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1 - Introduction

from Part I - Foundations and Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2025

By
Kevin Tobia
Edited by
Kevin Tobia
Kevin Tobia
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

This chapter briefly introduces experimental jurisprudence and the contents of the handbook.

Keywords

experimental jurisprudenceexperimental philosophylegal theoryphilosophy of lawphilosophical methodology
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence , pp. 3 - 9
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

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  • Introduction
  • Edited by Kevin Tobia, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence
  • Online publication: 17 May 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170901.002
Available formats
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Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Introduction
  • Edited by Kevin Tobia, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence
  • Online publication: 17 May 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170901.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Introduction
  • Edited by Kevin Tobia, Georgetown University, Washington DC
  • Book: The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence
  • Online publication: 17 May 2025
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009170901.002
Available formats
×