Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- In Memoriam
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Asia
- Part II Australia and North America
- Part III Europe
- Part IV Comparative Perspectives
- 21 Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Voting in a Comparative Perspective
- 22 Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Voting in Action: The Comparative Perspective
- 23 Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Index
22 - Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Voting in Action: The Comparative Perspective
from Part IV - Comparative Perspectives
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 September 2022
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- In Memoriam
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Asia
- Part II Australia and North America
- Part III Europe
- Part IV Comparative Perspectives
- 21 Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Voting in a Comparative Perspective
- 22 Shareholder Engagement and Corporate Voting in Action: The Comparative Perspective
- 23 Shareholder Engagement and Voting
- Index
Summary
This chapter addresses the voting and other engagement practices in the 19 jurisdictions in this Handbook on Shareholder Engagement and Voting. First, it is shown that shareholder participation in AGMs differs significantly between countries, which is related to differences in ownership structures, ownership concentration, the powers of the general meeting of shareholders and the other means shareholders have for voicing their interests. Similarly, the powers of the general meeting of shareholders differ substantially between the different countries. Common shareholder voting items are relatively few but include some kind of vote on board nominees and some say over pay although in some countries compensation is an exclusive business of the board of directors. Shareholder proposals seem to be more common in common law countries where it is relatively easy to table a proposal. Questioning the board at general meetings is a widespread practice of especially small shareholders, contrary to many other shareholder engagement techniques commonly used by (institutional) investors. The wide diversity of engagement practices shows that an optimal and efficient division of powers between shareholders and board has not yet been found.
Keywords
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- Information
- The Cambridge Handbook of Shareholder Engagement and Voting , pp. 501 - 536Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022