreme promptness, and checking behaviors related to many domains, but it can also present as avoidant and somewhat scattered. Perfectionism in EDs would typically include content related to diet, eating behaviors, and exercise, whereas in OCD it may be related to morality-based obsessions. Impression management is another trait that is often seen in both disorders, which can cause anxiety and self-doubt. This can make it difficult for patients to be honest with their provider, thus hindering the treatment process. Orthorexia is a subclinical disorder that has traits of both EDs and OCD, highlighting the complication of subclinical features presenting at the same time.

The final chapter examines Cavell’s theory of democratic perfectionism. Traditional perfectionist political philosophy views the purpose of the polity as the promotion of human flourishing. Contemporary liberals rejected perfectionism on two grounds. John Rawls believed perfectionism was antidemocratic because it was elitist. Isaiah Berlin claimed perfectionism was illiberal because it posited a singular end to life at the expense of all others. Against these claims, Cavell’s later work recovered an inherently egalitarian variety of perfectionism from the American Transcendentalist tradition. While agreeing with Cavell’s defense of perfectionism against liberal critiques, the chapter raises two limits to perfectionism. The first is that it runs the risk of turning into “debased perfectionism,” where striving for an unattained yet attainable self can lead to status anxiety. Second, Cavell pays insufficient attention to the economic conditions necessary for one to lead a perfectionist life. The chapter concludes by reading Thoreau’s writings on economics against Cavell’s reading of Thoreau. It argues that a greater attention to the economic dimension in perfectionism would address some of the concerns that liberal critics raise about perfectionism elitism.

This chapter assesses priority arguments against intervention in nature. First, on the Exclusion Approach, intervention is not a priority because equality and priority reasons simply do not apply to wild animals. Second, on the Deflation Approach, since nonhuman animals have a lower capacity for well-being, increasing wild animal well-being produces less value than increasing human well-being. Third, on the Perfectionist Approach, increases in nonhuman well-being cannot compensate for the loss of “the best things in life,” only attainable by human activity. We should, thus, give priority to increases in human well-being that ensure the existence of excellent goods. It is argued that all approaches have highly unacceptable results, particularly on the negative scale of well-being. Finally, the chapter considers the Domesticated Animals First objection, according to which priority should be given to alleviating the harms suffered by domesticated animals. It is argued that taken either as a substantive or as a strategic objection, it cannot soundly succeed.

While Wittgenstein has become recognized as the most overt philosophical influence in Wallace’s writing, he was by no means the only one. Wallace was heavily indebted to numerous philosophical schools, and was particularly influenced by the linguistic turn, and the post-philosophical ideas of Rorty and Cavell. Wallace attended classes with Stanley Cavell at Harvard University, and his influence on Wallace has been traced in recent scholarship by Adam Kelly and others. This chapter offers guidance on reading Wallace through the lens of what Cavell referred to as “moral perfectionism” – the drive toward constant moral improvement, an endless iterative repetition of self-discovery, “a process of moving to, and from, nexts” – which Wallace explored and embodied in different ways throughout the work. The recurrent theme of heroic attention as a virtuous struggle arguably owes a debt to Cavell’s concept of acknowledging the other as a moral good, and the anti-teleological drive of Wallace’s oeuvre fits neatly with Cavell’s imaginary of unending toil toward the good. Using the Pop Quiz structure of “Octet” as a point of departure and focusing more broadly on the dialogic imperative of Brief Interviews with Hideous Men as a whole, this chapter argues that Wallace’s work, with its sense of repeating shapes, themes and patterns, and especially the persistent figurations of failure and regrouping, is best read as a series of iterations of perfectionism, a career-long fantasy of searching for the good in the knowledge that it will not be attained.

Chapter 25 discusses some of the difficulties children and young people may experience with obsessive thinking and perfectionism and considers how to offer support for these difficulties. We also discuss how a diagnosis of obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is made in children and young people and helpful treatment approaches for this condition.

Becoming a parent is a process that begins psychologically at the start of the journey to pregnancy and continues beyond birth. This chapter covers what to expect emotionally as you adjust to life after birth. We provide practical tips on finding your own way as a parent and tips on how to manage worries about being an ‘anxious parent’. There is a practical guide to navigating anxiety about bonding with your baby and tips to increase feelings of closeness as this relationship develops.

Being pregnant and having a new baby attracts lots of attention and usually involves meeting a range of new people from professionals to other parents. This can be difficult if you experience social anxiety; the postnatal period can be a particularly challenging time as fears of being judged for how you are going about things are very common. Furthermore, it is easy to fall into self-criticism and self-judgements that we are not doing things well enough and that other parents are doing things better than we are. This chapter will help you understand the particular processes that keep social anxiety going and will help you develop alternative strategies that you can use to change your experience of social situations. The chapter will also help you understand the difference between high standards and unhelpful perfectionism, and what you can do to live more comfortably in your own skin as a parent and support yourself through this challenging time to become the parent you want to be.

Chapter 2 sets the stage for the analysis of my three cases, by delineating an account of utopianism that manages to withstand the objections raised by anti-utopian critics, both from the Left and the Right. I hold that these detractors miss their target insofar as they fail to acknowledge the actual complexity of utopianism. While utopias can, under specific circumstances, turn out to be impractical or dangerous, it is wrong to assume that this is necessarily and always the case. Drawing on groundbreaking work in utopian studies, I thus claim that anti-perfectionist utopias set into motion forms of social dreaming that productively educate our desire for things to be otherwise. The chapter then continues by investigating what can be considered utopianism’s paramount function: the production of estrangement. In a further step, I scrutinize the other two purposes that utopian visions of the Anthropocene cater to, namely galvanizing (eutopias) and cautioning (dystopias) an audience. Chapter 2 ends with an intermezzo elaborating on utopian practices – social experiments that perform collective life “against the grain.”