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Part I - Economics of Antitrust-IP

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2017

Edited by
Roger D. Blair  and
D. Daniel Sokol
Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
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The Cambridge Handbook of Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and High Tech , pp. 1 - 78
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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