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Statistical discrimination offers a compelling narrative on gender wage gaps among younger workers. Employers could reduce women's wages to adjust for expected costs linked to child-bearing. If this is the case, then trends toward delayed fertility should reduce the gender wage gap among young workers. We provide a novel collection of adjusted gender wage gap (AGWG) estimates among young workers from 56 countries spanning four decades and use it to test the conjecture that delayed fertility reduces gender wage inequality. We employ instrumental variables, and find that one year postponement of the first birth reduces AGWG by two percentage points (15% of the AGWG). We benchmark this estimate with the help of time-use data.
This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.
The philosopher Wilfried Hinsch focuses on statistical discrimination by means of computational profiling. He defines statistical profiling as an estimate of what individuals will do by considering the group of people they can be assigned to. The author explores which criteria of fairness and justice are appropriate for the assessment of computational profiling. According to Hinsch, grounds of discrimination such as gender or ethnicity do not explain when or why it is wrong to discriminate. Thus, Hinsch argues that discrimination constitutes a rule-guided social practice that imposes unreasonable burdens on specific people. He argues that, on the one hand, statistical profiling is a part of human nature and not by itself wrongful discrimination. However, on the other hand, even statistically correct profiles can be unacceptable considering reasons of procedural fairness or substantive justice. Because of this, Hinsch suggests a fairness index for profiles to determine procedural fairness; and argues that because AI systems do not rely on human stereotypes or rather limited data, computational profiling may be a better safeguard of fairness than humans.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly popular in the public sector to improve the cost-efficiency of service delivery. One example is AI-based profiling models in public employment services (PES), which predict a jobseeker’s probability of finding work and are used to segment jobseekers in groups. Profiling models hold the potential to improve identification of jobseekers at-risk of becoming long-term unemployed, but also induce discrimination. Using a recently developed AI-based profiling model of the Flemish PES, we assess to what extent AI-based profiling ‘discriminates’ against jobseekers of foreign origin compared to traditional rule-based profiling approaches. At a maximum level of accuracy, jobseekers of foreign origin who ultimately find a job are 2.6 times more likely to be misclassified as ‘high-risk’ jobseekers. We argue that it is critical that policymakers and caseworkers understand the inherent trade-offs of profiling models, and consider the limitations when integrating these models in daily operations. We develop a graphical tool to visualize the accuracy-equity trade-off in order to facilitate policy discussions.
Buchanan’s and Nutter’s 1959 “Economics of Universal Education” has generated intense controversy. Their analysis of education financed through a voucher system is read as offering Virginia racists a method to resist the integration mandated by the Supreme Court. Their comparison of a public school system to majority rule and a voucher system to proportional representation provides some context to the controversy. The Knightian background explains why, in the 1965 republication of their essay, they deemed segregated schools to be ineligible for state support. Buchanan returned to the context of the inequality of racial outcomes in which he adopted a Rawlsian notion of the “fair chance” to which all individuals are entitled. He formulated a social contract in which the randomness of market outcomes is accepted in exchange for being judged on competence. Buchanan argued for a government policy of quotas in hiring so that individuals might prove their competence. In line with this reasoning, Buchanan also renounced his previous support of a voucher system for education.
This article examines one kind of conscientious refusal: the refusal of healthcare professionals to treat sexual dysfunction in individuals with a history of sexual offending. According to what I call the orthodoxy, such refusal is invariably impermissible, whereas at least one other kind of conscientious refusal—refusal to offer abortion services—is not. I seek to put pressure on the orthodoxy by (1) motivating the view that either both kinds of conscientious refusal are permissible or neither is, and (2) critiquing two attempts to buttress it.
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