Modern states rely on the quality of their civil service. In the case of Tanzania, this chapter points to four key weaknesses: capacity, motivation and conduct, political interference, and resources and tools. Capacity and resources clearly depend on the level of economic development. From an institutional point of view, motivation and political interference play the most important role as they ultimately define the rules according to which the civil service, the political apparatus, and the private sector interact. The chapter maintains that the main factor behind these two weaknesses is the relationship betwwen civil servants and politicians, and recommends unplugging the civil service from political patronage through a transparent system of performance evaluation and promotion to senior positions, as well as a strengthening of the role and power of the Civil Service Commission. It also recognises that such a reform is unlikely to succeed unless supported by top politicians. While concurring with the need for this kind of reform, Jan Willem Gunning stresses in his comments the necessity to consider the political economy and the way in which compensation can be sought for losers.

Chapter 4 analyzes how mineral resources shape the state–capital relations in resource-rich regions. It argues that the symbiotic relationship between local state and resource capital can easily become collusive under the resource boom. Through studies of resource-related corruption cases, it demonstrates how the state’s regulation and interference in the resource sector create structural opportunities for rent seeking and collusion between the regulators and regulatees and how the resource windfalls turn local government departments into hotbeds for corruption. Through panel data analysis on the corruption rates of Chinese provinces, it testifies that resource-rich regions are indeed more corrupt than other regions. This chapter suggests that mineral resources amplify the existing loopholes in the Chinese political economic system and highlights the danger of local state capture by resource capital.

Law and Economics views the operation of private and public law as complementary, best seen as two aspects of a joint mechanism to guide actors in their environmental behaviours. This is a mechanism design technique from game theory, often referred to in popular press as ‘smart mixes'. Liability rules have their limits. Perhaps most noteworthy is that you have no case until you are already injured, thus civil liability rules are not optimal. Public regulations can monitor behaviour prior to an accident. Public regulation has a more diverse set of governance tools, including criminal law and incarceration. Public regulation is not free from its own problems. Agency capture and deflection of regulatory drafting are major concerns. Private regulatory mechanisms are programmess wherein public authorities design mechanisms that engage several private parties, all related to the environmentally risky activity, to create new interactions that both reveal more data and alter private behaviour to align with public regulatory goals. The story of environmental Law and Economics is not a tale in defence of private law rights against public law regulation, but rather a harmonious tale of two systems that can be integrated to function as a more effective and efficient whole.