Regionalism has a long history as an important instrument of American foreign policy. Yet such a statement does not do justice to the variations in goals, means, and settings that have affected United States policy toward participation in and cooperation with regional organizations. These differences have been the cause of serious debate in the past and are becoming so again as we approach the 1970's.

Hall and Kratochwil raise several serious claims in their critique of my recent article on feudal Europe. In order to demonstrate that these claims are unwarranted and that my study is sound, I will address the following points: (1) the relevance of context to empirical analysis, (2) counterfactual evidence and the representativeness of sample, (3) understanding the normative argument of critical theory, and (4) the accuracy of my citations.

Seventh United Nations Technical Assistance Conference: At the Seventh UN Technical Assistance Conference, which met at Headquarters on October 17, 1956, under the presidency of Sir Leslie Munro (New Zealand), 63 governments pledged $14,940,000; this sum excluded the amount to be pledged by the United States. Several participating countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia and El Salvador, were unable to announce their contributions at the Conference as negotiations had not been completed

Evidence on the extent of individual demand for international security programs is presented and analyzed. Factors affecting the extent of demand and the circumstances under which individuals might be willing to pay for peacekeeping are discussed. Eliminating the outright prohibition of contributions by individuals would be an effective way to stimulate disclosure of monetary evaluations of international security programs and to learn more about the extent of demand for them.

After years of hesitation, Canada is now seriously considering full membership in the Organization of American States (OAS). The initiative for this shift in policy has come, not from officials in die Department of External Affairs, but principally from Prime Minister John Diefenbaker and especially die Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green. Both have returned within die past year from visits soudi of the Rio Grande critical of Canada's traditional neglect of its interests in Latin America.

Financial contributions are one among several ways that states provide support for the United Nations. Different levels of contributions may serve as one measure of support, but differences in the size and wealth of states make comparisons of absolute amounts contributed misleading. In this study, member contributions from 1946 through 1969 are examined from a number of perspectives, including a state's relative capacity-to-pay. The results indicate that the United States has not been a particularly generous supporter of the UN even though its support levels have been higher than those of the Soviet Union. In general, smaller and poorer states have tended to assume heavier burdens in UN financing than larger and richer states; the trend over time has been toward increasing burdens for those least able to pay. If these tentative results and other studies of contributions are combined with investigations of other forms of support for the UN, we should be able to develop a fuller understanding of the evolution of commitments toward global organization.

Case concerning the Guardianship of an Infant (Netherlands v. Sweden): An application instituting proceedings against Sweden was filed by the Netherlands on July 10, 1957, and alleged that Marie Elisabeth Boll, born in Sweden of a Dutch father and a mother of Swedish nationality before her marriage, possessed Dutch nationality. After the death of the mother Swedish authorities had taken and maintained measures providing for guardianship of the child, despite appeals from the Dutch guardians and from the Netherlands government, which considered that the Swedish authorities had violated the 1902 convention governing the guardianship of infants. In an order of August 19, 1957, the Court fixed November 30, 1957, as the time–limit for the memorial of the Netherlands and March 31, 1958, as the time–limit for the counter–memorial of Sweden.

Stanley Hoffmann, Joseph Nye, and Karl Kaiser have all stressed the significance of the external environment in determining the attractiveness of a regional plan; Ernst Haas has acknowledged that he neglected this in his earlier model of the integrative process. I shall argue here 1) that a particular element in the external environment has been the key incentive for Sweden’s position in current negotiations for a Nordic customs union and connected economic package and 2) that an evaluation of this same external factor will be crucial for Norway’s and Denmark’s decision.

Savage and Deutsch's relative acceptance (RA) index does not actually measure nations' preferences for transactions with one another. Using a modified measure and 1928–71 data for international merchandise trade, I conclude (1) that EEC members' preferences for one another have increased only modestly since the establishment of their Common Market; and (2) that other groups of Western industrial countries have shown a greater rise in intragroup trade preferences in the same period than the EEC. There follows a discussion on the relationship between intraregional transactions preferences and regional political integration. Two conclusions are reached: (1) high intraregional transactions saliences are necessary but not sufficient preconditions for political integration; and (2) rising intraregional transactions preferences must follow political integration. Trade data suggest that, for the EEC, intraregional saliences are probably high enough to permit integration; but slowly increasing preferences suggest that only a little integration can actually have occurred.

UNESCO — the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization — has completed its first three years of activity. Its General Conference has resolved that its fifth session, to be held in Florence in May 1950, shall state with greater precision the long-term program of the organization, to be distinguished from its more transitory undertakings. It may be useful at this time to trace some forces in the development of UNESCO's plan of work.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations. By definition it is concerned with the atmosphere and atmospheric processes and, hence, with the human environment, for whatever definition of the human environment may be adopted, the atmosphere is clearly one of its essential elements. Many atmospheric processes are intimately, indeed inextricably, related to processes and phenomena the study of which falls within the compass of other geophysical disciplines — notably hydrology and oceanography. The WMO has therefore certain responsibilities in these fields also, and as a result its interest in the human environment is somewhat wider than its title may suggest.

The notion of the “world as a whole” is becoming increasingly prominent in the thinking and pronouncements of international prog-nosticators. Yet “globalism”, its functional expression, is a relatively new approach in the United Nations. In fact, it has hardly arrived. This statement is not paradoxical or even surprising. Globalism is not the same thing as internationalism as we have known it up to the present. There is more involved here than a matter of semantics. Traditional internationalism is derived from the dictates of political wisdom and a sense of human solidarity in a world of growing interdependence but of unlimited horizons opened up by tech nology. Globalism is associated today with the ambivalence of technology, its negative effects on the degradation of the environment, the destruction of ecological balances, the limited capacity of the biosphere, the possible depletion of natural resources, the population explosion, the finiteness of the planet, and perhaps even the finiteness of knowledge.

Readers of this periodical will have been struck with the quantity and the variety of international bodies existing today. Whatever else may be lacking in international organization there is no lack of international organizations.

The signing of the ANZUS Pact represented a confluence of attitudes. Australia and New Zealand were disturbed at the liberal Japanese peace treaty, while the United States wanted the treaty to go through with as little opposition as possible. All three countries were afraid of the march of communism in the Far East. The ANZUS Treaty made the Japanese peace settlement palatable to the Pacific Dominions, and at the same time it improved the channels of military cooperation in the Pacific. The significance of ANZUS lay as much in what it did not say as in its formal provisions; the United Kingdom was not included in ANZUS, and its absence gave rise to an extended debate in several countries. There were objections from certain Australian and New Zealand political leaders, and in the United Kingdom the Conservatives lamented “exclusion” while the Labor government declared “… it would not have been unwelcome to us if we had been included in the proposed pact”.

The eighth session of the General Assembly, which had recessed on December 9, 1953, to be reconvened if necessary by the President of the Assembly with the concurrence of a majority of United Nations Members to consider the problem of Korea, was formally adjourned at a brief meeting on September 20, 1954.

The existence of regional arrangements rests on two assumptions: First, the recognition that world unity, based on a common way of life and common values, is still very distant; and second, the increasingly inescapable conviction that, in our time, the great majority of national states are political and economic units illequipped to develop fully and even survive on solely national bases. Politically, most states have lost ground in a world which has had its centers of power radically diminished in the course of a generation. Economically, they are units too small to develop fully their natural resources and overcome their poverty unless they work together. The modern world needs to create regional units as a bridge between the isolated national state and a sufficiently integrated world collectivity of the future.

It is now three years since the Southcast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was rather hastily established after the French military collapse in Indo-China. What is its present effectiveness, and what are its prospects, as a security organization for Southeast Asia? There has never been any doubt or obscurity about SEATO's over-riding purpose to resist the extension, by whatever means, of communist rule in Southeast Asia. At die Manila Conference diere was some clash of opinion on how the purpose of die proposed body should be officially proclaimed. The United States wanted to limit it to resistance against communist aggression, while the United Kingdom and some odier countries diought it would be more politic to refer to aggression in general terms, since this might make SEATO less unpalatable to the Colombo powers. The United States then agreed to refer to aggression in general terms in the body of the Treaty, but announced its "Understanding" that its own military obligations were limited to die resistance of communist aggression. At the same time Australia insisted on its own proviso diat nothing in the Treaty must be construed as an obligation to intervene in any possible conflict between Asian members of the Commonwealth. Australia diereby sought to make it clear that SEATO was in no way concerned with the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. These verbal skirmishes only made it the more evident diat in fact, if not in form, SEATO was concerned solely widi stemming the advance of communism.

The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion is now almost universally considered to be “one of those rare politico-military events—a perfect failure.” One of the conclusions usually derived from that affair is the general inadvisability of direct United States intervention in the internal affairs of other nations to bring about desired changes in their domestic political structures. Almost simultaneously, however, the United States was doing just that in the Dominican Republic with a considerable degree of success, indicating that the lessons of the Cuban experience should not be overdrawn.