Studies in political science have revealed that voters evaluate candidates’ policy platforms based on gendered views, where women are expected to handle issues such as education well, while men are perceived to be better at issues such as national security. However, the extent to which voters’ views are gendered on immigration policy is less known, as existing theories offer varying interpretations of whether this issue is more aligned with the feminine or masculine stereotype. This paper empirically examines gendered evaluations of immigration policy platforms by conducting a survey experiment in Japan. Our experimental vignette presents a hypothetical candidate who is affiliated with a traditionally anti-immigration party but supports expanding immigration. We manipulate the gender of the candidate and the gendered framing of the position, and examine their interaction effects on attitudes to the candidate. Our experimental results show that the respondents do not evaluate the candidate based on gender and its interaction with the framing of the policy, suggesting that gender bias in voter evaluations may not be as severe as the literature expects in the immigration policy area.

Despite ongoing affective polarization in the United States, support for Taiwan has somehow remained unscathed; Democrats and Republicans unanimously endorse US-Taiwan foreign policy. This is reflected both in public opinion surveys of American voters and support for Taiwan from elected officials. Theories of foreign policy and public opinion suggest that whether voters take top-down or bottom-up cues on foreign policy, we should expect some level of polarization on a salient issue like Taiwan. Utilizing two preregistered survey experiments in the United States, this study tests how robust bipartisan support for Taiwan persists when Taiwan is framed as either a Republican or Democratic issue. When presented as a partisan issue, do American voters still support Taiwan? Contrary to theoretical expectations, Taiwan presents a complex reality. Some foreign policy issues related to Taiwan can become partisan when framed along party lines while others remain bipartisan. Specifically, support for diplomatic and military policy may be affected by partisan framing, but support for economic policy remains bipartisan. This study contributes to theories of public opinion and foreign policy, particularly for scholars focused on US-Taiwan and US-China relations.

Why do democracy supporters abandon their pursuit of a democratic system? Existing scholarship highlights how materialist incentive strategies employed by elites contribute to regime resilience; however, the cultural norms that motivate popular response to incentives remain unclear. We argue that East Asian individuals influenced by Confucianism interpret democracy through instrumental rationality, resulting in pragmatic democratic support. Ordinary citizens recognise the abstract ideals of democracy but hesitate to prioritise the democratic system over material well-being in trade-offs. To identify genuine supporters of democracy, this paper develops two conceptual tools: ‘minimum support for democracy (MSFD)’, which acknowledges the fundamental value of democracy, and ‘priority support for democracy (PSFD)’, which prioritises democratic principles and institutions over competing values. Using data from the latest fifth Asian Barometer Survey (2018–2022), our results suggest that Confucian values are compatible with the MSFD but simultaneously undermine the PSFD. Through mediation analysis, we further find that the instrumental understanding of democracy embedded within Confucianism drives people to abandon the PSFD. These findings shed light on the cultural roots of pragmatic democratic support, offering major implications for the prospects of democratisation in East Asia.

Diplomatic events are frequently cited as key determinants of public opinion on foreign countries. However, the process of political socialisation also plays a critical role in shaping such views over time. In this study, we examine trends in Japanese perceptions of China, Russia, and, as a comparative background, the U.S., focusing on the influences of age, period, and cohort effects. Utilising data from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude & Trends Survey (2007–2022), we apply the hierarchical age–period–cohort model to disentangle these three effects. Our findings indicate that while the older tend to hold more negative views of these three countries, the influence of age appears weaker than initially hypothesised. While major international crises tend to worsen perceptions across the board, regional disputes exert additional fluctuations (period effect). In comparison to the age and the period effects, cohort effects reveal a generational divide: First, contrasting with the U.S. case, different cohorts exhibit different perceptions toward China and Russia. Second, those born before or after the Cold War generally have more positive attitudes towards the two countries than those born during it. Notably, regional events appear to have little impact on these cohort-based attitudes. We also find that the age effect is more pronounced in the case of Russia, while period and cohort effects are more significant in the case of China. Our conclusions remain robust when controlling for other demographic factors. This study provides a temporal dynamics of Japanese foreign perceptions, utilising sociological methods to explore issues within international relations.