Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Orientalism and Analysis: Ideas of the ‘Arab’
- 2 Formation of the United Arab Republic
- 3 Revolution in Iraq
- 4 Syrian Secession
- 5 Civil War in Yemen
- 6 Six-Day War
- 7 War of Attrition
- 8 Early Years of Sadat's Presidency
- 9 Yom Kippur War
- 10 Aftermath of Victory
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
3 - Revolution in Iraq
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2017
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- 1 Orientalism and Analysis: Ideas of the ‘Arab’
- 2 Formation of the United Arab Republic
- 3 Revolution in Iraq
- 4 Syrian Secession
- 5 Civil War in Yemen
- 6 Six-Day War
- 7 War of Attrition
- 8 Early Years of Sadat's Presidency
- 9 Yom Kippur War
- 10 Aftermath of Victory
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The victory of the national revolution in Iraq cannot fail – in a profound manner – to disrupt the control of imperialism over all of the Middle East.
Pravda, 1958The real authority behind the Government of Iraq was being exercised by Nasser, and behind Nasser by the USSR.
John Foster Dulles, 1958On the 14 July 1958, a brigade of Iraqi army officers marched into Baghdad and declared the end of the Hashemite monarchy established by the British in 1921. Leading members of the royal family were brutally murdered in the courtyard of the opulent Rihab palace. Prime Minister Nurial-Said escaped disguised as a woman, but was given away by the fact that he was wearing men's shoes; he was captured and shot the next day. Iraq's first republic was established under the leadership of a young and zealous nationalist, General Abdul Karim Qasim. The revolution in Iraq seemed yet another exemplification of the Arab nationalist fervour spreading through the Middle East and destroyed all fledgling hopes for the existence of a conservative counterweight to Nasser. Policy-makers were so alarmed by events in Iraq that on the 15 July 1958, both the British and US governments deployed Marines and paratroopers to bolster pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan. Ultimately, the Iraqi revolt would transform the basis of the Anglo-American relationship with Nasser.
Most scholars writing about this seminal event have suggested that Western observers fundamentally misunderstood the revolutionary situation in Iraq. Hitherto neglected intelligence documents allows a fresh look at the nature of this ‘failure’, revealing that analysts were indeed aware of the pressures on the Iraqi monarchy. A detailed examination of the intelligence reports and in-house post-mortems suggest that this was more of a tactical failure than a strategic one. Perceptions of Egyptian influence were also fairly nuanced (after initial panic), noting the similarities in the socioeconomic problems in Iraq driving change but also the limitations of Nasser's ability to dictate events in the newly founded republic.
Far from being a Nasserist stooge, General Qasim proved to be a force of nature in his own right. He quickly demonstrated his desire to resist local Nasserists such as Abd al-Salam Arif, utilising the support of the Iraqi Communist party (ICP).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Arab World and Western IntelligenceAnalysing the Middle East, 1956–1981, pp. 79 - 115Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2017