This article explores the strategic (mis)use of historical memory by populist political actors, focusing on George Simion, leader of the Romanian radical-right party Alliance for the Unity of Romanians. Through a detailed case study of the Valea Uzului Cemetery controversy, the research examines how populist movements construct and disseminate exclusionary historical narratives to mobilize affective publics, reinforce nationalistic ideologies, and generate political support. Drawing on qualitative analysis of Facebook comments and posts, the study investigates how memory is weaponized to polarize public opinion and elevate a simplified, antagonistic vision of history. The Valea Uzului case exemplifies how war cemeteries and commemorative practices can be transformed into symbolic battlegrounds for political gain. The digital environment serves as a key vector for radicalization, emotional amplification, and narrative reinforcement. Ultimately, this research highlights the critical role of memory in populist politics and the power of social media in shaping historical perception. It calls for further comparative investigation into how such mnemonic strategies impact democratic processes, interethnic relations, and the broader politics of remembrance in contemporary Europe.

The subject of this study comprises how Turkey’s EU membership is seen by HDP-supporter Kurdish voters in Turkey, as a non-EU country that has on-hold negotiations but still an ostensible vision for membership. There is a dearth of literature regarding Kurdish voters’ views on the EU, and this study, employing the focus group method, aims to address this gap by providing insights into the perspectives of Kurdish voters who support the HDP on Turkey-EU relations and their attitudes toward the EU. The study employs focus group methodology to assess whether the independentist demands that began to spring in Europe are also becoming popular among Kurdish voters. The primary finding derived from the focus group study indicates that the interviewees exhibited limited interest in both the EU negotiations and the EU’s handling of the Kurdish issue, and that the EU accession process failed to evoke significant enthusiasm among the interviewees. Meanwhile, developments pertaining to the Kurdish population in Syria and Iraq have generated a significantly higher level of enthusiasm when compared to the negotiations with the European Union.

This article focuses on perceptions and attitudes of ethnic minorities toward nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. It provides important insights on how ethnic minorities position and perceive themselves after more than thirty years of nation-building. The article draws on a survey (N=4,000) and semi-structured interviews conducted in 17 regions of Kazakhstan. It concludes that despite some variations in perceptions toward civic and ethnic identities, in general, ethnic minorities positively evaluate the nation-building processes in Kazakhstan. The evidence suggests that ethnic identity continues to play an important role in self-identification of ethnic minorities, while civic identity is important to a limited degree. The study also shows that there is variation across different ethnicities in terms of salience of ethnic and civic identities.

In a longue durée study of the European context from 1918 to the present day, this article critically assesses alternative modalities of self-determination proposed by two non-state, transnational actors – the Congress of European Nationalities (1925–1942) and the Federal Union of European Nationalities (established 1949). Situating the activism of these organizations within an international system that has prioritized state determination over the self-determination of peoples, the study charts their attempts to renegotiate dominant statist paradigms of minority protection and human rights, using ideals and frameworks of European integration as a guide. The analysis shows that although the rise of the European Union after 1945 created an environment far more propitious than the one that existed between the two World Wars, transnational activism has faced consistent limitations on its effectiveness, arising not just from the external machinations of states but also from internal divisions within the organizations concerned. In this respect, the study also sheds light on an enduring tension between collective and individual concepts of self-determination within contemporary Europe, demonstrated most recently by the Federal Union of European Nationalities’ failed European Citizens’ Initiative on a “Minority Safepack” during 2013–2021.

Following the 2020 Karabakh War, the emerging geopolitical realities compelled Iran to recalibrate its South Caucasus policy, prompting a shift away from its longstanding posture of neutrality. Despite the potential for Tehran to engage in cooperation through proposed regionalist projects by other actors, a significant shift towards regionalism in Iran’s approach to the South Caucasus remains elusive. This article delves into two primary sets of factors to understand the reasons behind this absence of regionalism in Iran’s foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. The first set encompasses general approaches in Iran’s foreign policy and the impact of domestic political dynamics on their development. It discusses Iran’s perceived impossibility of aligning with the South Caucasus states, the absence of a robust neighborhood policy, and Iran’s strategic isolation in the region, attributed to its unique political system and the ideological stance of its ruling elite. The second set examines external dynamics, including constant international pressure on the Islamic Republic, Iran’s deep-seated ideological and security attachment to the Arab Middle East, and the fluctuating nature of Tehran’s relations with the West. Collectively, these factors significantly limit Iran’s capacity to craft a coherent strategy for regional integration in the South Caucasus.

To what extent does refugee protection in Western Europe depend on the ethno-religious and gender identity of asylum seekers? This article examines how selective humanitarianism, shaped by the identity of asylum seekers and migrants, shapes their protection status. It offers an analysis of Germany’s response to Yezidi refugees, in comparison with that of France, in the wake of the genocidal campaign carried out by the Islamic State in 2014. Drawing on fieldwork that includes interviews with Yezidi refugees and stakeholders in Germany, we argue that contemporary asylum regimes operate through three interrelated mechanisms: the securitization of certain groups, selective humanitarian exceptions, and neoliberal selection criteria. The Yezidi experience illustrates how these mechanisms generate hierarchies of protection, wherein even recognized victims of genocide must meet increasingly economic thresholds to secure lasting refuge. While specialized programs for women survivors represent important humanitarian innovations, they often exclude male family members, thereby producing new forms of vulnerability. Struggling to align with dominant narratives of economically valuable migrants, Yezidis encounter a renewed form of liminality in Europe.

Studies investigating motivations for political participation in receiving-state politics among immigrant groups typically follow a traditional approach to understanding the process behind political engagement. In this work, the authors argue that this approach is insufficient if we want to understand the motivations of diasporic groups, notably in cases in which they are geographically close to home and influenced by both origin and receiving-state politics. This study examines the motivations for political party engagement among members of Bosnian diaspora in Austria and elucidates the links between political party membership and receiving-country political opportunity structures which formally result in political detachment from homeland politics. It does so through twenty-five interviews with Bosnian members of Austrian political parties conducted in fourteen cities in Austria. The article focuses on motivations for engagement in political parties which result in detachment from homeland politics and an identification with receiving-state politics. The findings reveal that pre-migratory experiences of war and membership in diasporic associations do not drive the motivations for engagement. Instead, their participation evolves from motives that are embedded in local experiences, while motives related to origin-state opportunity structures are negative or feebly present.

This article examines institutional fragmentation among key organisations in charge of Biafra’s struggle for independence since the year 2000. The article argues that contrary to the mainstream explanations, which attribute the split to the differences in tactics between organisations (Duruji 2012) or their relations with the state (Kalyvas 2008; Cunningham 2014), organisational cohesion is largely absent due to the struggle for power and resources among the leaders in charge of the organisations. Supported by the in-depth interviews with key informants, we treat Biafran secessionist organisations as business models through which leading politicians act as political entrepreneurs and engage in predatory rent-seeking practices to maximise profits and power through the institutions that represent the collective struggle.

The study explores the engagement of Russophone Ukrainians with educational policies that increase the status of the Ukrainian language, the standardized tests of Ukrainian, and the subject tests that could be passed in Ukrainian. It argues that this centralized unitary language policy has received support from Russophones. It does so by analyzing the language choices of Russophone students when taking standardized tests in various subjects, as well as admission policies and discussions of relevant policies in local media and social media of the Russophone city of Kharkiv. It shows that following the introduction of standardized tests, the value of Ukrainian has increased across various actors: students have been choosing Ukrainian more, universities have valued Ukrainian in the admission process, and local citizens have defended the status of Ukrainian, relying on decolonial rhetoric. It shows that the decolonial framing of the Ukrainization policies resonated with Russophones enough for them to support them, and not to result in a backlash.

The main objective of this article is to examine history textbooks as sites of discursive contestation regarding the treatment of the 1986 Jeltoqsan protests, a pivotal moment in post-independence Kazakhstani collective memory. This research analyzes the multilayered and inter-discursive domains of Jeltoqsan across the History of Kazakhstan textbooks published between 1992 and 2024. It focuses on four key contested themes between official narratives and those of protest mourners and sufferers: the portrayal of Dinmukhamed Qonaev, whose dismissal sparked the protests; the role of former President Nursultan Nazarbaev in handling the aftermath; the framing of Jeltoqsan as either an ordinary event or an uprising for significant political change; and ethnic or non-ethnic dimension of the protests. The findings reveal discursive competition and conflict in articulating the official and protestor narratives.

Cultural transfers between metropolitan cores and colonial peripheries, have been a constant feature of the history of modern nationalism. Anti-colonial movements also influenced to some extent the development and strategies of European national movements before 1939. After 1945, and with particular intensity following the Algerian War of Independence, claims for national self-determination from the colonial possessions of the European empires also influenced the development of regional and national movements within Western Europe. This was flanked by the adoption of Marxist-Leninist and New Left doctrines by the post-war generation leading Western European minority nationalisms. The article deals with the reformulation of national self-determination in Europe under the influence of anti-colonial thought, particularly since the adoption of the theories of “internal colonialism”, and the new dimension given to the theory of national liberation by authors such as Frantz Fanon. It also looks at the emergence of radical ethno-nationalist parties in the 1960s and their commitment to this new wave of anti-colonial self-determination. Finally, the attempts of some of these movements to articulate a transnational programme will be analysed.

This article investigates the transformation of the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan, tracing a significant shift from Nazarbayev to Tokayev’s presidencies. The narrative of the Golden Horde became a strategic component of the second president, Tokayev, who announced the commemoration of 750 years of the Horde foundation in Kazakhstan and proclaimed that it laid the foundations for Kazakh statehood. The research explores the abrupt transformation of the official historical narrative and underscores the pivotal role of historians as memory actors. The study investigates the “memory game” between two schools of historians in independent Kazakhstan, revealing the agency of a new generation of historians in reshaping the national historical narrative through historicizing strategies, thus engaging in memory politics. This contribution extends the literature on the mnemonic context in Kazakhstan and non-state memory actors in authoritarian settings, shedding light on the dynamics of historical representation and memory politics in evolving mnemonic landscapes.

By analyzing articles published in the official publication of the Latvian SSR Union of Writers, this article examines how Latgalian identity and culture were constructed by the Soviet Latvian intelligentsia before, during, and after the 1958 Latgale Culture Week in Riga. Interwar-era narratives that had identified Latgale as the Latvian internal Other were endemic to the center-periphery relations in Soviet Latvia during the Khrushchev Thaw. Consequently, politicized representations of Latgale in the late 1950s deferred to the same discursive frames that had contributed to the formation of Latvian national imaginaries of Latgale as underdeveloped, backward, and fundamentally Other. By situating the Culture Week in a colonial setting and critically examining the historical entanglement of Latgale in multiple structures of power – Soviet and Latvian – this article shows that performances of Latgalian identity during the Culture Week became a tool for both nationally minded members of the Latvian Communist Party (LCP) and Russophile Soviet state-builders to consolidate power and project an image of national unity at a time of growing political strife in the LCP.

In the last few years, Hindu nationalism’s effort to shape the Hindu identity of the nation has intensified. Apart from its move to assert cultural homogenisation over the diverse landscape, this ideology produces a newer understanding of spaces in the land. When it is read as a part of the broader Hindutva movement, the use of violence, bureaucratic overreach, or judicial intervention to rewrite the sacred topography of the land unmasks the territorial goal of Hindu Rashtra. The territorial manifestation of this ideology takes a strident effort inside the country to encroach and reclaim the spaces inhabited by the “other” as Hindu spaces in the name of the nation. This immediately establishes a clear and precise correlation between the spaces and the nature of the spaces. This territorialisation of the spaces indicates the spatial rearrangement of the public spaces to marginalise minorities, invisibilise Muslims, and push them into the “private” space.

This article aims to analyse the historical, political, and socio-cultural significance of the Alash Orda movement in shaping Kazakh national identity and the quest for autonomy during the early 20th century. The research draws on a range of primary sources, including archival documents and speeches, as well as scholarly works by Kazakh and international historians. It analyses how Alash leaders developed a multifaceted political strategy to secure autonomy amidst the chaotic transition from imperial rule to revolutionary governance. Central to their approach was diplomacy: the Alash Orda government sought to establish ties with the Russian Provisional Government and A. Kolchak’s White Army, aiming to build alliances supportive of Kazakh autonomy. The movement also reached out to international organisations, seeking external recognition and assistance. Despite these efforts, the study demonstrates that Alash Orda ultimately failed to achieve lasting success in establishing a stable autonomous Kazakh state. Alongside this political narrative, the study highlights the cultural and educational initiatives of Alash Orda, particularly its promotion of the Kazakh language and national identity in the face of Russification policies.

How do people form durable cognitive and affective bonds to state territories? How do these place attachments become rigid? I argue that territorial attachments rest on what social epistemologists call structural ignorance — background knowledge and cognitive mechanisms that filter out discomforting narratives to preserve a dominant view. As the state structures ignorance and as people reproduce it, certain knowledges — the nation’s artificialness and the past presence/ongoing oppression of non-core groups inhabiting the state’s territory — cannot be known, lest people’s cognitive environment and sense of self be disrupted. As structured ignorance becomes entrenched, territorial attachments rigidify. I shed light on the territorializing practices-structured ignorance-rigid attachments mechanism through the case of Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Through discourse analysis and practice tracing, I find that as the Azerbaijani state structured ignorance during the Soviet era about the symbolic significance of Nagorno-Karabakh and the erasure of ethnic Armenians, territorial attachments grew. I then show how the 1988–1994 war over Nagorno-Karabakh and practices leading to the 2020 War entrenched the structure and rigidified attachments. Uncovering the structure of ignorance and the attachments it prescribes reveals new ramifications of nation-building and one of the facets of intractable conflicts.

The article addresses the paradox of the Russian legislation on nonterritorial, aka “national-cultural” autonomy – the lack of utilitarian ends and functions combined with a high domestic public demand for it. The author seeks to explain the case as simulation, or activities for the sake of demonstrating activities without definite substantive purposes. The analysis reveals that the relevant law’s goals and justifications voiced by the stakeholders were merely a combination of socially acceptable opinions unrelated to result-oriented action. These opinions were part of a common-sense worldview based on group-centric and essentialist vision of ethnicity and on neoliberal postulates, such as the need to foster bottom-up initiative and self-organization, the rejection of governmental social obligations, and the need for strict regulatory mechanisms securing fair relationships among the players. A brief comparison with a similar case in Europe reveals that simulation can take place in other contexts related to nonterritorial autonomy. Thus, a focus on simulative action must be a promising approach for research concerning the imaginaries of groups as entities and actors.

The Cominform resolution was a turning point in the history of Yugoslavia. In the context of the Cold War, the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Eastern Bloc also had serious consequences on a global level, representing the first major split in the international communist movement after World War II. However, echoes of the split within the million-strong Yugoslav overseas diaspora have not drawn much scientific interest, despite the diaspora’s extensive involvement in the socio-political situation in Yugoslavia throughout the 20th century. The goal of the article is to study the Tito-Stalin split as an international crisis of enormous significance through the local politics of diaspora to better understand its nature and impact. The influence of the diaspora’s host countries’ communist parties must be emphasised in order to understand why most Yugoslav emigrants in the west supported Cominform, as shown through the analysis of sources originating from archives in Australia, New Zealand, Croatia, and Serbia.

Situated at the intersection of language rights, nation-building processes, and security issues, this article analyzes language policies in Ukraine in the three decades since its independence (1991–2021). It traces the legal evolution and decisions of the Ukrainian Constitutional Court, identifying the specific ideological approaches towards language issues that emerge in such a development. We distinguish four periods in the evolution of Ukrainian laws, highlighting how these stages reflect specific ontological and societal (in)securities and related securitization processes, and their intersection with the process of nation-building and the role assigned to the Ukrainian language in such a process. In this way, the article discusses how, in light of the Soviet legacy and Russian kin-state activism and geopolitical agenda, Ukraine has moved to adopt a more assertive nationalizing approach to language issues that aim at promoting Ukrainian as the state language. Russia’s aggressive actions accelerated the ongoing nation-building process, interplaying with the relevance assigned to the Ukrainian language for the Ukrainian nation-state as well as the country’s ontological and societal (in)securities. In this way, our contribution complements our understanding of language policies, bringing to light the connections of their evolution and variations with how security concerns affect nation-building processes.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, pandemic-driven nationalism surged in China, exemplified by widespread mockery and disparagement of India’s handling of the crisis in Chinese cyberspace. Adopting a linguistically grounded approach, this study scrutinizes how India is discursively constructed as an inferior Other amid COVID-19. It conducts a linguistically informed discourse analysis of a highly viewed text on Zhihu (China’s largest online Q&A platform). Drawing mainly on Halliday’s transitivity theory, this study unpacks the linguistic features in the chosen text, which, within a discourse of modern medicine, depicts the Indian people as trapped between hopelessly passive and absurdly overactive in the face of the pandemic. The text also casts the Indian government as an impotent foil to the Chinese government, a representation situated within a discourse of strong-state pandemic governance. By interrogating the non-official social media text through a linguistic lens, this study contributes to understanding China’s representational politics of Othering the non-West within the intertextual nexus between official and non-official spheres. It also contributes to making sense of the multidimensionality and ambivalence underlying Chinese national identity-making as well as “Orientalism within the ‘Orient’” in the Chinese context.