Bentley et al. argue for the social scientific contextualization of “big data” by proposing a four-quadrant model. We suggest extensions of the east–west (i.e., socially motivated versus independently motivated) decision-making dimension in light of findings from social psychology and neuroscience. We outline a method that leverages linguistic tools to connect insights across fields that address the individuals underlying big-data media streams.

Recent research has identified several judgment and decision making tendencies associated with right-leaning political ideologies that are difficult (if not impossible) to explain in terms of stable, negative affective appraisals because they (1) are uncorrelated with the negativity of the stimuli being considered, (2) do not reflect divergent affective evaluations, and (3) can be eliminated by superficial manipulations and interventions.

An associative learning account of mirror neurons should not preclude genetic evolution of its underlying mechanisms. On the contrary, an associative learning framework for cognitive development should seek heritable variation in the learning rules and in the data-acquisition mechanisms that construct associative networks, demonstrating how small genetic modifications of associative elements can give rise to the evolution of complex cognition.

We apply error management theory to the analysis of individual differences in the negativity bias and political ideology. Using principles from evolutionary psychology, we propose a coherent theoretical framework for understanding (1) why individuals differ in their political ideology and (2) the conditions under which these individual differences influence and fail to influence the political choices people make.

Contrasting independent with socially influenced decision making does not capture crucial differences in decision making. Independence is fictional, and social influences substantially permeate preference construction. A distinction between deliberate and intuitive decision making would be more useful, and the problem in the big-data era is deciding when it is better to rely on deliberation and when to trust one's intuitions.

Cook et al. propose that mirror neurons emerge developmentally through a domain-general associative mechanism. We argue that experience-sensitivity does not rule out an adaptive or genetic argument for mirror neuron function, and that current evidence suggests that mirror neurons are more specialized than the authors' account would predict. We propose that future work integrate behavioral and neurophysiological techniques used with primates to examine the proposed functions of mirror neurons in action understanding.

Some birds and mammals have vocal communication systems in which coordination between individuals is important. Examples would include duetting or antiphonal calling in some birds and mammals, rapid exchanges of the same vocalization, and vocal exchanges between paired individuals and other nearby pairs. Mirror neurons may play a role in such systems but become functional only after experience.

Hibbing et al. provide a comprehensive overview of how being susceptible to heightened sensitivity to threat may lead to conservative ideologies. Yet, an emerging literature in social and cultural neuroscience shows the importance of genetic and cultural factors on negativity biases. Promising avenues for future investigation may include examining the bidirectional relationship of conservatism across multiple levels of analysis.

Outcome transparency and the weight given to social information both play important roles in decision making, but we argue that an overarching influence is the degree to which individuals can and do gather information. Evolution, experience, and development may shape individual specializations in social decision making that carry over across contexts, and these individual differences may influence collective behavior and cultural evolution.

We are sympathetic with Bentley et al.’s attempt to encompass the wisdom of crowds in a generative model, but posit that a successful attempt at using big data will include more sensitive measurements, more varied sources of information, and will also build from the indirect information available through technology, from ancillary technical features to data from brain–computer interfaces.

Hibbing et al. contend that individual differences in political ideology can be substantially accounted for in terms of differences in a single psychological factor, namely, strength of negativity bias. We argue that, given the multidimensional structure of ideology, a better explanation of ideological variation will take into account both individual differences in negativity bias and differences in empathic concern.

Cook et al. argue that mirror neurons originate from associative learning processes, without evolutionary influence from social-cognitive mechanisms. We disagree with this claim and present arguments based upon cross-species comparisons, EEG findings, and developmental neuroscience that the evolution of mirror neurons is most likely driven simultaneously and interactively by evolutionarily adaptive psychological mechanisms and lower-level biological mechanisms that support them.

Bentley et al. say that economics is the science of their map's northwest quadrant, where choice is individual and transparent. This accepts the picture of the discipline common among behavioral economists who aim to drag economics southward but not eastward. In fact, leading economics journals regularly publish models located in all four quadrants, and the prominence of work from the eastern zone is increasing.

Basic values explain more variance in political attitudes and preferences than other personality and sociodemographic variables. The values most relevant to the political domain are those likely to reflect the degree of negativity bias. Value conflicts that represent negativity bias clarify differences between what worries conservatives and liberals and suggest that relations between ideology and negativity bias are linear.

Cook et al. overstate the evidence supporting their associative account of mirror neurons in humans: most studies do not address a key property, action-specificity that generalizes across the visual and motor domains. Multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) of neuroimaging data can address this concern, and we illustrate how MVPA can be used to test key predictions of their account.

The description of the mirror neuron system provided by Cook et al. is incomplete for the macaque, and incorrect for humans. This is relevant to exaptation versus associative learning as the underlying mechanism generating mirror neurons, and to the sensorimotor learning as evidence for the authors' viewpoint. The proposed additional testing of the mirror system in rodents is unrealistic.

The proposed framework is insufficient to categorize and understand current evidence on decision making. There are some ambiguities in the questions asked that require additional distinctions between correctness and accuracy, decision making and learning, accuracy and confidence, and social influence and empowerment. Social learning techniques are not all the same: Behavior copying is quite different from theory passing. Sigmoidal acquisition curves are not unique to social learning and are often mistaken for other accelerating curves.

As a comment on Hibbing et al.'s paper, we discuss the evolution of political and social views from more liberal to more conservative over the span of adulthood. We show that Hibbing et al.'s theoretical model creates a false prediction from this developmental perspective, as increased conservatism in the adult life-span trajectory is accompanied by the avoidance of negative bias.