Chapter 3 - The Idea of Rationality in Raymond Boudon’s Theory: A Discussion

Summary

It can be said that the development of a theory of rationality is at the core of Raymond Boudon's general conceptualization of social life based on individual human behaviors. His attempt at reframing the commonly accepted so-called rational choice theory (RCT) is very important and has indeed a very ambitious scope: interpreting most of the human and social behaviors on the basis of rational attitudes. His aim is thus to restore a more comprehensive sense of rationality than the one that currently prevails in the framework of the RCT, in order specially to include the normative dimension of preferences and values. In his perspective, this implies going beyond a restriction of the idea of rationality to its “instrumental” dimension, that is the means/end relationship, and including in its jurisdiction the “ends” themselves that are predominantly left outside the domain of rationality by the conventional economic approach.

In this respect, it is clear that Boudon follows Weber in two directions: first, he is interested in interpreting peoples’ behaviors in terms of motives, those motives being equated to “reasons,” the latter concept implying then for him a direct link with the idea of rationality; second, this idea of “reasons,” further associated with “good reasons” implies a sense of “relevance,” or of correctness, that can be found in people's behaviors, and that includes, through “axiological” rationality, the normative preferences involving a sense of duty. I will argue in this chapter that, although Boudon considers himself as a follower of Weber in this emphasis on the so-called axiological rationality, he develops nevertheless a theory that goes beyond, in a significant way, Weber's classical position, in particular, regarding the issue of the relativity of values. When he extends the scope of correctness to the domain of values, his move can be seen as partly opposed to Weber's commonly understood legacy.

More generally, his insistence on the rationality of choices implies that people are responsible for their choices and the values they endorse, and therefore cannot be said to be only radically “socialized.”