We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
After Australian military forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1972, it seemed that Australian forces would never again serve overseas on warlike operations unless the nation was under direct threat. Yet just nineteen years later the Australian Government committed forces across the globe to the Gulf War. Why did the Australian Government decide to make this commitment, and what impact did it have on future Australian military operations? The issue of strategy and command continued to be paramount.
It was inevitable that the commanders of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) would be learning on the job. This was not just because the nature of the war could not have been anticipated and proved an overwhelming challenge for the commanders of all the armies involved; it was also because at the outbreak of the First World War the Australian Army was still in its infancy and relied heavily on the British Army for its ideas and direction. As Australia was a member of the British Empire, the AIF operated as part of the British Army. Further, the Australian forces were deployed by the British high command without consulting the Australian Government, and the commander of the AIF did not believe that it was his role to become involved in higher level questions of strategy. Even at the lower operational levels, senior Australian commanders were not willing, at first, to challenge the orders issued by their British superiors. Much of this would change during the war.
Road transport in mountainous Kashmir was long and hazardous, and landslides and accidents could prevent movement between locations. The inefficiencies of this transport method, combined with the difficult terrain and the distances to be travelled, meant that an air transport element was necessary for the successful operation of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (Unmogip). The UN military observers on both sides of Kashmir’s Line of Control were reliant on this UN air element for logistic purposes. Field observers and their supplies were delivered to airstrips near their field stations; personnel and their dependants were transported throughout the theatre and to places like Delhi or Lahore for leave; headquarters officers were flown around to attend meetings with officials in New Delhi, Srinagar and Rawalpindi; and, if required, the air element would perform emergency medical evacuations of mission personnel. The Royal Canadian Air Force had provided this service, by way of a DHC-4 Caribou and crew of eight, for Unmogip since 1964 (a Twin Otter replaced the Caribou in July 1971).
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.