Book contents
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- 17 The Economics of Horizontal Mergers
- 18 Horizontal Merger Policy
- 19 The Economic Theory of Vertical Integration
- 20 Vertical Merger Policy
- 21 Concluding Remarks
- Index
- References
17 - The Economics of Horizontal Mergers
from Part V - Mergers and Acquisitions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 November 2022
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Table of Cases
- 1 Health Care Markets and Competition Policy
- 2 Antitrust Policy in the United States
- Part I Monopoly
- Part II Seller Cartels
- Part III Monopsony
- Part IV Buyer Cartels
- Part V Mergers and Acquisitions
- 17 The Economics of Horizontal Mergers
- 18 Horizontal Merger Policy
- 19 The Economic Theory of Vertical Integration
- 20 Vertical Merger Policy
- 21 Concluding Remarks
- Index
- References
Summary
Horizontal mergers are ubiquitous in health care markets. Mergers are horizontal when two or more competitors join forces. They can be anticompetitive, procompetitive, or competitively neutral. A merger can increase market power when it so alters the market structure that either the newly merged entity would have the ability to exercise unilateral market power or would be more likely to collude overtly or tacitly with its competitors. The economic concerns surrounding either unilateral or coordinated effects are familiar: higher prices, lower quantity and/or lower quality, and reduced consumer or social welfare. But mergers can also lead to substantial efficiencies that increase social welfare by freeing up resources for other socially beneficial pursuits. Gains in efficiency improve profits by reducing costs, while gains in quality improve profits by making the merged firm’s output more attractive to consumers. In this chapter, we discuss firm incentives to merge and examine the trade-off between changes in market power and efficiencies.
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- Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 389 - 404Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022