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This chapter begins the last section, a section that explores how the police power can be used to address modern social problems. We look at a number of these wicked problems, including housing, transportation, environmental degradation, and other predicaments, and connect our conception of the police power as described earlier in this book to the use of this power proactively to confront these especially difficult problems.
This paper examines the question of reparation for non-recent institutional child sexual abuse in England and Wales and Australia in the light of independent inquiries which reported in 2022 (England and Wales) and 2017 (Australia). Both inquiries recommended the introduction of state-based redress schemes that would exist alongside private law. While the new UK government considers how to proceed, Australia has established a national redress scheme, there have been changes to private law and new legislation reforming tort law and removing procedural obstacles such as limitation. In evaluating the Australian reforms and the case for change in English law, this paper examines the different roles state-based redress and private law compensation play in responding to the harm suffered by victims and survivors of sexual abuse. It argues that there are urgent lessons that the UK government should learn from the Australian experience in establishing a redress scheme and that while legislative change to substantive private law has proven less than successfull in Australia, legislation on limitation periods and suing unincorporated associations has assisted plaintiffs. Finally there are lessons that private law can learn from state-based redress schemes in seeking to provide remedies that meet the distinctive needs of victims and survivors of child sexual abuse.
This article proposes a hybrid legal framework combining jus ad bellum and jus in bello to govern the attribution of State responsibility for reparations at the end of a war of aggression. To this end, the article considers former international mass claims processes and proposes a complementary approach that, on the one hand, acknowledges the role of the aggressor State in waging the war, and on the other, takes a cautionary approach to prevent a disproportionate burden of compensation being imposed on the aggressor State as a form of collective punishment. The consequences of respective violations of the prohibition of the use of force and the law of war are blurred in a war of aggression, resulting in complexities around liability for aggressor States. In response, this article concludes with a nuanced proposal to calculate compensation based on (1) the aggressor party's capacity to comply with jus in bello; (2) the extent of damage caused by the war of aggression, factoring in jus ad bellum considerations if a party is found to be intentionally maximizing destruction; and (3) the incorporation of tort law principles for equitable attribution of responsibility.
Dean John Wade, who replaced the great torts scholar William Prosser on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, put the finishing touches on the defamation sections in 1977.1 Apple Computer had been founded a year before, and Microsoft two, but relatively few people owned computers yet. The twenty-four-hour news cycle was not yet a thing, and most Americans still trusted the press.2
The laws of defamation and privacy are at once similar and dissimilar. Falsity is the hallmark of defamation – the sharing of untrue information that tends to harm the subject’s standing in their community. Truth is the hallmark of privacy – the disclosure of facts about an individual who would prefer those facts to be private. Publication of true information cannot be defamatory; spreading of false information cannot violate an individual’s privacy. Scholars of either field could surely add epicycles to that characterization – but it does useful work as a starting point of comparison.
Coordinated campaigns of falsehoods are poisoning public discourse.1 Amidst a torrent of social-media conspiracy theories and lies – on topics as central to the nation’s wellbeing as elections and public health – scholars and jurists are turning their attention to the causes of this disinformation crisis and the potential solutions to it.
It’s accually obsene what you can find out about a person on the internet.1
To some, this typo-ridden remark might sound banal. We know that our data drifts around online, with digital flotsam and jetsam washing up sporadically on different websites across the internet. Surveillance has been so normalized that, these days, many people aren’t distressed when their information appears in a Google search, even if they sometimes fret about their privacy in other settings.
In an era when the public and shareholders increasingly demand greater accountability from institutions for racial injustice and slavery, scholarship on corporate reparations is more and more essential. This article argues that corporations have played a significant role in the cultural dehumanization of Blackness and therefore have a particular responsibility to make repair. Cultural dehumanization refers to embedding anti-Blackness into US culture in service of capitalist profit accumulation, which has resulted in status and material inequalities between Blacks and whites that have persisted from slavery to the present. More specifically, the article argues corporations have a moral duty to offer reparations to Black Americans regardless of any redress offered by other perpetrators of anti-Blackness. It appeals to tort law in providing a moral justification for corporate reparations to Black Americans.
In this chapter we discuss two doctrines that are interrelated in that they impose liability either because of the relationship between the defendant and the tortfeasor (D2–D1) (vicarious liability), or the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff (D2–P) (non-delegable duty of care).
We will start by examining vicarious liability, which is a form of strict liability. We will learn that the employer–employee relationship is the most common instance of vicarious liability. At common law, the employee who commits the tort is always liable, and so vicarious liability of the employer is in addition to the direct liability of the employee (tortfeasor). We will distinguish the employer–employee relationship from the relationship of principal–independent contractor, as the employer is not vicariously liable for the acts of independent contractors. Then, we will establish when the employee acts in the course of employment. We will also note the employer’s right of indemnity from an employee.
As we have already seen, there are three basic elements to a successful action in negligence:
(1) a duty to take reasonable care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
(2) a breach of that duty of care by the defendant
(3) damage resulting to the plaintiff from that breach.
This chapter deals with the third element. This stage involves taking (yet again) three steps:
(1) Identify the damage having an adverse effect on the plaintiff to be recognised by law as damage for which compensation can be sought.
(2) Link the defendant’s conduct (act or omission) to the damage suffered by the plaintiff.
(3) Establish the scope of the defendant’s liability or, putting it differently, establish the extent to which the defendant should be found liable for the harm suffered by the plaintiff OR the type of harm suffered was within the scope of foreseeability.
Having discussed how the law of torts protects a person’s physical integrity and freedom of movement in the previous chapter, we will now consider how the law protects a person’s interests in property against certain types of interference, including trespass to land and trespass to personal property
In this chapter, we will explore the definitions and features of these trespass actions.
This chapter deals with defences to the trespass actions discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. As a general rule, the defendant bears the burden of proving the facts necessary to constitute a defence. Where the defence is established, the defendant will be relieved of liability.
It should be noted that some statutory defences, which are similar to common law defences, are provided by the civil liability legislation and/or Criminal Code in most of the Australian states and territories. Therefore, when considering such defences, the relevant legislation in a particular jurisdiction must be consulted. This chapter will discuss some of the most important defences available for trespass to the person, trespass to land and trespass to personal property.
The defences fall within three roughly divided categories:
(1) Self-help based defences
(2) Justification-based defences
(3) Fault-based defences
We also consider a number of factors that are not defences to trespass at the end of this chapter.
The common law principles of duty of care and negligence potentially apply to all actors, public and private, and earlier chapters have discussed their application to government actors. This chapter analyses two distinct forms of tortious action which are connected to the performance or non-performance of statutory duties and powers. The first, the action for breach of a statutory duty of care, exists where Parliament intends a legislative duty to be enforced by a private cause of action. This action in essence facilitates the enforcement of specific types of legislative duties which are aimed at the protection of certain interests. The second cause of the action, misfeasance in public office, exists as an action to prevent the bad faith use of statutory power by public officers performing public functions.
In a tort action, if the plaintiff’s claims are successful and no relevant defences are available to the defendant, the plaintiff will be entitled to an order or award by the court for an appropriate remedy. Such judicial remedies include:
damages
injunctions
declarations.
If the plaintiff seeks one of these remedies, the plaintiff must plead the details of the loss sustained (or that will be sustained), produce evidence to support them, and prove them on the balance of probabilities. Generally, the plaintiff bears the onus of proving such matters.
In addition, self-help remedies are available and include:
eviction of trespassers and re-entry of land
self-defence
abatement
apology.
The focus of this chapter will be on judicial remedies, especially damages.
Tort law is a compelling and dynamic area of law, affecting many aspects of individuals’ lives. A strong understanding of tort principles is important for legal practice, as lawyers may be required to represent clients in a range of tort disputes, from a physical altercation in a bar, to a fall in a supermarket or possibly the lowering of a client’s reputation through defamatory material posted on the internet. At its core, a tort is a civil wrong. Deriving from the Latin word tortum (‘wrong’), a tort is an act or omission that infringes upon the rights of individuals in society, allowing the aggrieved individual to seek a legal remedy.
Nuisance is one of the oldest and most interesting in the law of torts. It developed early in the common law to protect a person’s interest in land. The emergence and rise of the modern tort of negligence has posed a challenge to the precise scope and relevance of the tort of nuisance. An action in nuisance covers conduct of the defendant that is excessive, substantial, and unreasonable, which interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his or her land. Nuisance covers both physical and non-physical damage.
There are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance.
Since liability in nuisance is strict, the defendant must establish his or her defence, once a prima facie case has been established. A defendant is only liable for a harm that is foreseeable; thus, foreseeability is essential to establish the tort of nuisance. The tort of nuisance protects the pleasure, comfort and enjoyment derived by a plaintiff in the occupancy and use of both public and private rights in land. This chapter considers the elements of each tort.
The tort of defamation protects the reputation of individuals in society. A cause of action arises where one individual publishes a false matter about another that lowers the reputation of the latter in the eyes of ordinary and reasonable members of the society. While many of the torts covered in this book seek to protect the bodily integrity of individuals, the tort of defamation seeks to protect their reputation. Defamation laws are concerned with balancing freedom of speech with the protection of individuals’ reputation, character and standing in the community. The increased use of social media has a significant role to play in defamation, with the speed and ease of publication on the internet creating new sites for defamation action. Additionally, the emergence of novel technologies and methods of sharing defamatory posts online – such as hashtags, emojis and memes – have raised novel questions about application of traditional defamation principles to the modern technological landscape. This makes defamation a highly relevant tort in contemporary society.
Once a plaintiff has established that a duty of care is owed and has been breached and that the breach has resulted in damage the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant. In an action for negligence, the plaintiff’s claims can be defeated if the defendant can prove a relevant defence. The key defences to an action in negligence are the following:
The plaintiff’s failure to take reasonable care of their own safety, or ‘contributory negligence’
The plaintiff’s previous acceptance of the risk – their voluntary assumption of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct
The plaintiff’s intoxication or willing undertaking of dangerous recreational or unlawful activities may operate as a defence in some jurisdictions. In others, it may be relevant to establishing that a breach has occurred
Statutory defences, including the plaintiff’s delay in initiating proceedings
A defendant who wishes to rely on one of these defences must: (1) plead these matters by filing a defence that raises the matters; and (2) produce evidence to prove them on the balance of probabilities. The defendant bears the onus of proving the defence.
To establish that a defendant is liable in negligence, the plaintiff must establish that a duty of care is owed, that the duty has been breached, and that the breach has caused damage within the scope of liability. The concept of duty of care can be the most challenging to establish because it is difficult to define it in a meaningful way. At present, where a set of facts requires us to consider whether a duty of care is owed, the following general approach is used:
(1) Determine whether there is a relevant precedent establishing that a duty of care is owed to a person in the plaintiff’s position by a person in the defendant’s position for this type of harm.
(2) If there is no established precedent (in other words it is a ‘novel’ case), balance the ‘salient’ features of the relationship (the multi-factorial approach).
This chapter will consider the general principles of duty of care, some of the established categories of relationships of duty, as well as duty of care in novel cases.