Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - First-order Peano Arithmetic
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 What Gödel's Theorems say
- 2 Decidability and enumerability
- 3 Axiomatized formal theories
- 4 Capturing numerical properties
- 5 The truths of arithmetic
- 6 Sufficiently strong arithmetics
- 7 Interlude: Taking stock
- 8 Two formalized arithmetics
- 9 What Q can prove
- 10 First-order Peano Arithmetic
- 11 Primitive recursive functions
- 12 Capturing p.r. functions
- 13 Q is p.r. adequate
- 14 Interlude: A very little about Principia
- 15 The arithmetization of syntax
- 16 PA is incomplete
- 17 Gödel's First Theorem
- 18 Interlude: About the First Theorem
- 19 Strengthening the First Theorem
- 20 The Diagonalization Lemma
- 21 Using the Diagonalization Lemma
- 22 Second-order arithmetics
- 23 Interlude: Incompleteness and Isaacson's conjecture
- 24 Gödel's Second Theorem for PA
- 25 The derivability conditions
- 26 Deriving the derivability conditions
- 27 Reflections
- 28 Interlude: About the Second Theorem
- 29 µ-Recursive functions
- 30 Undecidability and incompleteness
- 31 Turing machines
- 32 Turing machines and recursiveness
- 33 Halting problems
- 34 The Church–Turing Thesis
- 35 Proving the Thesis?
- 36 Looking back
- Further reading
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Q is Σ1-complete, a fact which will turn out to be very important. But, as we saw, in other ways Q is an extremely weak theory. To derive elementary general truths like ∀x(0 + x = x) that are beyond Q's reach, we obviously will have to use a formal arithmetic that incorporates some stronger axiom(s) for proving quantified wffs. This chapter explains the induction axioms we need to add, working up to the key theory PA, first-order Peano Arithmetic.
Induction and the Induction Schema
(a) In informal argumentation, we frequently appeal to the following principle of mathematical induction in order to prove general claims:
Suppose (i) 0 has the numerical property P. And suppose (ii) for any number n, if it has P, then its successor n + 1 also has P. Then we can conclude that (iii) every number has property P.
In fact, we used informal inductions in the last chapter. For example, to prove that Q correctly decides all Σ1 wffs, we in effect began: let n have the property P if Q-correctly-decides-Σ1-wffs-of-degree-no-more-than n. Then we argued (i) 0 has property P, and (ii) for any number n, if it has P, then n + 1 also has P. So we concluded (iii) every number has P, i.e. Q correctly decides any Σ1 wff, whatever its degree.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Introduction to Gödel's Theorems , pp. 71 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007