The target article appeals to recent empirical data to support the idea that there is more to phenomenality than is available to access consciousness. However, this claim is based on an unwarranted assumption, namely, that some kind of cortical processing must be phenomenal. The article also considerably weakens Block's original distinction between a truly nonfunctional phenomenal consciousness and a functional access consciousness. The new form of phenomenal consciousness seems to be a poor-man's cognitive access.

A radical interpretation of the predictive coding approach suggests that the mind is “seamless” – that is, that cancellation of error signals can propagate smoothly from highest to lowest levels of the control hierarchy, dissolving a distinction between belief and perception. Delusions of alien control provide a test case. Close examination suggests that while they are evidence of predictive coding within the cortex, they are not evidence for the seamless interpretation.

Byrne (2005) assumes that counterfactual thinking requires a comparison of facts with an imagined alternative. In our view, however, this assumption is unnecessarily restrictive. We argue that individuals do not necessarily engage in counterfactual simulations exclusively to evaluate factual reality. Instead, comparative evaluation is often suspended in favor of experiencing the counterfactual simulation as if it were real.

I defend the claim that in psychological theories concerned with theoretical or practical rationality there is a constitutive relation between normative and descriptive theories: Normative theories provide idealized descriptive accounts of rational agents. However, we need to resist the temptation to collapse descriptive theories with any specific normative theory. I show how a partial separation is possible.

Neurally inspired models of human cognition exude explanatory power without necessarily making predictions that can be verified behaviorally. This is the case for Tsuda's dynamic model. It is suggested that a simpler principle based on the nonlinear dynamic interaction between modules based on control of chaos, can achieve a similar theoretical goal in a cognitively verifiable way.

In the target article, human cruelty is linked to intrinsic reinforcement from engaging in the behavior without any recommendations for a research program to validate or test for such reinforcement and its independence from ultimate adaptive outcomes. Suggestions are offered in this commentary for such a program.

By shifting the focus of analysis from forgetting and remembering to interpreting and making-meaning, Erdelyi allows theoretical consideration of repression to move beyond the heuristic assumption that personal memory is necessarily private memory. In this commentary, repression is considered to be a collective process in which memories are shaped by the need for coherence between individual and social narratives.

Latent variable modeling has revealed important conundrums in the DSM classification system. We agree that the network perspective has potential to inspire new insights and resolve some of these conundrums. We note, however, that alone it cannot really help us understand etiology. Etiology, not comorbidity, is the fundamental question.

Relational representation abilities are a crucial cognitive difference between human and nonhuman animals. We argue that relational reasoning and representation supports the development of culture that increases in complexity. Thus, these abilities are a force that magnifies the apparent difference in cognitive abilities between humans and nonhumans.

Much confusion exists within the robotics and the biology communities regarding the definition of biorobotics and the aims and strategies that characterize this approach. Not even the basic criteria for identifying biorobotic research are being applied consistently. Barbara Webb has taken a crucial step towards setting a common ground from which biorobotic systems can be described, analyzed, and compared.

Vertes & Eastman argue against the popular idea that dreams promote memory consolidation and suggest instead that REM provides periodic endogenous stimulation during sleep. Although we suspect that much of the debate on the function of dreams reflects a too eager acceptance of the “adaptationist program,” we nonetheless support the position of the authors and propose a specific advantage of periodic REM activity.

[Vertes & Eastman]

Nielsen's model presents a new isomorphic brain-mind viewpoint, according to which the sole dream generator is found in a REM-on (explicit or covert REM) mechanism. Such a model cannot explain the dreamlike activity during SWS (slow wave sleep), SO (sleep onset) and in the last period of sleep. Moreover the hypothesis contrasts with Solms's data, which show that dreaming is present also in case of destruction of the REM generator.

[Nielsen; Solms]

The Kalman filtering technique is considered as a part of concurrent data-processing techniques also related to detection, parameter evaluation, and identification. The adaptive properties of the filter are discussed as being related to symmetrical brain structures.

Nielsen's concept of “covert REM sleep” accounts for more of the complexity in sleep psychophysiology than its conceptual predecessors such as the tonic-phasic model. With new neuroimaging findings, such concepts lead to more precise sleep psychophysiology including both traditional polysomnographic signs and neuronal activity in greater proximity to the actual point sources and distributed networks which generate dreaming.

[Hobson et al.; Nielsen]

Localist networks are symbolic models, because their nodes refer to extra-mental objects and events. Hence, localist networks can be combined with symbolic computations to form hybrid models. Such models are already familiar and they are likely to represent the dominant type of cognitive model in the next few decades.

Deictic coding offers a useful model for understanding the interactions between the dorsal and ventral streams of visual processing in the cerebral cortex. By extending Ballard et al.'s ideas on teleassistance, I show how dedicated low-level visuomotor processes in the dorsal stream might be engaged for the services of high-level cognitive operations in the ventral stream.

This commentary addresses the strength of the comparative approach to the study of sex differences in pain. Animal studies can focus our attention on mechanisms of sex differences in these clinical sex differences. Important sex differences are seen in descending pain modulation, thereby providing an explanation for the observation of sex differences in pain perception. [berkley]

The instrumental model offered by Müller & Schumann (M&S) is broadened to apply not only to drugs, but also to other methods of self-control, including the use of mental constructs to produce adaptive changes in behavior with the possibility of synergistic interactions between various instruments.

Two standard epistemological accounts are conflated in Dienes & Perner's account of knowledge, and this conflation requires the rejection of their four conditions of knowledge. Because their four metarepresentations applied to the explicit-implicit distinction are paired with these conditions, it follows by modus tollens that if the latter are inadequate, then so are the former. Quite simply, their account misses the link between true reasoning and knowledge.

The neurophysiological phenomenon of LTP (long term potentiation) is considered by many to represent an adequate mechanism for acquiring or storing memories in the mammalian brain. In our target article, we reviewed the various arguments put forth in support of the LTP/memory hypothesis. We concluded that these arguments were inconsistent with the purported data base and proposed an alternative interpretation that we suggested was at least as compatible with the available data as the more widely held view. In doing so, we attempted to illustrate that the inadequacy of present experimental designs did not permit us to distinguish between equally viable hypotheses. In the four years since we wrote the first draft of our target article, hundreds of additional studies on LTP have been published and their results have been incorporated into current theories about memory. A diverse group of commentators responded to our target article with their own theories of how memories might be stored in the brain, some of which rely on LTP. Some commentators doubted whether memories can be stored through modifications of synaptic strength. Some assert that it will never be possible to understand the neural mechanisms of memory; still others remain hopeful that we will accomplish some semblance of a resolution, provided we appreciate LTP's role in a subset of seemingly amorphous memory systems. In summary, although it is commonly written that “LTP is a memory storage device,” the divergence of views among the commentators suggests, at least as strongly as our target article, that such conviction is unwarranted and fails to acknowledge both the lack of consensus regarding the role of LTP in memory and the complexity of the phenomenon of memory itself.