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4 - Patents and Exclusionary Product Hopping

from Part I - Monopoly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 November 2022

Roger D. Blair ,
Christine Piette Durrance  and
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Christine Piette Durrance
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin
Tirza J. Angerhofer
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
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Summary

Ever on the lookout for a way to extend a patent monopoly and thereby continue to earn monopoly profits, some prescription drug manufacturers have hit on a strategy known as product hopping. During the life of a pharmaceutical firm’s patent, the patentee may develop a modified version of the prescription drug by (1) altering the dose to improve efficacy, (2) changing the absorption rate, or (3) switching the medication form from, for example, tablets to capsules. To the extent that the newer version confers real therapeutic benefits, this practice may be unobjectionable. Product hopping may be anticompetitive, however, if the benefits to the patient from innovation are not greater than the harm to patients resulting from the delay in the entrance of competing drug manufacturers. In this chapter, we review how product hopping can work in practice by looking at some case examples and discuss available remedies for addressing this kind of behavior.

Keywords

product hoppingexclusionary product hopping
Type
Chapter
Information
Antitrust Policy in Health Care Markets , pp. 74 - 94
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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References

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