The Defence Of Normandy 1193–8

Summary

Many of the themes of this paper owe much to Maurice Powicke's the Loss of Normandy. This still seminal text pioneered the use of pipe roll evidence in the analysis of warfare in Normandy in the 1190s – a theme that will be further developed in this paper. While Powicke was certainly interested in the conduct and character of the Angevin kings he was also centrally concerned with the interplay between them and the economic, military and financial circumstances in which they operated. It is this interplay that provides the focus of this paper.

The successful defence of Normandy between 1193 and 1198 was, I wish to argue, critically dependent upon three factors: successful military leadership, the loyalty of the Norman aristocracy and a qualitative increase in revenue. They proved to be interrelated: revenue provided money to fight wars and provide patronage, military success strengthened ducal allegiance and made revenue raising easier while aristocratic loyalty provided the basis to recruit soldiers and raise additional money. In particular King Richard was able to overcome the potential conflict between rising taxation and political support. Every additional penny above the customary Carolingian revenue sources of the duchy of Normandy raised through tallages and forced loans can be seen as a vote of confidence by the Norman aristocracy in its duke. Thus when King John lost this confidence through leadership and military failings, chunks of the Norman aristocracy were neither prepared to fight for him nor provide additional revenue; hence decline in revenue and decline in political support dovetailed together in 1202–3. The defence of Normandy in 1193–4 depended on the basic loyalty of the Anglo-Norman and Norman aristocracy, but by 1195–6 military success, increased revenue and expanding aristocratic affiliation (both inside and outside the duchy) were generating the conditions of recovery.

The Crisis of 1193–4

In King Richard's absence in 1193–4 Normandy faced a severe crisis with war on several fronts. On the 1197– Norman pipe roll we learn that three years previously Count John, in a time of war, had damaged the castle and mills in the bailliage of Gavray.8 The bailliages of Cerences and Tinchebrai as well as the bailliage of Mortain (except escheats) were missing from the 1194–5 roll, presumably because they were the site of military rebellion in 1193–4 and had not yet been re-integrated into the Norman administration when the 1194–5 roll was made.