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5 - Pragmatic Arguments for Theism

from Part I - Faith and Rationality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2023

By
Elizabeth Jackson
Edited by
Jonathan Fuqua ,
John Greco  and
Tyler McNabb
Jonathan Fuqua
Affiliation:
Conception Seminary College, Missouri
John Greco
Affiliation:
Georgetown University, Washington DC
Tyler McNabb
Affiliation:
Saint Francis University, Pennsylvania
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Summary

Traditional theistic arguments conclude that God exists. Pragmatic theistic arguments, by contrast, conclude that you ought to believe in God. The two most famous pragmatic theistic arguments are put forth by Blaise Pascal (1662) and William James (1896). Pragmatic arguments for theism can be summarized as follows: believing in God has significant benefits, and these benefits are not available for the unbeliever. Thus, you should believe in, or “wager on,” God. This chapter distinguishes between various kinds of theistic wagers, including finite vs. infinite wagers, premortem vs. postmortem wagers, and doxastic vs. acceptance wagers. Then, it turns to the epistemic–pragmatic distinction and discusses the nuances of James’ argument, and how views like epistemic permissivism and epistemic consequentialism provide unique “hybrid” wagers. Finally, it covers outstanding objections and responses.

Keywords

Pascal’s WagerWilliam JamesTheistic BeliefPragmatic ReasonsInfinite ValueRationalityEpistemic PermissivismDecision TheoryHeaven and HellEvidence
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology , pp. 70 - 82
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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