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This chapter systematically teases out and reflects on the antinomies and aporias that characterize each of two broad sets of international human rights solidarity argumentation. These are the broadly shared discourses on the issue that emanate in each case from the Global North and Global South. Why do Global North States tend to accept and focus on binding international human rights obligations in the civil and political (CP) rights area, while demurring regarding similarly mandatory legal duties to express international solidarity in regard to economic and social (ES) rights? And why do Global South countries tend to argue in favor of such binding obligations with regard to ES rights but not nearly as much regarding CP rights? The chapter is mainly concerned with the rather ironic circulation and eclipsing of relevant antinomies and aporias in plain sight; their relationships to state sovereignty argumentation; and their connections to global power relations as ideationally constitutive forces. In the last respect, the key question is what the relative roles of values/norms in international human rights solidarity argumentation are, vis-à-vis global power relations. And these questions should highlight for scholars the imperative to track internationalist praxis over the longue durée.
In this chapter, I contrast the account of fictionality presented in the previous chapter with Walton’s, whose work was decisive in shaping it. In recent work, he gives up his account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples that allegedly show that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. Both in support and in further elaboration of the constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that was presented in the previous chapter, I critically discuss his objections here. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, this chapter provides additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à-vis both Walton’s account and Gricean speech-act proposals.
This introductory chapter sets out the book’s key findings, methodology and structure. It also introduces the principal questions the book seeks to address. How have agents, operating at national, international and transnational levels, attempted to institutionalise the norm of corporate accountability for human rights violations linked to transnational corporate activity? What do these initiatives reveal about the nature of transnational legalisation, and how legalisation should be framed or conceptualised in the twenty-first century? Finally, could a revised framework of legalisation help explain when transnational litigation and soft law initiatives are more likely to succeed in the future?
This is a book focusing on a comparative analysis of business systems primarily involving and surrounding the firms/enterprises across three leading economies in the world, that is, the United States, China, and Japan. The book will discuss one basic question: how does law matter to business practice, together with the markets and social norms of each jurisdiction? The book’s framework is as follows: the firm acts as a forum for incentive bargaining among four major participants: management and employees as human capital providers, creditors, and shareholders as monetary capital providers. Each participant will bargain with each other to maximize its own payoff based on exogenous factors: the situation of various markets (products, labor, intellectual property rights, and capital), social norms (e.g., shareholder value maximization model and stakeholder model), and enterprise law. This book will include the government as the fifth player of this game in the sense that the government provides indispensable resources (physical, social, and legal infrastructures) to the firm, shares the pie via tax revenue, and bargains with the other four players.
This paper presents a logic programming-based framework for policy-aware autonomous agents that can reason about potential penalties for noncompliance and act accordingly. While prior work has primarily focused on ensuring compliance, our approach considers scenarios where deviating from policies may be necessary to achieve high-stakes goals. Additionally, modeling noncompliant behavior can assist policymakers by simulating realistic human decision-making. Our framework extends Gelfond and Lobo’s Authorization and Obligation Policy Language ($\mathscr{AOPL}$) to incorporate penalties and integrates Answer Set Programming (ASP) for reasoning. Compared to previous approaches, our method ensures well-formed policies, accounts for policy priorities, and enhances explainability by explicitly identifying rule violations and their consequences. Building on the work of Harders and Inclezan, we introduce penalty-based reasoning to distinguish between noncompliant plans, prioritizing those with minimal repercussions. To support this, we develop an automated translation from the extended $\mathscr{AOPL}$ into ASP and refine ASP-based planning algorithms to account for incurred penalties. Experiments in two domains demonstrate that our framework generates higher-quality plans that avoid harmful actions while, in some cases, also improving computational efficiency. These findings underscore its potential for enhancing autonomous decision-making and informing policy refinement.
Policy makers can use four different modes of governance: ‘hierarchy’, ‘markets’, ‘networks’ and ‘persuasion’. In this article, it is argued that ‘nudging’ represents a distinct (fifth) mode of governance. The effectiveness of nudging as a means of bringing about lasting behaviour change is questioned and it is argued that evidence for its success ignores the facts that many successful nudges are not in fact nudges; that there are instances when nudges backfire; and that there may be ethical concerns associated with nudges. Instead, and in contrast to nudging, behaviour change is more likely to be enduring where it involves social identity change and norm internalisation. The article concludes by urging public policy scholars to engage with the social identity literature on ‘social influence’, and the idea that those promoting lasting behaviour change need to engage with people not as individual cognitive misers, but as members of groups whose norms they internalise and enact.
Huntington's third wave of democracy was no such thing. It neither ushered in a democratic era nor was it a wave in any acceptable historical sense. What it did do was to highlight a contrast and competition among norms and values, so that what we automatically regard as undemocratic practice that is norm-free is no such thing. They might perhaps, and with a freight of contingencies, be bad norms—but they are still norms.
NGOs are recognized as active participants in the policy process. There is general agreement that they are agenda setters and important actors in the framing of public issues. They are well-recognized providers of social services on behalf of, or in partnership with, private and public actors. Previous research demonstrates that the institutional context accounts for the extent of NGOs’ access to and influence over public policy making. Nonetheless, we know less about why there are important differences in the way they approach the policy process. Comparing the organizational evolution of two Spanish NGOs, both active in the field of humanitarian aid and poverty alleviation over a period of more than 50 years, this article contributes to our understanding of the relevance of organizational structure in NGOs as a determining factor in their role in public policy. Drawing on institutional organizational analysis, a theoretical framework is developed to assess the importance of organizational structure in explaining why NGOs take on different roles in the policy process, even when sharing the same institutional context. NGOs are driven by pre-existing institutions and legacy that affect the way they resolve conflict and engage in internal bargaining.
Norm contestation has become a defining characteristic of our time and a major interest in International Relations (IR) scholarship. However, researchers often view contestation as a repudiation of norm socialization and thus overlook the ways in which contestation occurs within socialization. This article advances an interpretive account based on performativity to capture the role of cultural translation and appropriation as practices of contestation within processes of norm socialization. It makes three key interventions. First, it redefines norm socialization as a process of cultural translation rather than straightforward transition. Second, it investigates various strategies through which actors appropriate norms by disjointing a norm’s normative appeal from its normalizing power – its prevalent interpretation. Third, it underscores how such contestations destabilize the relationships of authority and hierarchy in normative engagements. To illustrate the analytical purchase of this framework, the paper analyses the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood’s discourses of ‘Islamic democracy’ and the ‘Islamic civil state’ as examples of their performative socialization into the norm of democracy. The paper concludes by reflecting on the democratic promise as well as the precariousness of performative socialization in world politics.
Chapter 8 departs slightly from the focus on translation activity by shining a light on the translator, in an effort to highlight their role in the translation process itself, often minimized for the benefit of the text. The chapter serves as a reminder that the translator also has an impact on the text. It addresses what is meant by the translator’s (in)visibility and how practicing or aspiring translators can incorporate this notion into their practice and knowledge base. Also addressed are related topics such as norms, codes of ethics, agency, positionality and ideology. Additionally, the chapter helps inform aspiring translators and those who work with translators about the role and professional expectations for translators, including their role as agents of social justice, the translator’s workplace, recent changes in the field, translator profiles, and the qualifications and skills needed to work as a translator. This chapter guides readers to an understanding of the translator’s possible role/s and assists them with the creation of their own professional identity.
United Nations peacekeeping is drifting from its post–Cold War liberal model toward a more sovereignty-focused approach. This essay posits that the change is not formal or doctrinal, but instead emerges through institutional drift and norm reinterpretation, driven by accelerated US retrenchment, China and Russia’s growing influence, host-state assertiveness, and internal United Nations adaptation. Drawing on theories of norm dynamics, bureaucratic culture, and empirical studies of peacekeeping mission practice, the analysis shows how liberal principles, such as democratization and human rights, are increasingly sidelined in favor of conflict containment and host-state support. The essay concludes by outlining four potential futures for peacekeeping: gradual drift into stabilization, normative fragmentation and regionalization, niche reaffirmation of liberalism, and formal norm redefinition. Together, these scenarios suggest peacekeeping is entering a postliberal era, marked not by collapse, but by contested adaptation within a shifting world order.
The two crises in this chapter share three main characteristics. They involve territorial (border) conflict that relates to the independence of Ukraine (or, relatedly, the breakup of the Soviet Union), feature an East–West tension, and (as of this writing) do not escalate to a war among the major states. In 2014, after Ukraine attempted to move closer to Europe (i.e., it contemplated an EU agreement and the pro-Russian government fell), Putin annexed Crimea to secure the long-held naval base there. Although done forcefully, there were no military fatalities. In 2022, amidst a fear that Ukraine was again moving closer to Europe (i.e., it looked to be closer to joining NATO and its government became less pro-Russian), Russia invaded Ukraine. It failed to take Kyiv, even though it heavily bombed Ukraine. Russia then withdrew to the east, where a majority of Russian speakers had sought to separate from Ukraine. The United States and the European Union gave weapons and aid that expanded as the war continued. Deaths mounted on both sides. The Russians successfully created a land bridge from the Donbas to Crimea. After his election, Trump attempted to negotiate a settlement that would end the war.
This chapter summarizes the main lessons for diplomacy that we derive from our study. These eight lessons are: 1. A major factor separates the crises that escalate to war from those that do not; in the latter, a strong leader reins in any hard-liners who advocate going to war. 2. Individuals make a difference. 3. Contingency plays a more important role than system structure in determining whether or not a crisis escalates to war. 4. Someone must stand for peace. 5. The secret to preventing war structurally is to find a functional equivalent to war. 6. Norms and rules are important for avoiding war – and, therefore, maintaining peace. 7. War can be avoided; it is not inevitable. 8. The realist concepts of the national interest and balance of power do not always accurately describe the behavior of states.
The Munich conference notoriously symbolizes appeasement and its failure. The issue under dispute concerns territory – specifically, the Sudetenland. This territorial dispute was initially internal to Czechoslovakia, a disagreement between the Sudetenland Germans and the central government of Czechoslovakia. Eventually, however, the nationalistic element to the dispute brought in the German government. The major powers avoided war because the French and British prime ministers – Daladier and Chamberlain, respectively – forced the Czechoslovakian president, Benes, to accept the peaceful transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, based on the norm of nationalism (or self-determination). As this case shows, when actors widely agree on the norms through which territory can change hands, the probability of war declines. Nevertheless, this peace was short-lived. Indeed, the afterword to the chapter describes how Hitler invaded Prague shortly thereafter. The Danzig–Poland crises then followed. By that point, Britain and France had abandoned appeasement and shifted to balancing against Hitler; they allied with Poland and gave Hitler an ultimatum to try to stop his invasion. This conventional deterrence failed, and the Second World War began in Europe.
Italian unification ultimately emerges through four wars. This chapter covers the second of these wars (1859–1860). Austria holds sovereignty over territory in northern Italy. Cavour, the prime minister of Piedmont, learns from the first war (1848) that Piedmont cannot defeat Austria – and therefore wrest Italian lands from it – without a powerful ally. He secures an alliance with Napoleon III of France, and at a secret meeting in Plombières, Piedmont and France plot a war. The Italian nationalists argue that the “people” of a nation have a legitimate right to self-rule. The Concert plays no role in this crisis because it does not see the norm of nationalism as a legitimate justification for owning territory. In its view, the norm of dynastic succession (i.e., a king or queen coming to the throne) serves that purpose. The Concert system is therefore biased against the nationalists. The resulting clash of norms increases the probability of war. Nevertheless, territorial issues are generally more war-prone than non-territorial issues, and infusing territorial disagreements with nationalism and identity (or ethnic) claims raises the probability of war further. In the end, the case illustrates well why and how territorial issues lead to war.
Neither the First nor the Second Moroccan Crisis escalates to a war between the major states. In the First Moroccan Crisis, Kaiser Wilhelm II did not believe it was worth fighting a war over Morocco. In the Second Moroccan Crisis, the actors had recourse to the norm of compensation, which provided a focal point and procedure that guided the negotiations. It ultimately made a bargain possible and facilitated a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Nevertheless, despite the use of the norm of compensation and accommodationists at the highest levels of German decision-making, the case shows that coercive bargaining could have led to war.
This study sheds light on the diffusion of knowledge production as an institutional norm among central, development, and investment banks. It builds on an original database of 24,435 peer-reviewed scientific items published by a pool of 237 central banks, development banks, and investment banks from 1966 to 2023. The focus is on their interactive dynamics, analysed through a two-fold approach: Granger-Causality analysis for linear relationships and a multivariate Markov chain approach for non-linear interactions. Central banks emerge as leaders in scientific production, influencing development and investment banks. Results lead to further questions about inter-institutional agenda-setting, such as how central banks shape research priorities, the extent to which their intellectual leadership impacts others’ priorities, and the mechanisms through which institutional norms are diffused and reinforced within the global financial and policymaking landscape.
Constructivism emphasizes the role of ideas, identities, and norms in shaping state behavior and international politics, as well as the intersubjective and relational nature of these ideational factors. Social relations “make or construct people – ourselves – into the kinds of beings that we are. Conversely, we make the world what it is, by doing what we do with each other and saying what we say to each other” (Onuf, 1998, 59). Constructivism therefore highlights the intangible yet relational aspects of our reality: a world in which the meaning of objects and actions is not fixed but socially constructed through our interactions; states are held together by collective belief and actively participate in the social construction of anarchy. Norms play a significant role by defining appropriate behavior and enabling action by providing a framework for actors to understand and interact with the world.
To what extent should workers in physically demanding jobs be given the possibility of earlier retirement? This is one of the many pressing pension reform issues that ageing societies face. This article examines the extent to which such special treatment is supported by the general public. We uniquely combine a representative survey (2,136 respondents) with a vignette study to explore what respondents in the Netherlands consider a fair public pension age for 29 jobs that differ by level of physical demand. We also examine whether these pension ages are associated with other attributes that are important in an ageing society, such as the presence of chronic health conditions and informal care-giving responsibilities – such attributes may affect support for the special provisions for workers in physically demanding jobs – and control for stereotypical views about older workers. The findings reveal notable differences in public pension ages, indicating that workers in highly physically demanding jobs should be given the opportunity to retire earlier and those working in physically ‘light’ jobs should work slightly beyond the standard public pension age. We compare these differences to existing special retirement programmes for physically demanding or arduous jobs. Interestingly, non-work factors – namely, chronic health conditions and care-giving responsibilities – weigh more heavily in deciding a fair or reasonable public pension age. This suggests that organizations and policy makers facing an ageing society will have to deal with a broader set of problems than can be solved by offering early retirement programmes for specific jobs.
Post-Northian institutional economics has been predicated on the socially extended and enactivist concept of cognitive institution. It has recently been suggested that this framework should include North’s definition of institutions as ‘rules of the game’. In this paper, we agree with this normative turn but take issue with the mental-model framework in which it is proposed. Retaining both shared mental models and rules of the game remains too ‘Northian’, even if complemented with enactivist dynamic principles of mental-model change. We propose an alternative enactivist concept of norm that entirely avoids mental models. We base it on an alternative social ontology that considers norms as located in the relation between agents and institutions. The implications of this relational ontology for the norms (or principles) of rationality are also discussed. We argue that a truly relational framework requires abandoning the adaptationist norm of rationality in favour of coordinative rationality principles.