Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
8 - Common Sense in Metaphysics
from Part II
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 November 2020
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction: Why Common Sense Matters
- Part I
- Part II
- 7 The Delineation of Common Sense
- 8 Common Sense in Metaphysics
- 9 Common-Sense Realism
- 10 The Epistemic Authority of Common Sense
- 11 Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Common Sense and Philosophy
- 12 Morality and Common Sense
- 13 Common Sense and Ontological Commitment
- 14 The Tension between Scientific Knowledge and Common-Sense Philosophy
- 15 A Scientific-Realist Account of Common Sense
- References
- Index
- Other Volumes in the Series of Cambridge Companions
Summary
It is widely accepted that it counts for a metaphysical theory when the theory is in accord with common sense and against a metaphysical theory when the theory clashes with common sense. It is unclear, however, why this should be the case. When engaging in metaphysics, why should we give common sense any weight? This chapter maintains that it is only against the backdrop of a particular metametaphysical stance that questions about metaphysical best practices become tractable. From the perspective of a metaphysics-as-modelling approach, common sense ought to play a significant, though defeasible, role in metaphysical theorizing. According with common sense is one of a number of theoretical virtues that metaphysicians should strive for. Nevertheless, it is important for the metaphysician to be cautious when appealing to common sense. She should distinguish what actually falls within the bounds of common sense as such from what a particular researcher happens to find intuitive. Furthermore, our best scientific theories may undercut the evidence provided by common sense. Finally, the metaphysician should attend to the context in which she invokes common sense. For some topics of inquiry, common sense ought to play a more expansive role in our metaphysical theorizing than for others.
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- The Cambridge Companion to Common-Sense Philosophy , pp. 185 - 207Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020