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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2022
This chapter presents a theory of costly protest and legislative behavior. The theory contributes to a growing literature on legislators’ responsiveness to collective action demands. It answers an open question: are the groups with the most to gain from representation the most likely to benefit legislatively from protest efforts?
The theory suggests that it is not only likely but strategic for legislators to more frequently support the interests of protesters than non-protesters. The strategic representation of protest goals is especially likely when protesters have fewer resources to engage in collective action. Legislators’ greater support of low-resource groups relative to high-resource groups occurs because costly protest is a stronger indication of protesters’ intense desire for representation. Groups with lower resources can only protest when issue salience is high. Conversely, high-resource groups can protest regardless of their issue salience. Any legislator who ignores salient collective action demands risks electoral participation that could jeopardize their reelection.
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