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26 - Political Extremism

from Part III - Contemporary Challenges to Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2022

By
Jan-Willem van Prooijen  and
André P. M. Krouwel
Edited by
Danny Osborne  and
Chris G. Sibley
Danny Osborne
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
Chris G. Sibley
Affiliation:
University of Auckland
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Summary

While the field of political psychology has overwhelmingly focused on political orientation (i.e., ideological content), this chapter proposes that political extremism (i.e., ideological strength) at the left and right also matters for a range of important variables. The main argument is that feelings of distress prompt a desire for epistemic clarity, which increases the appeal of the clear-cut answers that politically extreme movements provide for pressing societal problems. The chapter subsequently proposes that political extremism in most cases is a problem for societies. We review evidence that politically extreme beliefs are associated with overconfidence in the correctness of one’s beliefs and knowledge about the world, an increased susceptibility to beliefs that are not supported by science or reason, and intolerance of competing belief systems or groups perceived as ideologically different. We conclude by articulating a few limitations and research directions in this research domain.

Keywords

Political extremismDistressEpistemic clarityoverconfidenceunfounded beliefsintolerance
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology , pp. 414 - 428
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

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