Understanding Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Choices Amid Sino-US Rivalry

Summary

INTRODUCTION

Vietnam's relations with China and the United States (US) are full of contrasts and complexities. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the Communist Party of China (CPC) share the same political ideology and the prevailing imperative of preserving their power monopoly. Yet, China presents the most pronounced threat to Vietnam's territorial integrity and sovereignty, and opinion polls consistently suggest a prevalent distrust of China among the Vietnamese. Polls also indicate that the US is favourably perceived by the Vietnamese public but the CPV views Washington's promotion of liberal democratic values with deep apprehension, out of concern for its regime security. The CPV keenly learns from the CPC's development path and governance model whereas young Vietnamese—including children of the ruling elites—often choose the US and other Western countries over China for their education. Historically, Vietnam had been at war with both great powers. In fact, it is the classic example of a small “David” that defied all odds to survive as an independent state under the Chinese imperial shadow over millennia and to prevail over the American “Goliath” in the twentieth century. Today, Vietnam's most important trade partners are China and the US, with China being the main source of imports and the US serving as its largest export market.

As US-China strategic competition intensifies, where does Vietnam stand between the two rivals, and how does it navigate the above contrasts and complexities that essentially represent its internal competing perceptions, goals and interests in relation to the two powers? This article seeks to answer these questions by examining the domestic determinants of Vietnam's foreign policy, including geographical, historical, political, institutional, economic and security considerations.

The focus on domestic determinants to understand the making of small states’ foreign policy is part of the “counter-current” to the great-power-centric paradigm that is prevalent in the realist school of thought and general international relations commentary. This great-power bias emphasizes the structural constraints of the international system on small states, according to Thucydides’ logic that “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”. It neglects the agency of small states and unique domestic conditions that differentiate one state's foreign policy decisions from another’s. Understanding the domestic conditions also helps us look beyond the simplistic categorization of “band-wagoning”, “balance of power” and “hedging” to grasp the full gamut of a country's foreign policy choices in its dealing with great powers.