Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figure
- Series Editors' Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- PART I ECONOMIC REALITIES
- PART II THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
- 4 From 1945 to June 1955: The Marshall Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community
- 5 The Establishment of the Common Market and the Free Trade Area Proposals, 1955–1958
- 6 Creating EFTA, Applying to the EC, and de Gaulle's Veto, 1958–1963
- 7 After de Gaulle's First Veto, the Second Application, and the Second Veto, 1963–1968
- 8 The End Game: From the Hague Summit to British Accession, 1969–1973
- PART III EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS MORE THAN TARIFFS
- Conclusion
- Index
6 - Creating EFTA, Applying to the EC, and de Gaulle's Veto, 1958–1963
from PART II - THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables and Figure
- Series Editors' Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- PART I ECONOMIC REALITIES
- PART II THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERCEPTIONS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
- 4 From 1945 to June 1955: The Marshall Plan and the European Coal and Steel Community
- 5 The Establishment of the Common Market and the Free Trade Area Proposals, 1955–1958
- 6 Creating EFTA, Applying to the EC, and de Gaulle's Veto, 1958–1963
- 7 After de Gaulle's First Veto, the Second Application, and the Second Veto, 1963–1968
- 8 The End Game: From the Hague Summit to British Accession, 1969–1973
- PART III EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS MORE THAN TARIFFS
- Conclusion
- Index
Summary
The free trade area was seen as a way for Britain to accommodate the common market and the Commonwealth. Its failure to win support in the common market countries, notably France, left the British government and British industry with a problem: how to respond? It could turn its back on the Six, it could try to find some accommodation, supported by the other non-European Community members of the OEEC, or it could apply to join the EC itself. Although the first of these seemed appealing to some in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the FTA negotiations, the real choice was between the second and third options. The preference remained the second option, to continue to try to create an open trading bloc across Western Europe. It was to this end that Britain helped to establish the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with other countries that were unable or unwilling to join the EC. Over time, it became clear that an accommodation between the two groups was unlikely to occur and so opinion began to move to the third option, joining the EC. Finally, on July 31, 1961 the British government announced its attention to open negotiations with the Six on the possibility of Britain becoming a member of the EC. However, after a lengthy period of negotiations, President de Gaulle effectively vetoed the British application in January 1963 and the negotiations ended later that month.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2007