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3 results

  • Chapter 2 - Practical Reasoning, Ends, and the End of Hope

  • from Part I - Beings of Thought in Action
  • Andy Mueller, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Am Main
  • Book:
    Beings of Thought and Action
    Published online:
    25 June 2021
    Print publication:
    08 July 2021, pp 31-54

  • Summary

    Epistemic norms for practical reasoning usually concern the question which epistemic condition must be met for it to be rationally permissible to treat p as a reason for action. I call this the classical question. In this chapter, I broaden the debate about epistemic norms, going beyond the classical question by focusing on ends. In section 2.1, I argue that we can approach the question of which ends one can rationally pursue by answering the question what one may hope for. In section 2.2, I argue that the standard condition on rational hope is too weak to properly constrain what one can rationally hope for. In section 2.3, I give my own account of what one may epistemically hope for, to which knowledge is central. In section 2.4, I point out that this suggests a novel angle on the knowledge-first program. In section 2.5, I relate my account of hope back to pursuing ends. Finally, in section 2.6, I argue that the wide variety of ends one can rationally pursue shows that many of the suggested epistemic norms that concern the classical question are overly demanding.

  • Chapter 11 - What does his Religion contribute to Kant’s conception of practical reason?

  • Edited by Gordon Michalson
  • Book:
    Kant’s <I>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</I>
    Published online:
    05 May 2014
    Print publication:
    17 April 2014, pp 214-232

  • Summary

    One of the arguments for which Immanuel Kant is best known is the moral proof of the existence of God, freedom, and the immortal soul. It is surprising that Kant gives hope, rather than belief, pride of place in the list of questions that motivate his entire critical philosophy. Commentators typically neglect the distinct nature and role of hope in Kant's system, and lump it together with the sort of belief that arises from the moral proof. A crucial difference between knowledge, rational belief, and rational hope is that they are governed by different modal constraints; the author discusses those constraints and the kind of modality involved. He offers what he takes to be Kant's account of the main objects of rational hope in that text, namely, alleged outer experiences (miracles); a supposed inner experience (effect of grace); and a future collective experience (the construction of a truly ethical society).

  • Chapter 9 - Pluralism in the ethical community

  • Edited by Gordon Michalson
  • Book:
    Kant’s <I>Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason</I>
    Published online:
    05 May 2014
    Print publication:
    17 April 2014, pp 175-192

  • Summary

    One of Immanuel Kant's most deeply held convictions was that human beings are by nature capable of being free, able to determine what they ought to be as human beings: responsible persons among persons. Kant develops the dilemma in his account of radical evil. For every moment of her life, a person ascertains that she wills evil without being able to explain this through appeal to a free decision in the past between the will for good or for evil. For each human being possesses three original predispositions that belong to the very possibility of such a being, namely the predispositions to animality, humanity, and personality. Kant's discussion of evil arises from his conception of freedom. The reality of freedom justifies the author's rational hope in the existence of God who makes it possible for persons to overcome their being evil by nature and orient themselves toward the good.