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33 - Legal Interpretation as Coordination

from Part III - Applications

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 May 2025

By
Piotr Bystranowski ,
Ivar Hannikainen  and
Kevin Tobia
Edited by
Kevin Tobia
Kevin Tobia
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
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Summary

Should judges and other legal decision-makers follow the literal meaning of applicable legal rules even if there are compelling reasons to do otherwise? The question of the primacy of plain meaning in legal interpretation is one of the oldest and most persistent problems in the philosophy of law. In this chapter, we argue that new arguments are available in this debate, emerging from recent developments in experimental jurisprudence. We posit that legal interpretation is, to some extent, an exercise in coordination: Judges seek to interpret rules in a way that would match interpretations of their peers, of other legal officials, and of society at large. In such a strategic context, the plain meaning of law often constitutes a focal point around which different legal actors can coordinate – allowing them to promote the uniformity and predictability of law and, ultimately, to sustain the rule of law.

Keywords

coordinationinterpretationtextpurpose
Type
Chapter
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The Cambridge Handbook of Experimental Jurisprudence , pp. 546 - 577
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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