This article argues that power–dependence relations are a crucial dimension of analysis to understand how states navigate between realist and liberal logics and particularly between the balancing and integration strategies. Specifically, I distinguish between three types of power–dependence relationships: limitation, neutralisation, and competition. Limitation and neutralisation make the balancing strategy viable by allowing power to offset dependence and thus preserve the autonomy of the state. On the other hand, when limitation and neutralisation are no longer workable, particularly in the case of cross-temporal interdependence, the balancing strategy becomes unreliable, and integration tends to become an attractive alternative. In the case of competition between a state’s different sources of dependence, the loss of flexibility brought about by integration may prove costly by limiting the state’s ability to address various dependencies simultaneously. Empirically, I illustrate these mechanisms by showing that post-war European integration started as a response to a situation of cross-temporal interdependence between France and West Germany, which tended to make the limitation and neutralisation strategies unreliable. However, military integration was later hindered by the tension between competing sources of dependence for France, which increased the cost of the loss of flexibility entailed by military centralisation.

This article argues that process tracing is a viable and suitable methodological alternative to probe the implications of formal models specifying how the dynamics of belief formation may systematically cause bargaining failures under uncertainty. I illustrate the argument with a brief case study of the failure of the European Defence Community in postwar Europe.