This is the first in what is intended as a series of comments on current developments in the law concerning freedom of religion that will appear regularly in this Journal. This first survey deals with religious liberty challenges brought in the UK courts in 2007 and 2008. A subsequent survey will examine similar developments in international human rights law and especially before the European Court of Human Rights.

In 1977 the House of Lords in R v Lemon unanimously asserted that the offence of blasphemy had survived a long period of desuetude, and remained very much alive and capable of being used. This surprised many. There had been no prosecution for the offence for sixty-five years. Lord Goddard had once declared it ‘obsolescent’, Lord Denning had described it as a ‘dead letter’, and in 1959 the Society for the Abolition of the Blasphemy Laws had abolished itself. Despite this, and despite disagreement among their Lordships as to the intention or mens rea of the offence, they had no doubt that it still existed as a criminal offence. Indeed, Lord Scarman expressly disassociated himself from the view that the offence ‘serves no useful purpose in modern law’.

In May 2004 eight former communist Central and Eastern European countries joined the European Union. Written constitutions in the region now contain guarantees on freedom of religion together with fundamental statements on Church-State relations. Since the fall of communism a net of bilateral agreements has been negotiated with the Holy See. Of the established members of the EU only Austria, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain had concordats whilst France and Luxembourg were partly bound by such treaties. Amongst the new member states only the predominantly Orthodox Cyorus has no contractual relationship with the Vatican. A pragmatic reason for this may be that the new members went through a very rapid leagal transition marked by considerable uncertainties after the fall of communism. The Catholic Church did not seek privileges with the agrements, but rather legal certainty. The stadards of religious with the agreements, but rather legal certainty. The standards of religious freedom in the new member states are generally good compared with the resrt of Europe. None of the new member states adopted a state church model, and none of them followed a rigid separation model either. Most new member states to be particularly valued by those who experienced forced secularism during communist rule.

The right to freedom of religion, enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights has been frequently tested, both in UK courts and in the European Court of Human Rights, where successive decisions over a number of years led to the establishment of several well-known principles. However, in recent years religious extremism has brought into focus a tension between the right of freedom of religious expression and the well-being of individuals (not least children) and society. The Strasbourg court requires neutrality on the part of the state and its courts. However, unlike the European Court of Human Rights, the domestic courts have had to face situations where religious observance can be seen to be causing serious harm and where interference in religious freedom and family life has been shown to be justified.

Amongst the subjects discussed by the theologians of ARCIC, canon law has been conspicuously absent. The ecclesiology of koinonia, which is central to the work of ARCIC, has been of the greatest importance in ‘re-imagining’ the Church and so promoting ecumenism. It has faced received canon law with new questions: to what extent can canon law facilitate those structures and practices which undergird the ecumenical initiatives promoted by koinonia ecclesiology? Already, canon law provides for shared institutions and chaplaincies to institutions. Test areas for future ecumenical convergence include the reception of a member of one tradition by the other, ethics and suitability for ministry. The proposed Anglican covenant presents a challenge to the canon law of member churches within the Anglican Communion and may present a model for future ecumenical convergence. The work of canon lawyers in developing this and other new models for ecumenism is indispensable to a deeper and more extensive koinonia amongst the churches.

In an article in this journal published in 1998 entitled ‘Digging Up Exhumation’, Rupert Bursell, Chancellor of the Dioceses of Durham and St Albans, surveyed the then existing case law on exhumation and identified divergencies of approach between the cases. He concluded: ‘A definitive decision from the Court of Arches and Provincial Court may, therefore, seem to be called for […]’. Shortly afterwards the Chancery Court of York had occasion to consider the matter in Re Christ Church, Alsager. This article considers that case as well as two cases subsequent to it where the impact of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights has fallen to be considered.

Norman Doe's book Christian Law compares and contrasts the internal regulations of churches and seeks to identify principles common to churches across the denominational spectrum. This response to Doe's work reviews the religious questions that have come before the House of Lords and Supreme Court since 2004 and seeks to identify the principles governing the secular courts' approach to religious questions. The relationship between those principles and the principles outlined in Christian Law is far from clear. While an understanding of the rules of particular religious bodies is sometimes necessary for secular judges deciding civil rights in a religious context, in most cases the courts are not concerned with the conformity of religious beliefs with religious laws, but simply with protecting the freedom to hold and manifest those beliefs.

The faculty jurisdiction of the Church of England is the core of what remains as a distinctive system of Church Law in England. It serves inter alia to safeguard the national heritage of parish churches and it is the reason why ecclesiastical buildings in use generally are immune from listed building control under secular planning law. The faculty jurisdiction still provides a model for regulating the conservation of buildings of historic and aesthetic interest and their contents which can be compared favourably with listed building control.

In Act Three of Shakespeare's King Richard III the Duke of Buckingham asks Cardinal Bourchier to try and persuade Elizabeth Woodville to release the young Duke of York from sanctuary at Westminster. In the event of such tactics failing, Buckingham wishes Lord Hastings to accompany the Cardinal to Westminster and ‘… from her jealous arms pluck him perforce.’ The Cardinal's initial reaction is one of horror:

‘…if she be obdurate

To mild enteraties god in heaven forbid

We should infringe the holy privilge

Of blessed sanctuary not for all this land

Would I be guilty of so deep a sin.’

Reconciling conflict between religious freedoms and non-religious human rights is a subject that has begun to affect many countries as they have become more liberal, multicultural and secular. The law relevant to the subject is currently developing at a fast pace, and is of particular interest in England and Wales given the historical position that Christianity has had within the establishment – the monarchy, Parliament and the law. This article charts the development of the law in these areas from an era of officially Protestant uniformity to the current plural and tolerant society. The fast pace of development, particularly since the end of the Second World War, is shown through examination of the development of the law in the fields of racial discrimination, discrimination on the grounds of sexuality, and religious freedom and discrimination. To all intents and purposes, the law has now become neutral towards religion and belief and provides an enlarged space where, subject only to legitimate interference for the protection of that freedom and the rule of law, all are free to adhere to their own faith and belief system.

The Church of England has committed itself to achieving net-zero carbon emissions by 2030. An important element required for success in this aim will be to amend the legislation around the management of church buildings and in particular the operation of the faculty jurisdiction. While aspects of the present system can and do facilitate some necessary change, to achieve the swift and widespread changes required within the timescale envisaged a more radical overhaul is required because the present faculty system favours the status quo, however bad that is from a carbon emissions perspective.

Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) returned to the test of individual sincerity for determining whether there has been an infringement of freedom of religion pursuant to section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the Charter) in SL c Commission scolaire des Chênes. Sincerity of belief or in practice as necessary for religious expression on the part of a complainant has been accepted from some of the earliest Charter cases as the triggering requirement for a section 2(a) claim, and, in itself, sufficient to establish a claim which a court must then balance against conflicting claims pursuant to section 1 (‘reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’) or section 15 (equality rights). In SL, the court confirmed that mere sincerity is no longer sufficient and that an objective burden of proof now rests on a claimant to show how a state-sanctioned requirement infringes the fundamental right to freedom of religion before competing claims will be assessed. In SL, the court found that the complainants had failed to show how a religious education course mandated for all students without exception by the Government of Quebec interfered with what they argued was their religious freedom as Roman Catholic parents to pass on their faith to their children. This result has also been interpreted to mean that the state has a right prior to parental rights in the religious formation of their own children, and, on this reading, has been highly controversial. The court's new formulation of a sincerity test may be of interest elsewhere. The earlier formulation in Syndicat Northcrest v Anselem was adopted by the House of Lords in R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education and Employment, and the subsequent spread of its use has since been subject to consideration in England.

In the July 1995 number of the Ecclesiastical Law Journal, Mr R. H. Bloor presented an interesting account of recent difficulties encountered by the parish church of St Mary's Belton with regard to the chiming of its church clock. In his article, ‘Clocks, Bells and Cockerels’, he took occasion to consider briefly the law relating to bells as a noise nuisance and usefully brought some unreported cases to the attention of readers of the Journal. He did not however consider one question which is, it is submitted, of peculiar importance to ecclesiastical lawyers, a question raised by the present author in a letter to The Times on 22 October 1994, namely whether the obligation of clerics to ring a bell under ecclesiastical and canon law can be a defence to a complaint of nuisance for the noise caused. Nor did he examine the differences which exist, particularly with regard to defences, depending upon whether the complaint is one of public, private or statutory nuisance. The present paper is therefore offered as a discussion of these points and as a wider review of the authorities relating to them.