No‐confidence motions (NCMs) are attempts by opposition parties to publicise the government's failings in a salient policy arena, and previous research has shown that they often negatively affect citizens' evaluations of governing parties' competence and damage their electoral prospects. Yet currently there is a lack of understanding of how opposition parties respond ideologically to these NCMs. It is argued in this article that opposition parties should distance themselves from the government challenged by NCMs to show that they are different from the incompetent government and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970–2007, empirical evidence is presented that NCMs encourage political parties to move their positions away from the government's position, especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals about government performance. These results have important implications for our understanding of opposition party policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of party competition.

Current comparative policy research gives no clear answer to the question of whether partisan politics in general or the partisan composition of governments in particular matter for different morality policy outputs across countries and over time. This article addresses this desideratum by employing a new encompassing dataset that captures the regulatory permissiveness in six morality policies that are homosexuality, same‐sex partnership, prostitution, pornography, abortion and euthanasia in 16 European countries over five decades from 1960 to 2010. Given the prevalent scepticism about a role for political parties for morality policies in existing research, this is a ‘hard’ test case for the ‘parties do matter’ argument. Starting from the basic theoretical assumption that different party families, if represented in national governments to varying degrees, ought to leave differing imprints on morality policy making, this research demonstrates that parties matter when accounting for the variation in morality policy outputs. This general statement needs to be qualified in three important ways. First, the nature of morality policy implies that party positions or preferences cannot be fully understood by merely focusing on one single cleavage alone. Instead, morality policy is located at the interface of different cleavages, including not only left‐right and secular‐religious dimensions, but also the conflicts between materialism and postmaterialism, green‐alternative‐libertarian and traditional‐authoritarian‐nationalist (GAL‐TAN) parties, and integration and demarcation. Second, it is argued in this article that the relevance of different cleavages for morality issues varies over time. Third, partisan effects can be found only if individual cabinets, rather than country‐years, are used as the unit of analysis in the research design. In particular, party families that tend to prioritise individual freedom over collective interests (i.e., left and liberal parties) are associated with significantly more liberal morality policies than party families that stress societal values and order (i.e., conservative/right and religious parties). While the latter are unlikely to overturn previous moves towards permissiveness, these results suggest that they might preserve the status quo at least. Curiously, no systematic effects of green parties are found, which may be because they have been represented in European governments at later periods when morality policy outputs were already quite permissive.

Do more rules improve overall policy performance? To answer this question, we look at rule growth in the area of environmental policy from an aggregate perspective. We argue that impactful growth in rules crucially depends on implementation capacities. If such capacities are limited, countries are at risk of ‘empty’ rule growth where they lack the ability to implement their ever‐growing stock of policies. Hence, rules are a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for achieving sectoral policy objectives. We underpin our argument with an analysis of the impact of a new, encompassing measure of environmental rule growth covering 13 countries from 1980 to 2010. These findings call for ‘sustainable statehood’ where the growth in rules should not outpace the expansion in administrative capacities.

The European debt crisis has uncovered serious tension between democratic politics and market pressure in contemporary democracies. This tension arises when governments implement unpopular fiscal consolidation packages in order to raise their macroeconomic credibility among financial investors. Nonetheless, the dominant view in current research is that governments should not find it difficult to balance demands from voters and investors because the economic and political costs of fiscal consolidations are low. This would leave governments with sufficient room to promote fiscal consolidation according to their ideological agenda. This article re‐examines this proposition by studying how the risk of governments to be replaced in office affects the probability and timing of fiscal consolidation policies. The results show that governments associate significant electoral risk with consolidations because electorally vulnerable governments strategically avoid consolidations towards the end of the legislative term in order to minimise electoral punishment. Specifically, the predicted probability of consolidation decreases from 40 per cent after an election to 13 per cent towards the end of the term when the government's margin of victory is small. When the electoral margin is large, the probability of consolidation is roughly stable at around 35 per cent. Electoral concerns are the most important political determinant of consolidations, leaving only a minor role for ideological concerns. Governments, hence, find it more difficult to reconcile political and economic pressures on fiscal policy than previous, influential research implies. The results suggest that existing studies under‐estimate the electoral risk associated with consolidations because they ignore the strategic behaviour that is established in this analysis.

Nonprofit and voluntary associations have a long history of defending the rights of their members, clients, and the public. Despite a burgeoning literature on advocacy by nonprofit organizations, few studies attempt to answer a central question: what factors influence nonprofit success in achieving the changes they aim to affect? Using original data from nearly 400 US nonprofits, we examine the extent to which they were involved in changing public policy, the nature of this engagement, and advocacy activities, organizational characteristics and relationships with others associated with reported policy change. More than three quarters of respondents reported having enacted, stopped, or modified policy. Nonprofits more often reported proactively changing policy when working in partnership and reactively stopping or modifying policy when facing opposition groups. Providing expertise and attending meetings was associated with reported policy change, whereas placing opinion ads was not.

Non-governmental organizations (NGO) and government donor agencies (GDA) are often caught in a dilemma; an NGO between responsiveness to its target group(s), expectations of individual donors and demands of its GDA; GDA between its policy to respect NGO’s integrity, its wish to keep NGOs accountable for received fund and its operation within the bounds of its general policies. This dilemma is mirrored in the NGO–GDA negotiation for funds. Based on negotiation theory and using three explanatory approaches, 18 years of negotiations between an NGO, Vi Skogen (ViS) and its GDA, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), are analyzed in order to demonstrate how organizational structures, power relations and the context influence the outcome of the negotiations. All three approaches help to explain how ViS managed, mainly in the interest of its individual donors, to resist changes demanded by Sida and also to explain how the agendas of ViS and Sida finally converged.

Policy and sociocultural advocacy are still entrenched within their disciplinary silos. This makes that a lot of research is missing out on the complete picture of nonprofits’ social change efforts. Moreover, this also relates to inconsistencies (i.e., determinants) and ambiguities (i.e., tactics) that are characteristic of the current ‘morass’ in which nonprofit advocacy literature finds itself today. In this study, we empirically analyze whether nonprofits engage in policy and/or sociocultural advocacy as well as whether determinants and tactics relate differently or similarly to both advocacy goals. Making use of a large-N survey database of Flemish nonprofits, our findings show that: (a) most nonprofits engage in advocacy in general and around half pursue both policy and sociocultural change, (b) the field of activity, age, public and market income are important explanatory variables and (c) not all advocacy tactics are used for pursuing both policy and sociocultural advocacy.

Pension systems play a crucial role in providing economic security and supporting well-being in later life. However, as governments implement reforms to ensure financial sustainability—such as raising the retirement age, reducing benefits, and shifting to defined-contribution schemes—these measures often overlook their psychological and social consequences. Pension insecurity has been linked to heightened stress, anxiety, and depression, as well as increased social isolation, particularly among vulnerable populations, including those in physically demanding jobs, low-income workers, and individuals with existing health conditions. Despite clear evidence of these effects, mainstream pension reform discourse prioritises fiscal concerns over social and mental health implications. This article examines pension reform through the Human Rights–Public Health Pension Framework (HRPHPF), integrating legal, public health, and policy perspectives to assess its impact on mental well-being. It situates pension rights within international human rights law, explores the psychological risks associated with pension insecurity, and advocates for a human rights-based approach to pension policymaking. The article calls for integrating mental health impact assessments into pension reforms to prevent adverse outcomes and ensure that policies promote dignity, social inclusion, and economic security in old age. A more balanced approach is necessary to align financial sustainability with broader well-being and human rights principles.

As negotiations on the Global Plastics Treaty progress, the extent to which reuse is embedded in the Treaty will serve as an indicator of its ambition to transform plastic systems rather than merely manage their waste outputs. Reuse is one of the most powerful yet underutilised interventions to achieve circularity, and is essential for reducing plastic production, lowering emissions and disrupting the dominance of single-use models. However, the current Treaty text reflects only limited and ambiguous references to reuse, often coupled with recycling, raising concerns that this cornerstone of circularity is at risk of being sidelined. This article argues that the Treaty’s effectiveness, both as a regulatory instrument and as a tool for transformation, will depend on whether it embeds the enabling conditions required to make reuse viable at scale. Drawing on recent research by the Global Plastics Policy Centre, we explore two core areas where progress is urgently needed: first, the limitations of setting numerical reuse targets without the underlying systems, infrastructure and regulatory clarity needed to implement them; and second, the persistent structural and regulatory barriers that prevent reuse systems from scaling. Without system-wide enablers, the Treaty risks repeating the common policy pattern of prioritising headline commitments over operational feasibility. Numerical targets, while politically attractive and symbolically important, do not create the conditions needed for sustained reuse uptake. Effective systems require regulatory mandates alongside design standards, infrastructure investment and mechanisms for tracking performance and ensuring compliance. At the global level, structural barriers include divergent regulations, inconsistent standards, a lack of harmonised definitions and metrics and financing systems that favour single use. Extended producer responsibility schemes, still skewed towards recycling, have not adequately incentivised reuse. The Treaty presents an opportunity to address these barriers through common standards and policy signals that support reuse as the default. To realise reuse as a transformative pillar of circularity, the Treaty must go beyond aspiration and commit to building the conditions under which reuse can thrive, which would shift plastics governance towards systems that value durability, more equitable responsibility and reform.

This article considers the negotiations and historical context of Japan's two major climate change bills. We find that the political approach to emissions reductions has resulted in non-specific, iterative reduction commitments from 1998, while attempts to introduce reduction schemes or taxes and define specific long-term targets, as in 2010, largely failed due to stalwart opposition from the energy and heavy industry sectors. Negotiations were further complicated by inter-ministry conflict, the often-rotating prime ministership, and the uncertain role of nuclear power. While these earlier efforts and changing international standards laid track for legislative revisions in 2021, their ultimate realization remains uncertain.

This article addresses whether responses to COVID-19 created opportunities for future policy change. We explore this matter by presenting a framework rooted in political economy and the literature on pandemics. We argue that the opportunities created by emergency responses are context-specific and that narratives, policy tools, and pro-equity state actors are variables that mediate emergency responses and future opportunities. We ground our analytical contribution on the emergency cash transfers deployed during 2020 following the COVID-19 outbreak in two contrasting Central American countries, Costa Rica and Guatemala. The paper promotes further policy discussion on the opportunities for progressive change in unequal contexts.

Research on policy shifts has found that repositioning can be costly as it affects candidates’ perceived honesty, reliability, and competence. It remains unclear, however, whether a politician’s gender affects perceptions of repositioning. Research on gender stereotypes has found that while male politicians are viewed as more competent, decisive, and displaying strong leadership, female politicians are believed to be more honest. Applying expectancy-violation theory, I test the hypothesis that the reputational cost of repositioning is more pronounced for female politicians in a preregistered survey experiment fielded on a large convenience sample in Flanders, Belgium (n = 6,957). I find that while frequent repositioning is evaluated negatively, the negative effect of repositioning is not more pronounced for female candidates than for male candidates on most outcome measures.

State Medical Boards (SMBs) can take severe disciplinary actions (e.g., license revocation or suspension) against physicians who commit egregious wrongdoing in order to protect the public. However, there is noteworthy variability in the extent to which SMBs impose severe disciplinary action. In this manuscript, we present and synthesize a subset of 11 recommendations based on findings from our team’s larger consensus-building project that identified a list of 56 policies and legal provisions SMBs can use to better protect patients from egregious wrongdoing by physicians.

Policy change is not an instantaneous or linear process. In fact, change includes several mechanisms working in tandem and even against one another. This article examines the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on homelessness policy in Canada. In a sector that is already plagued with emergency responses – rather than long-term solutions – the pandemic has initiated a critical juncture where policy change is possible, but not guaranteed. Although the existing failures to alleviate homelessness in Canada make policy failings even more obvious, aspects of the pre-existing Canadian response to homelessness negate change. The pandemic, however, has led to temporary solutions and created a setting where long-term change is possible. Using over 150 primary sources, this article analyses mechanisms of change and path dependence in the pandemic response to homelessness. The presence of such mechanisms is tested in three major Canadian cities.

Coronaviruses have emerged as a potential disruptive force in policymaking. Using a comparative case study method, we examine two social policy responses in Jakarta, Indonesia: the Social Safety Nets (SSN) programme and the health policy. Such examples demonstrate an aggressive change in policy direction from means-tested systems and government-centred approaches to a total relaxation of conditions with the involvement of non-state actors in the provision of services. Our study analyses the ideational dimensions of the policy process that produces abrupt and radical change. From our analysis, the policy change may be explained by the emergence of a new policy paradigm created through the emulation-contextual process – an alternative model of policy learning. The theoretical implication of our research is that policy response in this study cannot be viewed in a completely path-dependent process. Instead, we propose a ‘path-creation accelerator,’ which represents an infrequent instance of policy change.