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2 results

  • Chapter 5 - Is Virtue Sufficient for Happiness?

  • Nicholas D. Smith, Lewis and Clark College, Portland
  • Book:
    Socrates on Self-Improvement
    Published online:
    11 June 2021
    Print publication:
    01 July 2021, pp 107-128

  • Summary

    Scholars have debated the various texts in which Socrates seems to indicate an extremely close – perhaps even logical or analytic – connection between virtue and happiness. Is virtue simply identical to happiness? Is virtue all that is needed – is it sufficient – for happiness? Some texts seem to indicate such a logical connection, but attributing the sufficiency thesis to Socrates also commits him to the view that even the worst disasters cannot make a good person unhappy or spoil a virtuous agent’s life. Other texts, however, seem to show that Socrates clearly did recognize our vulnerability to conditions that are beyond human control. Provides an interpretation of the Socratic view on this issue that denies the sufficiency thesis while maintaining a strong nomological connection between virtue and happiness. Greater virtue will always improve a human life, even if such improvement falls short of achieving positive happiness. Success comes in degrees, even in the most important pursuits.

  • Chapter 9 - What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief?

  • from Part II - Criticism
  • Edited by Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, Tim Black, California State University, Northridge
  • Book:
    The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology
    Published online:
    05 September 2012
    Print publication:
    02 August 2012, pp 152-170

  • Summary

    The sensitivity condition on knowledge emerges out of a simple but highly attractive idea: whether S's belief that p amounts to knowledge depends on whether S would have so believed had it been false that p. This chapter describes a belief that makes true the sensitivity conditional in SEN, the conditional that if p were false, then S would not believe that p via M, as classically sensitive, or c-sensitive for short. It is helpful to start the discussion by assuming that the sensitivity condition on knowledge requires classic-sensitivity, that is, by assuming that c-sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowledge. The chapter assumes a sensitivity account that consists in a conjunction of three claims: SEN, the Sufficiency Thesis, and the claim that M (TGEN) is the proper way to individuate the belief-forming method involved in testimony cases. Such an account entails what it calls the testimony/classicalsensitivity biconditional, or TCS-biconditional.