Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-cphqk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-14T11:31:27.400Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

21 - Reasoning Bias and Dual Process Theory

Developmental Considerations and Current Directions

from Subpart II.2 - Childhood and Adolescence: The Development of Human Thinking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 February 2022

By
Darren Frey  and
Wim De Neys
Edited by
Olivier Houdé  and
Grégoire Borst
Olivier Houdé
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
Grégoire Borst
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
Get access

Summary

If you are racing toward a cliff or a steep mountain drop-off, the sensible thing to do is to slow yourself down and stop – and as a matter of some urgency. Braking in this case is natural and intuitive. Yet, when you are hang gliding, not only should you not slow down as you approach a cliff, it is important that you accelerate, gaining velocity with every single stride as you approach the drop-off in order to have the necessary wind speed to fly. In the last moments before flight, you should be nearly sprinting toward the edge. For many aspiring hang gliders this can be quite challenging. A successful hang glide start requires you to override your intuitive tendency to stop when seeing a cliff. Although this natural “stopping” intuition is usually very useful, failing to control it when needed can have dramatic consequences.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Development , pp. 472 - 480
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2017). Fast logic?: Examining the time course assumption of dual process theory. Cognition, 158, 90–109.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2020a). Advancing the specification of dual process models of higher cognition: A critical test of the hybrid model view. Thinking & Reasoning, 26, 1–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bago, B., & De Neys, W. (2020b). The smart system 1: Evidence for the intuitive nature of correct responding on the bat-and-ball problem. Thinking & Reasoning, 26, 1–30.Google Scholar
Ball, L., Thompson, V., & Stupple, E. (2017). Conflict and dual process theory: The case of belief bias. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 100–120). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Banks, A. (2017). Comparing dual process theories: Evidence from event-related potentials. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 66–81). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barrouillet, P. (2011). Dual process theories of reasoning: The test of development. Developmental Review, 31, 151–179.Google Scholar
Brainerd, C. J., & Reyna, V. F. (2001). Fuzzy-trace theory: Dual processes in memory, reasoning, and cognitive neuroscience. In Reese, H. W., & Kail, R. (eds.), Advances in Child Development and Behavior (Vol. 28, pp. 41–100). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Brainerd, C. J., Reyna, V. F., & Ceci, S. J. (2008). Developmental reversals in false memory: A review of data and theory. Psychological Bulletin, 134, 343– 382.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Davidson, D. (1995). The representativeness heuristic and the conjunction fallacy effect in children’s decision making. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 41, 328–346.Google Scholar
De Neys, W. (2006). Dual processing in reasoning: Two systems but one reasoner. Psychological Science, 17, 428–433.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W. (2012). Bias and conflict a case for logical intuitions. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 28–38.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W. (2013). Heuristics, biases, and the development of conflict detection during reasoning. In Markovits, H. (ed.), The Developmental Psychology of Reasoning and Decision Making (pp. 130–147). Hove: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
De Neys, W. (2017). Bias, conflict, and fast logic: Towards a hybrid dual process future? In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 47–65). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Neys, W., & Feremans, V. (2013). Development of heuristic bias detection in elementary school. Developmental Psychology, 49, 258–269.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W., & Glumicic, T. (2008). Conflict monitoring in dual process theories of thinking. Cognition, 106, 1248–1299.Google Scholar
De Neys, W., Rossi, S., & Houdé, O. (2013). Bats, balls, and substitution sensitivity: Cognitive misers are no happy fools. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 20, 269–273.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
De Neys, W., & Vanderputte, K. (2011). When less is not always more: Stereotype knowledge and reasoning development. Developmental Psychology, 47, 432–441.Google Scholar
De Neys, W., Vartanian, O., & Goel, V. (2008). Smarter than we think when our brains detect that we are biased. Psychological Science, 19, 483–489.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2003). In two minds: Dual-process accounts of reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7, 454–459.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgement and social cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 255–278.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2010). Intuition and reasoning: A dual process perspective. Psychological Inquiry, 21, 313–326.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2017). Dual process theories: Perspectives and problems. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 137–155). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. (1996). Rationality and Reasoning. Hove: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8, 223–241.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Franssens, S., & De Neys, W. (2009). The effortless nature of conflict detection during thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 15, 105–128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gangemi, A., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., & Mancini, F. (2015). Feelings of error in reasoning – in search of a phenomenon. Thinking & Reasoning, 21, 383–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Houdé, O. (1997). Rationality in reasoning: The problem of deductive competence and the inhibitory control of cognition. Current Psychology of Cognition, 16, 108–113.Google Scholar
Houdé, O. (2000). Inhibition and cognitive development: Object, number, categorization, and reasoning. Cognitive Development, 15, 63–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Houdé, O. (2007). First insights on neuropedagogy of reasoning. Thinking & Reasoning, 13, 81–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Houdé, O., & Borst, G. (2014). Measuring inhibitory control in children and adults: Brain imaging and mental chronometry. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 616.Google ScholarPubMed
Jacobs, J. E., & Klaczynski, P. A. (2002). The development of decision making during childhood and adolescence. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 4, 145–149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jacobs, J. E., & Potenza, M. (1991). The use of judgment heuristics to make social and object decisions: A developmental perspective. Child Development, 62, 166–178.Google Scholar
Johnson, E. D., Tubau, E., & De Neys, W. (2016). The doubting system 1: Evidence for automatic substitution sensitivity. Acta Psychologica, 164, 56–64.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kahneman, D. (2002, December). Maps of bounded rationality: A perspective on intuitive judgement and choice. Nobel Prize Lecture. Available from http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf, Last accessed January 11, 2006.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. & Frederick, S. (2005). A model of heuristic judgement. In Holyoak, K. J., & Morrison, R. G. (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning (pp. 267–293). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review, 80, 237–251.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klaczynski, P. A., Byrnes, J. B., & Jacobs, J. E. (2001). Introduction: Special issue on decision making. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 22, 225–236.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Klaczynski, P. A., & Narashimham, G. (1998). Representations as mediators of adolescent deductive reasoning. Developmental Psychology, 5, 865–881.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kokis, J. V., Macpherson, R., Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2002). Heuristic and analytic processing: Age trends and associations with cognitive ability and cognitive styles. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 83, 26–52.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Markovits, H., & Barrouillet, P. (2004). Why is understanding the development of reasoning important? Thinking and Reasoning, 10, 113–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mevel, K., Poirel, N., Rossi, S., Cassotti, M., Simon, G., Houdé, O., & Neys, W. D. (2015). Bias detection: Response confidence evidence for conflict sensitivity in the ratio bias task. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 27, 227–237.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Newman, I., Gibb, M., & Thompson, V. A. (2017). Rule-based reasoning is fast and belief-based reasoning can be slow: Challenging current explanations of belief -bias and base-rate neglect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 43, 1154–1170.Google ScholarPubMed
Pennycook, G. (2017). A perspective on the theoretical foundation of dual process models. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 5–27). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Barr, N., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2014a). Cognitive style and religiosity: The role of conflict detection. Memory & Cognition, 42, 1–10.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2012). Are we good at detecting conflict during reasoning. Cognition, 124, 101–106.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive Psychology, 80, 34–72.Google Scholar
Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., Handley, S. J., & Thompson, V. A. (2014b). Base rates: Both neglected and intuitive. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40, 544–554.Google ScholarPubMed
Piaget, J. (1952/1941). The Child’s Conception of Number. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Raoelison, M., Boissin, E., Borst, G., & De Neys, W. (2021). From slow to fast logic: The development of logical intuitions. Thinking & Reasoning, 1–25, online doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1885488.Google Scholar
Raoelison, M., Thompson, V., & De Neys, W. (2020). The smart intuitor: Cognitive capacity predicts intuitive rather than deliberate thinking. Cognition, 204, 104381.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reyna, V. F. (2004). How people make decisions that involve risk: A dual-processes approach. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 13, 60–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reyna, V. F., & Brainerd, C. J. (1994). The origins of probability judgment: A review of data and theories. In Wright, G., & Ayton, P. (eds.), Subjective Probability (pp. 239–272). New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Reyna, V. F., & Farley, F. (2006). Risk and rationality in adolescent decision making: Implications for theory, practice, and public policy. Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 7, 1–44.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Reyna, V. F., Lloyd, F. J., & Brainerd, C. J. (2003). Memory, development, and rationality: An integrative theory of judgement and decision-making. In Schneider, S., & Shanteau, J. (eds.), Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research (pp. 201–245). New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, G., Lubin, A., Houdé, O., & De Neys, W. (2015). Anterior cingulate cortex and intuitive bias detection during number conservation. Cognitive Neuroscience, 6, 158–168.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Stanovich, K. E. (2011). Rationality and the Reflective Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Stanovich, K. E. (2018). Miserliness in human cognition: The interaction of detection, override and mindware. Thinking & Reasoning, 24, 423–444.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000). Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 645–665.Google Scholar
Stanovich, K. E., West, R. F., & Toplak, M. E. (2011). The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models. Developmental Review, 31, 103–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stupple, E. J., Ball, L. J., Evans, J. S. B., & Kamal-Smith, E. (2011). When logic and belief collide: Individual differences in reasoning times support a selective processing model. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 23, 931–941.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, V. A., & Johnson, S. C. (2014). Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 20, 215–244.Google Scholar
Thompson, V. A., & Newman, I. (2017). Logical intuitions and other conundra for dual process theories. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 121–136). Oxford: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, V. A., Pennycook, G., Trippas, D., & Evans, J. S. B. (2018). Do smart people have better intuitions? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147, 945.Google Scholar
Thompson, V. A., Turner, J. A. P., & Pennycook, G. (2011). Intuition, reason, and metacognition. Cognitive Psychology, 63, 107–140.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Trippas, D., & Handley, S. (2017). The parallel processing model of belief bias: Review and extensions. In De Neys, W. (ed.), Dual Process Theory 2.0 (pp. 28–46). Oxford: Routledge.Google Scholar
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Vartanian, O., Beatty, E. L., Smith, I., Blackler, K., Lam, Q., Forbes, S., & De Neys, W. (2018). The reflective mind: Examining individual differences in susceptibility to base rate neglect with FMRI. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 30, 1011–1022.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×