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11 - How Sophisticated Is Infants’ Theory of Mind?

from Subpart II.1 - Infancy: The Roots of Human Thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2022

By
Rose M. Scott ,
Erin Roby  and
Renée Baillargeon
Edited by
Olivier Houdé  and
Grégoire Borst
Olivier Houdé
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
Grégoire Borst
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
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Summary

Imagine the following scenario (inspired by true events): We are grocery shopping with our friend Anita, who notices a woman down the aisle and waves and smiles at her. The woman looks confused and walks away. Perplexed, Anita tells us that she spent the previous day training the woman, a new employee at their firm, and is surprised by her behavior because she thought they had established a friendly rapport. We suggest a possible explanation: Perhaps the woman did not recognize Anita outside of work. Later at the checkout line, we notice the woman standing with someone who is obviously her identical twin. In light of this new information, we revise our initial explanation: Anita must have waved at her trainee’s twin, falsely believing her to be her trainee, and the twin responded with confusion because she had never met Anita before. Anita then joins us at the checkout, one of the twins waves happily to her, and the mystery is resolved with smiles all around.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development , pp. 242 - 268
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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