Chapter 1 - Epistemic Encroachment on Practical Rationality

Summary

In this chapter, I argue for epistemic encroachment, the thesis that, in an important sense, practical rationality depends on epistemic rationality. I argue for this thesis by engaging with several challenges to it. The first one is due to Derek Parfit, who questions that, generally, epistemic failings translate into a failure of practical rationality. Sections 1.1 to 1.4 concern this general challenge to epistemic encroachment on practical rationality. In section 1.5, I argue that we can infer from epistemic encroachment that there is an epistemic norm on practical reasoning. In section 1.6 and 1.7, I turn to the second challenge due to Davide Fassio, who tries to resist a specific form of epistemic encroachment, namely, that there is a genuine epistemic norm for practical reasoning.