from Part V - Psychological Games
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 June 2025
This chapter focuses on psychological games, where the players’ preferences may directly depend on higher-order beliefs. The chapter starts by explaining how a psychological game can be viewed as a collection of one-person decision problems. By using the same epistemic model as for standard games, it provides a formal definition of common belief in rationality. It is shown that the choices which are possible under common belief in rationality can be characterized by the iterated elimination of choices and second-order expectations. The chapter finally demonstrates when the easier procedure of iterated elimination of choices and states is sufficient for common belief in rationality.
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