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11 - Social Cognition Overview

from Part III - Social Cognition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2021

By
Juan C. Gómez
Edited by
Allison B. Kaufman ,
Josep Call  and
James C. Kaufman
Allison B. Kaufman
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
Josep Call
Affiliation:
University of St Andrews, Scotland
James C. Kaufman
Affiliation:
University of Connecticut
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Summary

The social life of animals poses specific adaptive challenges that may be cognitively different to challenges from ecological adaptations to their physical environment.Social cognitive adaptations for dealing with other agents are evolutionarily remarkable in that they automatically become an adaptive challenge that may trigger counter- or co-adaptations. This chapter discusses three main problems in social cognition: first, the issue of mentalism or theory of mind, or whether social cognitive adaptations in animals are based on mentalistic attribution skills that may involve representing the intentions and knowledge of others; second, the cognitive underpinnings of animal communication, with a focus on referential and intentional communication; and third, the problem of how animals know and represent the social relations structuring their groups. There is widespread debate about how the social knowledge and reasoning demonstrated in animal social behavior are exactly implemented. The traditional debate in comparative psychology between reductionist behavioristic explanations and complex cognitive explanations has become especially pronounced in social cognition. A widespread proposal is that the type of knowledge demonstrated by animals is ‘implicit,’ distinct both from the verbally expressible knowledge evolved by humans, and from low-level, reflex-like associative behaviours and habits. However, the key notion of implicit knowledge remains elusive and ill-defined.

Keywords

social cognitiontheory of mindsocial relationscommunicationintentionalityrepresentations behavior readingfalse beliefgaze followingimplicit knowledge.
Type
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Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Animal Cognition , pp. 225 - 271
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

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