Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left‐leaning citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right‐wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left‐wing parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration issues. Deliberative theory promises that discussion, information and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizen. This article assesses the extent to which deliberative polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. More specifically, it gauges the extent to which especially less well educated left‐wing voters – those whose attitudes research finds to be particularly out of tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration – adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational input and the presentation of two‐sided arguments. Use is made of unique data generated during the first European‐wide deliberative polling project, ‘EuroPolis’, held in 2009. The results indicate that less well educated left‐wing voters indeed have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with secondary or post‐secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro‐mechanisms of attitude change in a deliberative setting, the analyses show that both levels of education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four models, evidence is found that less well educated left‐leaning citizens are indeed most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic.

Prominent theories claim that young Europeans are increasingly socialist as well as divided from their elders on non‐economic issues. This paper asks whether age‐based polarisation is really growing in Europe, using new estimates of the ideological positions of different age groups in 27 European countries across four issue domains from 1981 to 2018. The young in Europe turn out to be relatively libertarian: more socially liberal than the old in most countries but also more opposed to taxation and government spending. These age divides are not growing either: today's differences over social issues and immigration are similar in size to the 1980s, and if anything are starting to fall. Analysis of birth cohorts points to persistent cohort effects and period effects as the explanation for these patterns; there is little evidence that European cohorts become uniformly more right‐wing or left‐wing with age. Hence age‐based polarisation need not be a permanent or natural feature of European politics but is dependent on the changing social, political and economic climate.

This article examines support for radical left ideologies in 32 European countries. It thus extends the relatively scant empirical research available in this field. The hypotheses tested are derived mainly from group‐interest theory. Data are deployed from the 2002–2010 European Social Surveys (N = 174,868), supplemented by characteristics at the country level. The results show that, also in the new millennium, unemployed people and those with a lower income are more likely to support a radical left ideology. This is only partly explained by their stronger opinion that governments should take measures to reduce income differences. In contrast to expectations, the findings show that greater income inequality within a country is associated with reduced likelihood of an individual supporting a radical left ideology. Furthermore, cross‐national differences in the likelihood of supporting the radical left are strongly associated with whether a country has a legacy of an authoritarian regime.

Previous studies comparing ideological groups have been restricted to tests of between‐group differences in the means of relevant political psychological variables, thereby neglecting group differences in the variances, meanings and nomological networks of the tested variables. A first exploratory study used data from the European Social Survey (N = 7,314) comparing groups of political party members on the basis of their scores on a self‐placement left–right scale. The second study (N = 69) constituted an in‐depth test for the presence of differences between samples of political activists of moderate parties, communists, anarchists and right‐wing extremists. The results revealed that there is a fair amount of heterogeneity within left‐wing and right‐wing extremists, indicating a substantial amount of within‐group variance of social attitudes, values and prejudice. Moreover, the extremist ideologies are best approached as distinct ideologies that cannot be reduced to extreme versions of moderate ideology, and differences in the meanings and nomological networks of the various extremist ideologies were also obtained. It is erroneous to consider members of extremist groups as being ‘all alike’. The findings obtained from samples of political moderates are not a particularly solid basis for theories about extremism.

How do political parties respond to external shocks? Using an original survey of political parties across Europe conducted in June 2020 and Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) data on partisan ideological positioning, we argue that the pre‐existing ideological stances of Europe's political parties shaped their response to emerging Covid‐19 policy issues, including the tension between economic normalization and containment, legal versus voluntary enforcement and the role of science in policymaking. We find that party ideology powerfully predicts how parties, both in government and in opposition, responded to the pandemic.

A certain type of citizen holds technocratic views. They favour pragmatic problem solving through scientific and technical expertise, and reject party politics for being harmful to the common good. Yet, empirical evidence on the ideological profile of these citizens is fragmented and inconclusive. Using an original survey in Western Europe, Australia and the United States, we test predictions about the left−right alignment of citizens with technocratic attitudes on the economic and cultural dimensions of politics. We argue that technocracy is not antithetical to ideology and that citizens holding technocratic attitudes are not immune to ideological positions. Findings show that technocratic citizens are more economically left-wing than mainstream voters, contrary to common associations of technocracy with neoliberal economic principles. However, they are more centrist than populists. This highlights that, in addition to a representational challenge, technocracy mounts an ideological challenge to party-based representative democracy. In times of cumulative crises, which put democracies under stress with demands for competence and effectiveness, these findings offer insights about the appeal of alternative forms of representation.

Do individuals with right‐wing populist ideologies have higher violence‐justification attitudes than those supporting different political ideologies? While the literature has confirmed the association between political violence and populism, research on which components of populist ideologies relate to individual attitudes towards political violence is relatively scarce. Based on 18 European democracies, this research note examines whether right‐wing populist individuals are more likely to justify political violence to pursue their political goals. The analyses reveal that right‐wing populists are generally more likely to justify political violence compared to mainstream voters and non‐voters. Additionally, left‐wing populist voters also support political violence, although the effect size is comparatively smaller. This indicates that voters’ radicalisation depends on populist ideologies rather than left‐right ideological distinctions. The effect among right‐wing populists depends on city residence, gender and immigration status. Subsequent analyses suggest that right‐wing populists’ attitudes towards violence are not conditional on nativism or anti‐immigration perceptions. These findings contribute to the general understanding of the nature and consequences of populism.

Under what conditions is decentralisation a salient issue for state‐wide political parties? It is argued in this article that the extent to which state‐wide parties emphasise decentralisation depends on their strategic considerations: on their overall ideology, on the electoral incentives created by the context in which they compete, and on the interaction between the two. The results of the analysis of party manifestos in 31 countries since 1945 are as follows. First, parties that pay greater attention to cultural matters relative to economic matters tend to talk more about decentralisation. Second, the systemic salience of decentralisation also encourages parties to talk more about decentralisation. Third, the larger the regionally based ethnic groups within a country, the more salience all state‐wide political parties will attach to decentralisation. Finally, only parties that put greater relative emphasis on cultural matters tend to respond to the electoral threat of regionalist parties. The influence of territorial diversity on the salience of decentralisation thus works through two channels and is partly conditioned by political parties’ ideological profile.

Choosing a candidate can be difficult in open‐list proportional representation systems, with many candidates on display. Under such circumstances, candidates' personal vote‐earning attributes (PVEAs) become useful for voters since PVEAs function as information shortcuts (heuristics) that reduce the cognitive costs of casting a ballot. However, recent research has demonstrated that more cognitively demanding information, namely candidates' ideological positions, also matters for candidates' electoral success. Yet, much is unknown about the circumstances under which ideology comes into play. In this study, we demonstrate that the availability of easily applied heuristics (operationalized via the level of recognizable candidates on party lists) conditions the effect of candidates' ideological positioning on intra‐party success. Our analyses show that ideology matters most when the share of recognizable candidates with typical PVEAs on the list is limited. The effect of ideological distance from the party gradually disappears as the share of recognizable candidates on the list increases. The results suggest that when the supply of candidates with PVEAs is limited, voters use ideological cues as the base for their voting decisions.

Representative democracy is perceived to be in crisis in many Western countries. Increasing citizen participation is often considered to be a remedy to close this gap between government and the people. Which instruments should be used to realize this remains, however, open for discussion. In this article, we compare attitudes of citizens, politicians and civil servants towards a number of participatory instruments. We assess to what extent these attitudes are influenced by ‘interests’ (operationalized as the formal position one takes: either politician, citizen or civil servant) and ‘ideas’ (measured as ideological beliefs), while holding the institutional context constant (the local level in Flanders [Belgium]). Analyses based on a large‐scale survey (N = 4,168) show that although the ideological position of the respondents to some extent affects attitudes towards particular participatory instruments, especially their formal position has a considerable impact on how participatory instruments are appreciated. Indeed, different stakeholders distinctly advance different instruments as the best way to enhance citizen participation. This raises questions about the potential of citizen participation to narrow the gap between citizens and policymakers, as diverging attitudes towards particular instruments might create a new gap rather than closing one.

Governments around the world are experimenting with deliberative mini‐publics as a means of integrating public input into policymaking processes, including as a method for directly creating policy. This raises the important question of when ordinary people will judge the outputs of mini‐publics to be legitimate and support their use. We investigate how public support for mini‐publics is shaped by: (1) whether the mini‐public is held in response to calls from politicians or from the general public; (2) which political party sets up the mini‐public; and (3) whether there is partisan conflict surrounding the mini‐public's creation. To do so, we use two pre‐registered survey experiments fielded in the United Kingdom that focus on climate assemblies, a prominent form of deliberative mini‐public. Results are three‐fold. First, we find some evidence that assemblies are more positively evaluated when they stem from the demands of local residents rather than partisan actors, but this effect is relatively modest and does not emerge consistently across our analyses. Similar findings are noted with regard to partisanship. Partisan conflict, by contrast, has a more robust effect – leading respondents to adopt more ideologically stereotypical views of the assembly, with left‐wing (right‐wing) respondents being more supportive of Labour‐sponsored (Conservative‐sponsored) assemblies.

During the COVID‐19 pandemic, public opinion regarding restrictions and lockdowns was quickly characterized by significant disagreement. In a societal crisis such as COVID‐19, it is important to understand the drivers behind citizens’ attitudes and behaviours. Political disagreement related to COVID‐19 restrictions and lockdowns has often been interpreted as an ideological or partisan divide along the left‐right dimension of political opinion. Here, we argue that there is more to unpack. There is increasing awareness that public opinion is structured by both left‐right orientation and trust in the system. In this paper, we examine the divide in COVID‐19 attitudes and behaviours and compare the influence of ideology and system trust as drivers across countries and across time during the pandemic. Based on monthly surveys from eight countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, France and Italy) from September 2020 to July 2021 (total sample of 49,414 respondents), we show that citizens with right‐wing ideologies and those who do not trust ‘the system’ perceived a lower threat from the coronavirus, were less supportive of government measures against the virus, report having changed their behaviour less and report lower intentions to vaccinate against COVID‐19 compared to citizens with left‐wing ideologies and those with high system trust. These results are stable across time and across countries. We also find that behavioural differences are larger between those who support the system and those who do not than between those with right‐ and left‐wing ideological outlooks, respectively. This implies that system trust is at least as important as ideology in terms of shaping cleavages in COVID‐19 attitudes and behaviours. The results suggest that in order to increase public support for societal responses during a crisis, it is not only important to appeal to both sides of the ideological spectrum, but also to appeal to those who do not trust ‘the system’.

This article addresses the problem of unclear usage of “coercion” and “repression” in literature concerning protest and repression in democratic and nondemocratic states. It questions the bases and conclusions of domestic democratic peace theory and discusses its consequences. The article proposes expanding definitions of coercion and repression in terms of timing, agency, and perceptiveness. Using vocabulary of poststructuralist discourse theory and the “logics” approach to analyzing social phenomena, it introduces the notion of hegemonic coercion and repression and describes their functioning. It argues that contemporary liberal democracies are not free from coercion and repression, but that the hegemony embodied in the state is able to sustain itself by means of hegemonic coercion with little use of direct violence. Consequently, the absence of state violence is not a criterion of a mature democracy, but can also be a characteristic of a totalitarian regime where ideological deviations are strictly and preemptively controlled.