This editorial considers how scholars interested in issues of global constitutionalism should approach the questions that have concerned those interested in enlightenment. Reflecting on the relocation of the journal’s editorial offices to Edinburgh, we foreground discussions from the historiography of the long eighteenth century that should be of interest to scholars of international relations, international law and political theory. Two main contributions are emphasized. First, a contextualist and political approach to enlightenment invites us to see global constitutionalism as a strategic response to crisis, aiming to combat fanaticism. Second, a global approach to enlightenment invites us to continue enlarging the world of global constitutionalism. Taken together, the contributions support the journal’s ongoing efforts to decolonize global constitutionalism by enjoining readers and contributors to attend to neglected sides and sites of global constitutional processes.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide invoked the ‘precautionary principle’ to justify policies designed to protect public health. This principle holds that the state may act proactively to avert harm where there is factual uncertainty about that harm and the efficacy of policies proposed to mitigate it. Many of the policies introduced during the pandemic limited citizens’ constitutional rights. This article accordingly analyzes how the precautionary principle can be integrated into the proportionality doctrine courts use to assess the validity of rights limitations. As our case study, we take the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada and its globally influential Oakes proportionality test. When articulating the test in the past, the Court has grappled with the need to defer to laws that pursue important public objectives when the evidence underlying those policies is indeterminate. However, it has been criticized for not creating detailed guidelines for when judges should defer, which is said to breed arbitrary, results-oriented decision-making. We update this criticism by showing that it continues to apply to judgments of lower courts in Canada that have followed the Court’s proclamations to evaluate laws that limit constitutional rights to combat COVID-19. We then construct the requisite guidelines by drawing analogies with existing legal principles found in tort and criminal law. We argue that in contexts of factual uncertainty, the degree of judicial deference should vary according to the gravity and likelihood of the harm the government seeks to prevent. This risk-based framework restrains judicial subjectivity and illuminates how precaution should operate at each stage of the proportionality test. We further argue that it can assist courts across jurisdictions when incorporating precaution within proportionality because, unlike approaches to this problem offered by other comparative constitutional scholars, it is suitably modest and avoids excessive revision of accepted proportionality principles.

Salient normative status dimensions, or the socially significant and widespread ideational bases on which states seek to be viewed positively in international societies, pattern inter-state relations and signal fluctuating values underpinning an international order. Their dynamics, however, are not well understood. This article introduces an analytical framework to study relations between issue salience and status dimension salience in an international society over time. To what extent have democracy, human rights, economic development, social development and fighting poverty, gender equality, and environmental protection gained, lost or retained salience – both as issues and as sources of states’ domestic-level social identifications? Empirically, the article analyzes trends in the salience of issues and of normative status dimensions in the six above-mentioned issue areas, using manually-coded content analysis and automated text analysis of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) General Debate (GD) speeches between 1978 and 2023. Findings include that there has been an expansion of the characteristics, efforts and aspirations with which state representatives in this venue express their states’ positive social identities, adding new layers to the normative foundations underpinning international order.

Digital constitutionalism has been in vogue in recent years. A series of journal articles, edited collections and monographs that front the catch term have mushroomed. This has, in turn, inspired a growing body of critical scholarship that questions the normative and theoretical coherence as well as epistemic value of digital constitutionalism. Critics deplore the use of the age-old notion of constitutionalism to describe what they consider to be mere regulatory and self-regulatory initiatives which do not meet its well-established core normative minimums. In casting digital constitutionalism in this light, critics present it as a project driven primarily or hijacked by private sector actors, namely big digital platforms. This article seeks to challenge and bring some nuance to such recent sharp criticisms of digital constitutionalism. By positioning its origins and evolution in the digital bill of rights movement, it makes the case for reimagining digital constitutionalism as a discourse. The article thus hopes to rehabilitate and clarify the role and epistemic value of digital constitutionalism as a discourse that is an inchoate, gradualist and fundamentally hortatory. In a novel approach, it argues that framing digital constitutionalism as a discourse depicts accurately its ontological and normative dimensions but also attends to the concerns of its detractors.

State consent is the primary mechanism by which international legal rules are generated and amended and by which states undertake legal obligations. The focus on state consent is celebrated for its strong protection of state sovereignty and for expressing the will of states. The main purpose of this article is to raise some doubts about this understanding of the value of state consent. I argue that far from protecting state sovereignty, unrestricted state consent can undermine it. I show that it is false to think that the virtually unlimited freedom to act protected by state consent safeguards state sovereignty in an environment in which every other state possesses the same unlimited freedom to act. I suggest one possible way of reconceiving state consent in line with existing trends in international law to increase the scope of nonconsensual mechanisms for making international legal rules.

The Citizen Initiative (CI) in the context of the legislative process is now a common mechanism in different parts of Europe and Latin America. However, it is rarely used as a participatory formula in constitution-making processes. This article documents the case of the CI (Iniciativas Populares de Norma) in Chile’s two failed constitution-making processes between 2021 and 2023, during which more than a million people actively participated in its formulation. The Chilean case matters for comparative constitutional studies due to its innovative use of technology to advance forms of digital democracy and the demonstrable impact of the CI standards on both constitutional proposals, which were ultimately rejected in the final national referendums. We argue that despite these rejections, the CI as a participatory mechanism is likely to endure over time and in future constitution-making processes. The article provides a detailed study of the Chilean experience and seeks to draw lessons for other countries’ attempts at participatory constitutional reform.

This introduction to the Agora outlines the issues raised by and arguments in Itamar Mann’s article, ‘From survival cannibalism to climate politics: Rethinking Regina vs Dudley and Stephens’, and the four commentaries thereon.

This essay proposes a novel framework for conceptualising climate politics through the lens of maritime custom. Drawing on A. W. Brian Simpson’s study of Regina vs Dudley and Stephens (1884) and Cătălin Avramescu’s intellectual history of cannibalism, it critically examines ‘providential’ and ‘catastrophic’ lifeboat metaphors in political thought. Despite their apparent opposition, these metaphors share common assumptions rooted in natural law traditions. As an alternative, the essay introduces the concept of the ‘commonist lifeboat’, grounded in maritime custom, class consciousness and environmental encounters. Inspired by historical practices of survival and mutual aid at sea, this approach suggests principles for addressing climate adaptation through bottom-up customs rather than top-down theoretical solutions. Three brief illustrations address climate policy’s intersections with property law, criminal law and international human rights law. This approach ultimately offers a historically informed perspective on climate crisis challenges, reconciling consequentialist arguments with concerns for dignity and consent.

In From Survival Cannibalism to Climate Politics (2025) as well as in Law and Politics from the Sea (2024) Mann proposes the ‘commonist lifeboat’ as a political metaphor for the age of climate change. This response to Itamar Mann’s re-reading of Regina vs. Dudley and Stephens proposes a materialist reading of his political theory of the ‘commonist lifeboat’, arguing that the lifeboat may be a metaphorical and practical site from which alternatives to our current ways of doing and thinking about politics in times of climate crisis might emerge. The text brings Mann’s lifeboat into conversation with my own and other scholars’ work on radical vessels – historical and contemporary – in order to demonstrate and expand its analytical capacity as a more-than-metaphorical term. Building on Mann’s use of the lifeboat as a metaphor and a site of maritime custom, I propose to understand the ‘commonist lifeboat’ also as a material container that operates in a specific material environment: the sea. I argue that a focus on the materiality of the sea and of the lifeboat may point to political practice, community and customs yet to be invented, which may help us navigate the turbulent political environment of our time.

Boat-based metaphors, which portray individual societies or even humanity as a whole as cast adrift on a sea of challenges, have resonated within political theory since the time of Plato, and they continue to frame how we understand and respond to key political choices. However, unless handled very carefully, they can facilitate mis-framings of our contemporary predicament. To date, these metaphors have often done a poor job of capturing the ecological challenges we face. They also risk downplaying the messy pluralism that enduringly characterises political life. If this is true, we should be suspicious of the conclusions their authors seek to draw about our collective future. Lifeboat metaphors, I will suggest, are prone to the same general problems but also add some distinctively their own. As a consequence they should be deployed with especial caution.

In ‘From survival cannibalism to climate politics: Rethinking Regina vs Dudley and Stephens’, Itamar Mann argues inter alia that survival cannibalism and the duty to rescue at sea can inform how to approach climate politics (Mann, p 1). In this piece, I will address this claim through maritime law, the law of the sea and human rights law perspectives. In particular, I will argue that the criminalisation of survival cannibalism is justified on grounds of protection of the fundamental right to life. Survival cannibalism is presented here as a ‘practice’ or ‘custom of the sea’ rather than a maritime custom or ‘bottom-up customary law’ (Mann, pp 4–6). I will suggest an alternative model of sacrifice accompanied by a system of redress grounded in the maritime custom of general average to inform the commonist lifeboat model proposed. In this process that starts at the inner circle before moving to the outer circle where the customary duty to rescue at sea is examined, class dynamics will be briefly considered. The environment will be the last element examined through the Teitiota case. Human rights concerns inform the overall approach taken in an effort to affirm and advance fundamental principles in addressing climate adaptation.