Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Thanks
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Functions and enumerations
- 3 Effective computability
- 4 Effectively axiomatized theories
- 5 Capturing numerical properties
- 6 The truths of arithmetic
- 7 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 8 Interlude: Taking stock
- 9 Induction
- 10 Two formalized arithmetics
- 11 What Q can prove
- 12 IΔ0, an arithmetic with induction
- 13 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 14 Primitive recursive functions
- 15 LA can express every p.r. function
- 16 Capturing functions
- 17 Q is p.r. adequate
- 18 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 19 The arithmetization of syntax
- 20 Arithmetization in more detail
- 21 PA is incomplete
- 22 Gödel's First Theorem
- 23 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 24 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 25 Rosser's proof
- 26 Broadening the scope
- 27 Tarski's Theorem
- 28 Speed-up
- 29 Second-order arithmetics
- 30 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's Thesis
- 31 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 32 On the ‘unprovability of consistency’
- 33 Generalizing the Second Theorem
- 34 Löb's Theorem and other matters
- 35 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 36 ‘The best and most general version’
- 37 Interlude: The Second Theorem, Hilbert, minds and machines
- 38 μ-Recursive functions
- 39 Q is recursively adequate
- 40 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 41 Turing machines
- 42 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 43 Halting and incompleteness
- 44 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 45 Proving the Thesis?
- 46 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
20 - Arithmetization in more detail
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Thanks
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Functions and enumerations
- 3 Effective computability
- 4 Effectively axiomatized theories
- 5 Capturing numerical properties
- 6 The truths of arithmetic
- 7 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 8 Interlude: Taking stock
- 9 Induction
- 10 Two formalized arithmetics
- 11 What Q can prove
- 12 IΔ0, an arithmetic with induction
- 13 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 14 Primitive recursive functions
- 15 LA can express every p.r. function
- 16 Capturing functions
- 17 Q is p.r. adequate
- 18 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 19 The arithmetization of syntax
- 20 Arithmetization in more detail
- 21 PA is incomplete
- 22 Gödel's First Theorem
- 23 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 24 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 25 Rosser's proof
- 26 Broadening the scope
- 27 Tarski's Theorem
- 28 Speed-up
- 29 Second-order arithmetics
- 30 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's Thesis
- 31 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 32 On the ‘unprovability of consistency’
- 33 Generalizing the Second Theorem
- 34 Löb's Theorem and other matters
- 35 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 36 ‘The best and most general version’
- 37 Interlude: The Second Theorem, Hilbert, minds and machines
- 38 μ-Recursive functions
- 39 Q is recursively adequate
- 40 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 41 Turing machines
- 42 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 43 Halting and incompleteness
- 44 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 45 Proving the Thesis?
- 46 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In the last chapter we gave informal but hopefully entirely persuasive arguments that key numerical properties and relations that arise from the arithmetization of the syntax of PA – such as Term, Wff and Prf – are primitive recursive.
Gödel, as we said, gives rigorous proofs of such results (or rather, he proves the analogues for his particular formal system). He shows how to define a sequence of more and more complex functions and relations by composition and recursion, eventually leading up to a p.r. definition of Prf. Inevitably, this is a laborious job: Gödel does it with masterly economy and compression but, even so, it takes him forty-five steps of function-building to show that Prf is p.r.
We have in fact already traced some of the first steps in Section 14.8. We showed, in particular, that extracting exponents of prime factors – the key operation used in decoding Gödöl numbers – can be done by a p.r. function, exf. To follow Gödel further, we need to keep going in the same vein, defining ever more complex functions. What I propose to do in this chapter is to fill in the next few steps moderately carefully, and then indicate rather more briefly how the remainder go. This should be quite enough to give you a genuine feel for Gödel's demonstration and to indicate how it can be completed, without going into too much unnecessary detail.
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- Information
- An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems , pp. 144 - 151Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013