Consider a company whose business carries the potential for investment losses and is additionally vulnerable to exogenous shocks. The unpredictability of the shocks makes it challenging for both the company and the regulator to accurately assess their impact, potentially leading to an underestimation of solvency capital when employing traditional approaches. In this paper, we utilize a stylized model to conduct an extreme value analysis of the tail risk of the company under a Fréchet-type and a Gumbel-type shock. Our main results explicitly demonstrate the different roles of investment risk and shock risk in driving large losses. Furthermore, we derive asymptotic estimates for the value at risk and expected shortfall of the total loss. Numerical studies are conducted to examine the accuracy of the obtained estimates.

Hedging against tail events in equity markets has been forcefully advocated in the aftermath of recent global financial crisis. Whether this is beneficial to long horizon investors like employees enrolled in defined contribution (DC) plans, however, has been subject to criticism. We conduct historical simulation since 1928 to examine the effectiveness of active and passive tail risk hedging using out of money put options for hypothetical equity portfolios of DC plan participants with 20 years to retirement. Our findings show that the cost of tail hedging exceeds the benefits for a majority of the plan participants during the sample period. However, for a significant number of simulations, hedging result in superior outcomes relative to an unhedged position. Active tail hedging is more effective when employees confront several panic-driven periods characterized by short and sharp market swings in the equity markets over the investment horizon. Passive hedging, on the other hand, proves beneficial when they encounter an extremely rare event like the Great Depression as equity markets go into deep and prolonged decline.

The UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF) was established in April 2005 to protect the pensions of members of UK private sector defined benefit pension schemes which have insufficient assets and whose corporate sponsor fails. The Fund takes over the pension scheme assets and assumes responsibility for the payment of compensation to the former members of the scheme. The PPF is funded by a levy on the population of eligible schemes. This paper discusses the application of Enterprise Risk Management principles and techniques to the unique situation of the PPF. The elements of the financial management of the Fund have been developed by reference to practice within proprietary insurance institutions and within pension funds. The paper will be of interest and, we hope, of some value to students, researchers and analysts and also to the PPF's own stakeholder groups that have a stake in an effective pension protection regime.