Chapter 10 - Phantasia and Error

Summary

I argue that Aristotle thinks of perception as veridical, and that phantasia – as a secondary motion consequent on perception – is responsible for all sensory error. I neutralize passages where Aristotle seems to countenance misperception by defending what I call an “object-oriented reading,” which holds that though Aristotle says we can make errors about the objects of perception, he is not committed to thinking that we can perceive them erroneously, as there are faculties besides perception (including phantasia) that engage with the objects of perception. According to the object-oriented reading, apparent misperception results when a false phantasia is mistaken for a perception, something that is possible due to the similarities between perception and phantasia. Nonetheless, since the faculties are distinct, perception remains veridical. I also address how this conception of phantasia can explain Aristotle’s appeals to phantasia in contexts like memory, thought, and animal motion.