This essay is part of an ongoing dialogue on INTERPOL’s role in international law and global governance. It argues that INTERPOL’s 2025 General Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICPO-INTERPOL (General Agreement)1 reflects a remarkable development in the multilateral recognition of international organizations.

Whatever may have been thought in the past, including within the United Nations (UN), there is now no reason to doubt the status of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) as an international organization.1 That is important for many reasons, including its status under international and national law, which is fundamental for its dealings with states and other international organizations, not least the UN, and for immunities and other international privileges.

The decentralized international legal order arguably creates structural incentives for states to utilize INTERPOL—an entity of virtually universal membership—to reduce gaps in transnational police cooperation. One of INTERPOL’s iconic actions is the release of a Red Notice. It is the publication of decentralized requests by a member country or approved international entities such as the International Criminal Court (ICC),1 asking police worldwide to locate and, if applicable domestic law and treaties permit, provisionally arrest wanted persons or restrict their movement, pending extradition or surrender.2 Although INTERPOL does not have legal authority to oblige members to arrest persons in question, a Red Notice regularly leads to border stops or arrest pending extradition, travel or visa denials, and knock-on effects such as banking and employment difficulties. The fragmented international legal order may have paradoxically generated structural incentives to support a level of centrality represented by INTERPOL.

INTERPOL is recognized as an international organization with legal personality, a permanent structure, and independent decision-making authority. Its operational core lies in facilitating international police cooperation, primarily through the exchange and processing of data related to criminal matters. The present essay develops a working concept of shared responsibility in this particular context.

Over centuries and across continents, authoritarian governments have demonstrated a large appetite for international cooperation to target political opponents across borders. In 1851, the “first modern police organization”—the Police Union of German States, whose members included Austria and Prussia—was established “with the express purpose of policing the political opposition of established autocratic regimes.”1 During the 1970s and early 1980s, military regimes in South America participated in a secret scheme known as Operation Condor to coordinate their efforts to suppress subversion.2 A recent analysis of twenty-nine “hard authoritarian” regional organizations found that twenty-five were engaged in police cooperation.3 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an example. Its member states have agreed to jointly fight the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism.4 Following a 2009 demonstration that led to riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang, some organizers fled abroad; at China’s behest, SCO members Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan detained and then extradited them back to China.5

Out of the many fascinating issues concerning the International Criminal Police Organization—INTERPOL (INTERPOL), I would like to concentrate on three main themes and topics. The first one has to do with the status of INTERPOL and the potential impact of a multilateral privileges and immunities treaty on such status. The second concerns the challenges arising from the case of Waite and Kennedy v. Germany1 (Waite and Kennedy), and whatever followed in the “shadow of Waite and Kennedy,”2 not only for INTERPOL, but for international organizations more generally. The third theme addresses the responses to Waite and Kennedy, and particularly the availability of suitable alternative dispute settlement mechanisms—an issue that is currently discussed in the International Law Commission.3