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Well, if things could talk then I’m sure you’d hear A lot of things to make you cry, my dear. Ain’t you glad, Oh, ain’t you glad, Ain’t you glad, Glad that things don’t talk?
Most democracies are representative. Elected by the people, representatives constitute a legislature and create laws. This is typically done through voting. This raises an interesting question of institutional design: should our representatives vote transparently or by secret ballot? No contemporary philosopher, to my knowledge, has addressed this question. In this chapter I argue that if we take seriously the value of political equality—a normative ideal that nearly all democratic theorists embrace—then voting among representatives in a legislature ought to occur by secret ballot. Representatives should vote just as citizens do in elections. Democratic equality, I argue, thrives in darkness.
This introductory chapter offers an overview of Secret Government: The Pathologies of Publicity. The book is split into two separate and autonomous parts, roughly tracking what I take to be two distinct traditions in political philosophy. Part I is focused on transparency as it relates to questions of institutional design. Part II focuses on publicity as it relates to the political philosophy of John Rawls and the liberal tradition he inspired. In conjunction, parts I and II jointly offer something like a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government.
Among politicians and policy-makers it is almost universally assumed that more transparency in government is better. Until now, philosophers have almost completely ignored the topic of transparency, and when it is discussed there seems to be an assumption (shared with politicians and policy-makers) that increased transparency is a good thing, which results in no serious attempt to justify it. In this book Brian Kogelmann shows that the standard narrative is false and that many arguments in defence of transparency are weak. He offers a comprehensive philosophical analysis of transparency in government, examining both abstract normative defences of transparency, and transparency's role in the theory of institutional design. His book shows that even when the arguments in favour of transparency are compelling, the costs associated with it are just as forceful as the original arguments themselves, and that strong arguments can be made in defence of more opaque institutions.
This chapter documents how the Roman elite attempted to speak to ‘popular’ concerns: Will there be enough to eat? Can we keep the favor of the gods? How will our rights to land and our own bodies be protected? What can preserve the anonymity of our votes? It starts with coins celebrating concord in the aftermath of the Catilinarian conspiracy.It then looks at the representation of religious festivals and the city's grain supply on the coinage.The next section examines numismatic evidence related to Roman agrarian policies and colonization, with particular attention to Paestum.The last section considers how the coinage reflects constitutional issues, especially the secret ballot and political rhetoric in reaction to the Sullan Constitution.
Most contemporary research on clientelism focuses on “electoral clientelism” – a phenomenon that exclusively delivers benefits during election campaigns. Chapter 2 demonstrates that electoral clientelism is undermined by substantial institutional and legal challenges. First, it presents a typology of distinct strategies of electoral clientelism and introduces a theoretical framework explaining how politicians employ strategies. The chapter shows why two key factors – rigorous ballot secrecy and stringent compulsory voting – pose significant challenges for vote buying, turnout buying, and abstention buying during Brazilian campaigns. Given these challenges, many politicians use campaign handouts to import outsiders into their municipalities, but this expensive tactic is also hindered by extensive voter audits. The chapter then turns to yet another major challenge facing electoral clientelism in Brazil, the enactment of a new law against campaign handouts that has ousted over a thousand politicians from office. Amidst such challenges, electoral clientelism has declined in Brazil, though some politicians still employ its risky and unreliable strategies as a secondary measure.
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