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5 - Law and Economic Institutions

from Part I - Determinants of Economic Performance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2008

By
Bruce Frier  and
Dennis Kehoe
Edited by
Walter Scheidel ,
Ian Morris  and
Richard P. Saller
Bruce Frier
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Dennis Kehoe
Affiliation:
Tulane University
Walter Scheidel
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Ian Morris
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
Richard P. Saller
Affiliation:
Stanford University, California
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Summary

The landscape of the Greek and Roman economies (as of all other economies both past and present) is invariably configured, not just of individuals, but also of institutions, the organized activity of production and commerce. If population and technology established the basic limits within which the economies of the Greek and Roman worlds could develop, it also seems clear that law and other institutions surrounding the economy represented an exogenous factor affecting productivity in the Greek and Roman worlds. An analysis of the complex relationship between legal institutions and the economy can help us to understand better the basic relationships that characterized the economy of the Greco-Roman world. Law and legal institutions helped determine the forms within which economic activity was organized and had important consequences for the basic welfare of people of all classes in the ancient world. Legal institutions shaped the distribution of wealth between the state and citizens or subjects, between city and countryside, between elite landowners and peasant farmers, and even between masters and slaves. It is thus worth examining how these institutions are likely to have influenced economic behavior, allocation of resources, and predictable outcomes in terms of performance and growth. Did legal institutions serve to promote or inhibit the type of investment that was necessary for greater productivity and ultimately for growth in the ancient economy? Did they foster the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small elite, or instead promote a more even distribution of wealth?

Keywords

economic institutionsadverse selectionasymmetrical informationCoase Theoremlaw institutionsNew Institutional Economics
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World , pp. 113 - 143
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2007

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