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9 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2024

Tyler Jost
Affiliation:
Brown University, Rhode Island
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Summary

The concluding chapter briefly summarizes the main findings and discusses the broader implications for the study of international relations. This book has argued that the trade-off between good information and political security helps to explain why leaders often charge headfirst into conflict that they lose. Whereas much of the existing literature posits that bureaucratic participation in a foreign policy decision-making process tends to degrade the information available to leaders as they choose between war and peace, this book has instead argued that institutions and leaders benefit from the information that the bureaucracy provides, especially when leaders pit bureaucracies against one another in competitive dialogue. Yet leaders often forgo these institutions precisely to avoid the costs that a powerful bureaucracy can impose on their prospects for political survival. As such, miscalculation on the road to war is often the byproduct of how leaders resolve the trade-off between a more accurate vision of the world and protection from bureaucratic punishment.

Type
Chapter
Information
Bureaucracies at War
The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation
, pp. 325 - 338
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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  • Conclusion
  • Tyler Jost, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Bureaucracies at War
  • Online publication: 05 December 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009307253.009
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  • Conclusion
  • Tyler Jost, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Bureaucracies at War
  • Online publication: 05 December 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009307253.009
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Tyler Jost, Brown University, Rhode Island
  • Book: Bureaucracies at War
  • Online publication: 05 December 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009307253.009
Available formats
×