In this paper, we revisit the Knowledge Problem addressed by Hayek eight decades ago and emphasised more recently by Rizzo and Whitman in their critique of the new paternalist approach of mainstream behavioural economics promoted by Sunstein and Thaler. We do this in light of the work of Michael Polanyi. Polanyi developed a theory of knowledge which has some commonalities with Hayek’s but also departs from it by emphasising the tacit, personal and perceptual dimensions of any process of knowing, thus radically renouncing any attempt of a knowledge typology separating different types of tacit knowledge (TK) and even denying that general knowledge could exist independently of TK.

Kahneman’s criticism of neoclassical rationality was central to his research programme. He argued that rationality understood as temporal consistency among preferences and beliefs is inapt as a descriptive and prescriptive standard of decision-making. Descriptively, consistency ignores high decision costs and biases, such as framing effects. Prescriptively, it is problematic since it neglects the processual nature of choice and the crucial role of regret. Instead, Kahneman argued in favour of using reasonableness as a standard, though he did not fully develop the concept in his work.

We have previously argued thatbehavioral scientists have been testing and advocating individualistic (i-frame) solutions to policy problems that have systemic (s-frame) causes and require systemic solutions. Here, we consider the implications of adopting an s-frame approach for research. We argue that an s-frame approach will involve addressing different types of questions, which will, in turn, require a different toolbox of research methods.

Existing research demonstrates that parents are poorly informed consumers of early childhood education and care (ECEC) services. Choosing such services is a complex process shaped by a combination of logistical limitations (e.g., cost/location), informational barriers and ideas about what the goal of care should be (e.g., education of young children or provision of an environment that feels like home). Experimental studies have also demonstrated that when study participants are informed of the importance of a specific decision, they engage in more complex decision-making. In this article, we test whether providing parents with information about the regulatory stringency of ECEC options available influences their choices regarding ECEC. A conjoint survey designed to capture quasi-behavioural choices for ECEC services was completed by 682 parents. Before engaging with the survey, participants were randomly assigned into either a control group or a treatment group that informed them about the stringency of oversight regarding ECEC options available in the province of Ontario, Canada. Receiving information did not meaningfully change the choices of the entire sample. However, a subgroup analysis revealed an important information effect on parent decisions for lower income/lower-education parents.

Behavioural public policy (BPP) operates within one of four cultural models of public management, an illustration of an influential scheme set out by Christopher Hood. Even though BPP can be fatalist, individualist or egalitarian, so far it has been hierarchicalist. Hallsworth’s manifesto is largely an expression of this hierarchicalist form of public management, with all its limitations and contradictions. As the manifesto pays relatively little attention to decentralist and egalitarian approaches, it misses a radical opportunity. Future work on BPP could incorporate entrepreneurial and egalitarian possibilities while recognising the difficulties of moving away from hierarchalism completely. Even though Hood cautions against a ‘public management for all seasons’, it remains a plausible path for the next generation of researchers and practitioners of BPP.

Times of emergency often serve as triggers for the creation of new policy. Such policies may involve restriction of human rights, and various mechanisms can be used to mitigate the severity of such restrictions. One such mechanism is the temporary measure. A series of three experiments examined the potential of temporary measures for increasing the likelihood of approval of rights-restricting policy and the role of time – both prospectively and retrospectively – in the willingness to restrict human rights. We find that behavioural examination confirms the concerns expressed in the literature regarding temporary legislation. Participants asked to approve a rights-restricting policy were more willing to approve a temporary measure when it was presented as a compromise, and they were more willing to extend a rights-restricting policy when it had previously been implemented. These findings indicate a possible slippery slope effect in temporary legislation: policymakers might be persuaded to approve measures they would not otherwise approve when those measures are temporary or when they have been previously approved by others.

In 1921, John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight independently insisted on the importance of making a distinction between uncertainty and risk. Keynes referred to matters about which ‘there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever’. Knight claimed that ‘Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated’. Knightian uncertainty exists when people cannot assign probabilities to imaginable outcomes. People might know that a course of action might produce bad outcomes A, B, C, D and E, without knowing much or anything about the probability of each. Contrary to a standard view in economics, Knightian uncertainty is real, and it poses challenging and unresolved issues for decision theory and regulatory practice. It bears on many problems, potentially including those raised by artificial intelligence. It is tempting to seek to eliminate the worst-case scenario, and thus to adopt the maximin rule, which might seem to be the appropriate approach under Knightian uncertainty. But serious problems arise if eliminating the worst-case scenario would (1) impose high risks and costs, (2) eliminate large benefits or potential ‘miracles’ or (3) create uncertain risks.

This article serves as a commentary on Michael Hallsworth’s 2023 piece, ‘A manifesto for applying behavioural science,’ featured in Nature Human Behaviour. The manifesto was prompted by methodological, practical and normative critiques directed at behavioural science and its role in public policy. In this commentary, I argue that the manifesto presents numerous insightful and constructive reform proposals regarding the scope, methods and values in behavioural science, which can help advance the field of behavioural public policy. While there is much to agree with, I contend in this commentary that applied behavioural science can and should delve deeper into the study of socially and culturally embedded processes of goal formation. Additionally, it should explore the institutional conditions necessary for individuals to formulate their goals competently and in a self-determined manner.

The aim of this article is to better understand how judgements about nudge acceptability are formed and whether they can be manipulated. We conducted a randomized experiment with N = 171 participants to test whether acceptability judgements could be (1) more favourable when the decision to implement the nudges was made following a consultation with the targeted population and (2) influenced by the joint framing of the nudge's purpose and effectiveness (in terms of an increase in desirable behaviour versus decrease in undesirable behaviour). We tested these hypotheses on various nudge scenarios and obtained mixed results that do not clearly support our hypotheses for all nudge scenarios. A surprising result that calls for further work is that by mentioning that a nudge had been implemented through a consultation with the targeted population its acceptability could be lowered.

This essay is in celebration of the contributions of Mario Rizzo. I argue that among contemporary economists in the Austrian School of Economics tradition it is Rizzo that advanced, more than his contemporaries, the scientific research program of rational choice as if the choosers were human beings; the dynamic subjectivism and the agony of choice and social interaction; the causal processes and the institutional dynamics that make up a complex social order; and the role of law, politics and civil society in shaping commercial life. In making this argument, I attempt to arbitrage the contributions of two essays of Rizzo’s: ‘Law Amid Flux’ and ‘The Genetic-Causal Tradition and Modern Economic Theory’.

Viewed from the perspective of public policy, behavioural public policy (BPP) faces challenges in four main areas: Systems, Impatience, Nudging, and Scaling. To address these challenges, several suggestions are proposed. First, understanding how BPP interventions unfold in complex systems requires better diagnostics and the development of predictive and generative models of human behaviour. Second, the rapid pace of policy processes necessitates a shift towards generating timely and fit-for-purpose evidence. Third, maximising the opportunities presented by BPP, beyond merely ‘nudging’, demands the early and proactive application of behavioural science in the policy cycle. Fourth, achieving widespread impact in BPP initiatives means considering scale-up from the start. Lastly, the consistent and comprehensive integration of behavioural science into standard policymaking practices would support sustainable progress in addressing these challenges.

Participatory work structure is a popular concept but its causal impacts in real-world work groups have heretofore been unquantified and research has been Western-centric. We test the hypothesis that participatory group structure increases productivity for blue-collar workers in a context where participation is not a normative default. We conducted a pre-registered longitudinal field experiment with 65 Chinese factory groups (1752 workers). Half of the groups were randomly assigned to a 20-minute participatory meeting once per week for 6 weeks, in which the group's supervisor stepped aside and workers contributed ideas and personal goals in an open discussion of their work. The other half continued with status-quo meetings in which supervisors spoke and set goals, workers listened, and a researcher observed. We found that a participatory versus a hierarchical structure led to a 10.6% average increase in individual treatment workers’ productivity, an increase that endured for 9 weeks after the experiment ended. The brief participatory meetings also increased treatment workers’ retention rate (an 85% vs. 77% retention rate in treatment vs. control groups) and feelings of empowerment such as job satisfaction and sense of control. We found no evidence of informational gains or new worker goals; instead, evidence suggests that the increase in frequency of workers’ voicing opinions may have driven higher productivity. These findings provide rare causal evidence in a setting where participation is not a normative default, indicating the benefits of direct group participation for changing and sustaining behavior and attitudes.

Field experiments which test the application of behavioural insights to policy design have become popular to inform policy decisions. This study is the first to empirically examine who and what drives these experiments with public partners. Through a mixed-methods approach, based on a novel dataset of insights from academic researchers, behavioural insight team members and public servants, I derive three main results: First, public bodies have a considerable influence on study set-up and sample design. Second, high scientific standards are regularly not met in cooperative field experiments, mainly due to risk aversion in the public body. Third, transparency and quality control in collaborative research are low with respect to pre-analysis plans, the publication of results and medium or long-term effects. To remedy the current weaknesses, the study sketches out several promising ways forward, such as setting up a matchmaking platform for researchers and public bodies to facilitate cooperation, and using time-embargoed pre-analysis plans.

I’m grateful to the authors for taking the time to read and respond to the manifesto. I have great respect for the contributions each of them has made to our field, and I’d like to offer some clarifications and reflections prompted by their thoughts.

People buy some goods that they do not enjoy and wish did not exist. They might even be willing to pay a great deal for such goods, whether the currency involves time, commitment or money. One reason involves signaling to others; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to friends or colleagues. Another reason involves self-signaling; so long as the good exists, nonconsumption might give an unwanted signal to an agent about himself or herself. Yet another reason involves a combination of network effects and status competition; nonconsumption might deprive people of the benefits of participating in a network and thus cause them to lose relative position. With respect to real-world goods (including activities) of this kind, there is typically heterogeneity in relevant populations, with some people deriving positive utility from goods to which other people are indifferent, or which other people deplore. Efforts to measure people’s willingness to pay for goods of this kind will suggest a welfare gain, and possibly a substantial one, even though the existence of such goods produces a welfare loss, and possibly a substantial one. Collective action, private or public, is necessary to eliminate goods that people consume but wish did not exist. Legal responses here might be contemplated when someone successfully maneuvers people into a situation in which they are incentivized to act against their interests, by consuming a product or engaging in an activity they do not enjoy, in order to avoid offering an unwanted signal. Prohibitions on waiving certain rights might be justified in this way; some restrictions on uses of social media, especially by young people, might be similarly justified.

Since the publication of the seminal book Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein, several critics have highlighted preference endogeneity as a serious obstacle to nudging. When individuals hold preferences that are dynamic and endogenous to the nudge frame, it is unclear what the normative benchmark for libertarian paternalistic policies should be. While acknowledging this issue, the pro-nudging camp has not yet sufficiently addressed it. This article aims to fill this void by presenting a conditional defence of nudging when preferences are endogenous. We explain the learning process through which individuals establish ‘agentic’ preferences: preferences that are sufficiently stable, reasonable, autonomous and associated with organismic well-being to ground the ‘welfare’ principle of libertarian paternalism. To describe this process, we draw on theories from psychological science, in particular self-discrepancy theory and self-determination theory. We argue that agentic preferences are not only welfare-relevant and thus appropriate to libertarian paternalism but can also be identified by choice architects.

Some products, notably but not only platforms, increase in value for users as the number of other users increases. These interaction or network effects can result in ‘product market traps’ (Bursztyn et al., 2023) where people who use the product would be better off if they all stopped using it and switched to another product, but cannot because of coordination problems. A parallel but overlooked phenomenon is the labor market trap, where employees would be better off if they collectively left an employer, job, or profession, but cannot because of the difficulty of coordination. Product market and labor market traps pose a challenge to public policy because of the complexity of people’s behavior in networks, but can be mitigated in some cases with relatively simple taxes and regulatory interventions.

Local public managers increasingly use behavioral policy instruments to influence the behavior of citizens. However, despite their increased reliance on these instruments, there is little evidence on why local public manager would prefer behavioral instruments over classic stick, carrot or sermon-type instruments. We conduct a mixed-methods study, combining a stated-preference survey and two focus groups, to examine whether senior local public managers (directors and deputy directors) in Flanders prefer behavioral policy instruments over classic stick, carrot and sermon-type instruments, and explore whether their trust in citizens (perceptions of citizen’s ability, benevolence and integrity) affects these preferences for policy instruments. The results indicate that in some policy areas, such as health, public nuisance and road safety, public managers appear more willing to use behavioral policy instruments than classic sticks and carrots, but not sermons. Furthermore, we find that public managers’ trust in citizens does not appear to significantly affect their preferences for policy instruments, but that political and economic motives do play a role in their preferences for behavioral policy instruments. Finally, the results also indicate that the simultaneous use of behavioral and classic policy instruments (packaging) can help mediate the perceived risks of citizens’ non-compliance with behavioral policy instruments.

Recently, defaults have become celebrated as a low-cost and easy-to-implement nudge for promoting positive outcomes, both at an individual and societal level. In the present research, we conducted a large-scale field experiment (N = 32,508) in an educational context to test the effectiveness of a default intervention in promoting participation in a potentially beneficial achievement test. We found that a default manipulation increased the rate at which high school students registered to take the test but failed to produce a significant change in students’ actual rate of test-taking. These results join past literature documenting robust effects of default framings on initial choice but marked variability in the extent to which those choices ultimately translate to real-world outcomes. We suggest that this variability is attributable to differences in choice-to-outcome pathways – the extent to which the initial choice is causally determinative of the outcome.