Will voters punish incumbents for psychological distress associated with public policy during external shocks? This study examines this question in the empirical context of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in India, utilizing three novel cross-sectional surveys conducted in the first three weeks of June 2020, immediately after the national lockdown policy was officially revoked. We find that propensity to vote for the nationally incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (if hypothetical elections were held on the day of the survey) was negatively correlated with mental stress from routine disruptions in mobility (Week 1); worsening mental health (Week 2); and emotion-focused coping (Week 3). We show that these effects are strongest in BJP-ruled states. We argue that psychological distress shaped political attitudes in the midst of the pandemic and this effect was conditional on the source of distress and moderated by governmental clarity of responsibility.

New Zealand made international waves when it implemented a wellbeing budget in 2019. We investigated the factors which facilitated the adoption of this novel budgeting policy. In interviews with 22 key informants from New Zealand’s central government, most interviewees (90% and over) emphasized the impact of politics, internal direction, and the international policy environment as key factors of effect on the formulation and adoption of wellbeing budgeting. Results of our study add new insights to Good’s theory that predicts similar motivations and behaviors to be expected from groups of budget actors who inhabit monolithic roles of politicians, treasury officials, and ministerial bureaucrats. Rather, even with inherent tensions within budget actor groups, they can be positioned to debate differing approaches that lead to the aim of adopting innovative policy. Wellbeing budgetary reform may be undertaken with a combination of legislation, fostering public sector debate, and responding to global conditions of uncertainty.

Do societies with more extensive welfare states also perform better environmentally? Surprisingly, the empirical evidence for this relationship remains inconclusive. We focus on CO2 emissions in lower-income countries and argue that considering state capacity as a moderator helps achieving greater theoretical and empirical clarity in understanding when the welfare state – climate change mitigation relationship. We hypothesize that lower-income societies with more developed welfare states exhibit lower carbon emissions when they also have more state capacity. The underlying mechanism centers on the ability of the state to compensate losers from policy change and its enforcement power required for policy implementation. Using data on CO2 emissions, social protection, and labor market regulations, as well as state capacity in 66 lower-income countries since 2005, we find that carbon emissions tend to be lower in countries characterized both by a welfare state focused on reducing socio-economic inequality and high state capacity.

To improve health coverage and revenue collection, several African countries consider tax-for-health-services programs where informal workers pay income tax for health insurance. We examine these programs in Nigeria, investigating whether informal workers support such initiatives, what parameters improve program perception, and what drives preferences about these parameters. Using a conjoint survey experiment with 12,000 informal workers across 12 Nigerian states, we find citizens more likely to support earmarked tax allocation programs, with tax level being most important. Informal workers with less healthcare experience and need, and those feeling distant from government, prioritize tax level and starting date more than others. Our study shows that informal workers in Nigeria generally support earmarked tax-for-health-services programs, but specific design parameters matter. Preferences vary based on healthcare experience and government trust. These findings inform the design of earmarked tax programs to improve healthcare coverage and revenue collection.