Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-v9fdk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T13:47:12.497Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

16 - No-Poaching Agreements and Antitrust Policy

from Part IV - Buyer Cartels

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2022

Roger D. Blair ,
Christine Piette Durrance  and
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Christine Piette Durrance
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Get access

Summary

In recent years, the exercise of monopsony power has become more prevalent in labor markets, particularly through anticompetitive agreements among firms. No-poaching agreements are agreements among rival employers to refrain from hiring another firm’s employees. No-poaching agreements deprive employees of the competitive benefits that result from outside employer interest. Recent litigation in a variety of industries highlights the competitive concerns with no-poaching agreements. In this chapter, we explore the role of monopsony and buying power in no-poaching agreements and specifically review a no-poaching case involving the deans of two medical schools in North Carolina.

Keywords

no-poaching agreementsmonopsonySeaman v. Duke Universitycollusion
Type
Chapter
Information
Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 368 - 384
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Amidi, Amid. (2018). Animation Workers Set to Receive $170 Million Payout from Wage-Theft Lawsuit. Cartoonbrew. www.cartoonbrew.com/artist-rights/animation-workers-set-to-receive-170-million-payout-from-wage-theft-lawsuit-161482.html.Google Scholar
Blair, Roger D., and Harrison, Jeffrey L.. (2010). Monopsony in Law and Economics. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Blair, Roger D., and Lopatka, John E.. (2016). The Economic Effects of Anti-Tampering Rules in Professional Sports Leagues. Managerial and Decision Economics 38:704–713.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. (2016). Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals. www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download.Google Scholar
Krueger, Alan B., and Ashenfelter, Orley. (2018). Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector. NBER Working Paper No. 24831.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lerner, Abba. (1934). The Concept of Monopoly and Measurement of Monopoly Power. Review of Economic Studies 1: 157–175.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lindsay, Michael A. (2019). McDonald’s and Medicine: Developments in the Law of No-Poaching and Wage-Fixing Agreements. Antitrust 33: 18–28.Google Scholar
Milizio, Joseph G. (2021). Biden Pushes for National Ban of Non-Compete Agreements. Vmm Legal. www.vmmlegal.com/publications/2021/july/biden-pushes-for-national-ban-of-non-compete-agr/.Google Scholar
Naidu, Suresh, Posner, Eric A., and Weyl, Glen. (2018). Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power. Harvard Law Review 132: 537–601.Google Scholar
Pazanowski, Mary Anne. (2019). Florida Can Enforce Law Outlawing Doctors’ Noncompete Contracts. Bloomberg Law. https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/florida-can-enforce-law-outlawing-doctors-noncompete-contracts.Google Scholar
Robinson, Joan. (1933). The Economics of Imperfect Competition, London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Sullivan, Daniel. (1989). Monopsony Power in the Market for Nurses. Journal of Law and Economics 32: 135–178.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Young, A. Christopher. (2019). Legal Challenges to No-Poach Provisions in Franchise Agreements. Pepper Hamilton LLP. www.pepperlaw.com/publications/legal-challenges-to-no-poach-provisions-in-franchise-agreements-2019-01-07/.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×